Portal de Periódicos da CAPES

Security in the Black Sea region: back to Realpolitik ? 1

2008; Routledge; Volume: 8; Issue: 2 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1080/14683850802117724

1743-9639

James Sherr,

Security, Politics, and Digital Transformation

Abstract Not for the first time, the Black Sea region finds itself between zones of geopolitics and competing geopolitical dogmas. Yet within only a few years, the framework has appreciably changed. The impact of 9/11 and, still more recently, the recovery of Russia's confidence make it essential for the states of the region to recalculate the art of the possible and the methods of realizing it. This is also true for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU). These entities still have a largely post‐Cold War and post‐modern approach to a region that is, once again, becoming a zone of Realpolitik. It is essential that this challenge be understood with perspective and adapted to in a way that does not jettison the achievements of the 1990s and the thinking that underpinned them. Keywords: RussiaEUNATOUkraineenergy Notes 1. The views expressed in this paper are entirely and solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect official thinking and policy either of Her Majesty's Government or the Ministry of Defence. 2. At a symposium in Kyiv, 4–6 July 2001, titled 'The World in the 21st Century: Cooperation, Partnership and Dialogue,' the Assistant Chief of Staff, EU Military Staff, Brigadier Jean‐Luc Lagadec affirmed that ESDP is designed to benefit NATO as much as the EU. A similar stance was taken by General Joachim Spiering, former NATO Commander‐in‐Chief North, who added that 'the US will remain the most important European power for years to come'. 3. At a closed address on 27 April 1994, excerpted (and partially paraphrased) by ITAR‐TASS. 4. Vyacheslav Kostikov, Trud, 22 February 1994. Kostikov had only just retired as Yeltsin's press secretary. He also stated that 'Russian interests will no longer dissolve in the interests of European diplomacy', adding for good measure that 'Russia increasingly sees itself as a Great Power, and it has started saying this loudly'. 5. Hence the verdict of Krasnaya Zvezda during the 1999 Kosovo conflict (27 March 1999): 'Today they are bombing Yugoslavia, but are aiming at Russia'. The article goes on to say, 'tomorrow they will bomb Russia because of Chechnya, Ukraine because of Crimea, Moldova because of Transdnestria and Georgia because of Abkhazia and South Ossetia'. Along similar lines, Lieutenant General Leonid Ivashov, Head of the MOD's International Cooperation Directorate, told Nezavisimoe Televedenie [Independent TV] (NTV), '[i]f the world community swallows this large‐scale aggression, this barbarity, then it is today difficult to say who will be next, but there will be a state that is going to be next in line without fail'. 6. The theme emerged in conciliatory format as early as September 1992 in the first MFA report on the so‐called 'near abroad'. Deputy Foreign Minister, Fedor Shelov‐Kovedyayev, 'Strategy and Tactics of Russian Foreign Policy in the New Abroad' [Strategiya i taktika vneshney politiki Rossii v novom zarubezh'ye] (September Citation1992). In a somewhat harder vein, the Foreign Ministry's December 1992 'Concepts' document stipulated the interest of 'the leading democratic states' in the 'provision of stability' on the former Soviet 'geopolitical space' and warned that this would depend 'on our ability to uphold with conviction, and in extreme cases with the use of means of force, the principles of international law, including human rights, and to achieve firm good neighbourliness', see Foreign Policy Concepts of the Russian Federation [Kontseptsiya Vneshney Politiki Rossiyskoy Federatsii], December 1992. In February 1993, Yeltsin called upon the UN to 'grant Russia special powers as guarantor of peace and stability'. By late 2000, Andrey Fedorov, former First Deputy Foreign Minister, stated: '[T]oday we are speaking more or less openly now about our zones of interests. In one way or another we are confirming that the post‐Soviet territory is such a zone… In Yeltsin's time we were trying to wrap this in a nice paper. Now we are saying it more directly: this is our territory, our sphere of interest.' 7. Again, see endnote 6. Or, as another self‐described liberal put it at the same time, 'Russian domination [in the former USSR] is an inevitability. The whole question is at what price. One cannot become a great power using the methods of the Tsarist or Communist regimes…We need to learn civilized and neo‐colonialist ways of influencing others… The biological uniformity – the strong subordinate the weak – is still valid in world politics with the inexorability of universal gravitational laws'. (Shmelev Citation1992). 8. In a similar vein, the Foreign Ministry's December 1992 'Concepts' document stipulated the interest of 'the leading democratic states' in the 'provision of stability' on the former Soviet 'geopolitical space', and warned that this would depend 'on our ability to uphold with conviction, and in extreme cases with the use of means of force, the principles of international law, including human rights, and to achieve firm good neighbourliness'; see Foreign Policy Concepts of the Russian Federation [Kontseptsiya Vneshney Politiki Rossiyskoy Federatsii], December 1992 (emphasis added). 9. Sergei Ivanov (then Secretary of the Russian Federation Security Council) outlining the Russian Federation's new 'Concepts of Foreign Policy', approved by the President on 28 June 2000. 10. 'The CIS Project – The New Priority of Russian Foreign Policy?' ['"Proyekt SNG"– noviy prioritet rossiyskoy vneshney politiki?'], February 2004. 11. See Energy Strategy of Russia to 2020 [Energeticheskaya strategiya rossii na period do 2020]. Decree of the Government of the Russian Federation no. 1234‐g, (Moscow, 28 August 2003). 12. See the text of Alexei Miller's address to EU ambassadors, 18 April 2006, Moscow (page 1). [Rasshirovka viystupleniya Predsedatelya Pravleniya OAO Alekseya Millera na vstreche s poslami stran Evropeyskogo Soiuza v rezidentsii posla Avstrii]. 13. '…but it's the daughter‐in‐law's fault…' […a nevistka vinna…], cited in Yeremenko Citation2007. Since 2001, Gazprom's capitalization has risen 25 times. Its sights are now set on becoming a $1000 billion company, almost four times its size today ($270 billion). 14. See Daly, Citation2007. 15. See Viktor Cherkesov, 'We cannot allow warriors to become traders' [Nel'zya dopustit', chtobiy voiniy prevratilis' v torgovtsev'], Kommersant (9 October 2007). 16. See Ekho Moskviy, 'Sveta's Circle' [V kruge Sveta], 12 February 2008. 17. Maxim Litvinov's comment to Averell Harriman at the end of 1945 is once again pertinent. Asked 'What can my government possibly do to allay suspicions of our intentions?', Litvinov instantly replied, 'nothing!'.