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Intentionality: Some Lessons from the History of the Problem from Brentano to the Present

2013; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 21; Issue: 3 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1080/09672559.2013.812605

1466-4542

Dermot Moran,

Embodied and Extended Cognition

Abstract Abstract Intentionality ('directedness', 'aboutness') is both a central topic in contemporary philosophy of mind, phenomenology and the cognitive sciences, and one of the themes with which both analytic and Continental philosophers have separately engaged starting from Brentano and Edmund Husserl's ground-breaking Logical Investigations (1901) through Roderick M. Chisholm, Daniel C. Dennett's The Intentional Stance, John Searle's Intentionality, to the recent work of Tim Crane, Robert Brandom, Shaun Gallagher and Dan Zahavi, among many others. In this paper, I shall review recent discussions of intentionality, including some recent explorations of the history of the concept (paying particular attention to Anselm), and suggest some ways the phenomenological approach of Husserl and Heidegger can still offer insights for contemporary philosophy of mind and consciousness. Keywords: intentionalityphenomenologyBrentanoHusserlAnselmHeideggerSearleDennett Acknowledgements An earlier version of this paper was delivered at the workshop on Intentionality, held at the Royal Irish Academy, Dublin, on 4–5 February 2010, as part of the Irish Research Council sponsored project 'The Phenomenology of Consciousness and Subjectivity' (2010–12). I want to thank the IRCHSS, the School of Philosophy, UCD, the Dept. of Philosophy Trinity College Dublin, and the Embassy of France in Ireland, for their support. In particular, I would like to thank Rasmus Thybo Jensen, Lilian Alweiss, Tim Crane, Maeve Cooke, and Peter Simons, for their comments. This research is also supported by the ARC Discovery Grant, 'Judgment, Responsibility and the Life-world'. Notes 1 See Dermot Moran, 'A Case for Pluralism: The Problem of Intentionality', pp. 19–32. See also G. Forrai and G. Kampis, eds, Intentionality: Past and Future; Alessandro Salice, ed., Intentionality. Historical and Systematic Perspectives; and Philip J. Bartok, 'Brentano's Intentionality Thesis: Beyond the Analytic and Phenomenological Readings'. 2 E. Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen. Erster Band: Prolegomena zur reinen Logik. Text der 1. und der 2. Auflage, hrsg. E. Holenstein, Husserliana vol. 18 (1975) and Logische Untersuchungen. Zweiter Band: Untersuchungen zur Phänomenologie und Theorie der Erkenntnis, in zwei Bänden, Husserliana 19(1) and 19(2), hrsg. Ursula Panzer (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1984), trans. John Findlay, Logical Investigations, 2 vols., ed. with a New Introduction by Dermot Moran and New Preface by Michael Dummett (London & New York: Routledge, 2001). Hereafter 'LU' followed by the Investigation number, paragraph number and pagination of English translation (vol. 1 = I; vol. 2 = II), followed by Husserliana volume and page number. 3 For a comparison between Searle and Husserl on intentionality, see Ronald McIntyre, 'Searle on Intentionality', Inquiry 27 (1984): 468–83. 4 See Tim Crane, 'Intentional Objects'; and 'What is the Problem of Non-Existence?'. 5 See Shaun Gallagher and Dan Zahavi, The Phenomenological Mind. For an excellent overview, see Thomas Szanto, Bewusstsein, Intentionalität und mentale Repräsentation. Husserl und die analytische Philosophie des Geistes. 6 See J. B. Watson, 'Psychology as the Behaviorist Views It'; Rudolf Carnap, 'Psychology in Physical Language'; and B. F. Skinner, 'Behaviourism, Skinner On'. See also Laurence D. Smith, Behaviorism and Logical Positivism: A Reassessment of the Alliance, and William Lyons, Approaches to Intentionality. 7 On the interrelations between intentionality and phenomenology, see Terence Horgan and J. Tienson, 'The Intentionality of Phenomenology and the Phenomenology of Intentionality'. The claim explored here is that phenomenal mental states (e.g., sensory-experiential states such as color-experiences, itches, and smells) have intentional content that is inseparable from their phenomenal character, and also that intentional mental states (e.g., cognitive states such as beliefs and desires), when conscious, have phenomenal character that is inseparable from their intentional content. 8 See Charles Siewert, The Significance of Consciousness. 9 See Dan Zahavi, Subjectivity and Selfhood. 10 See, for instance, Charles Siewert, 'Subjectivity and Selfhood: Investigating the First-person Perspective', Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77(3) (2008): 840–43; and K. Farkas, The Subject's Point of View, who discusses privileged self-knowledge. 11 See Shaun Gallagher, How the Body Shapes the Mind; Francisco Varela, Evan Thompson, and Eleanor Rosch, eds, The Embodied Mind; Evan Thompson and Francisco Varela, Lived Body: Why the Mind is not in the Head; and Andy Clark, Supersizing the Mind. Embodiment, Action, and Cognitive Extension. 12 Lucy O'Brien, Self-Knowing Agents; Terry Horgan and John Tienson, 'The Phenomenology of Embodied Agency', and Terence E. Horgan, John L. Tienson and George Graham, 'The Phenomenology of First-Person Agency'. 13 See G. Rizzolatti and C. Sinigaglia, Mirrors in the Brain: How our Minds Share Actions and Emotions, and A. Meltzoff and R. Brooks, '"Like Me" as a Building Block for Understanding Other Minds: Bodily Acts, Attention, and Intention'; and Dan Zahavi, 'Beyond Empathy. Phenomenological Approaches to Intersubjectivity'. 14 On collective intentionality and social constitution, see, inter alia, Eerik Lagerspetz, Heikki Ikaheimo, and Jussi Kotkavirta, eds, On the Nature of Social and Institutional Reality; John R. Searle, The Construction of Social Reality; Raimo Tuomela, The Philosophy of Social Practices (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003) and Philosophy of Sociality: The Shared Point of View; Heikki Ikaheimo and Arto Laitinen, Recognition and Social Ontology; and Hans Bernhard Schmid, Plural Actions. The classic study is Alfred Schutz, 'Scheler's Theory of Intersubjectivity and the General Thesis of the Alter Ego'. On cultural objects, see Roman Ingarden's conception of 'purely intentional objects' in his The Ontology of the Work of Art, translated by Raymond Meyer with John T. Goldthwait, and Amie L. Thomasson, Fiction and Metaphysics. 15 See J. Schear, Mind, Reason and Being-in-the-World. The McDowell-Dreyfus Debate; Martin Endress, George Psathas and Hisashi Nasu, eds, Explorations of the Life-World. Continuing Dialogues with Alfred Schutz; and David Hyder and Hans-Jörg Rheinberger, eds, Science and the Life-World: Essays on Husserl's 'Crisis of European Sciences'. 16 On the evolution of the concept of intention, see Elisabeth Baumgartner, Intentionalität. Begriffsgeschichte und Begriffsanwendung in der Psychologie, and P. Engelhardt, 'Intentio'. 17 G. E. M. Anscombe, Intention, and 'The Intentionality of Sensation: A Grammatical Feature', where she distinguishes between 'material' and 'intentional' objects of perception. Anscombe tends to see the intentional object as semantically and linguistically constituted and so belongs to the linguistic turn in the discussion of intentionality, independently of Chisholm. For a comparison between Anscombe and Chisholm, see William Lycan, 'On "Intentionality" and the Psychological'. 18 See Roderick Chisholm, 'Sentences about Believing'; idem, Perceiving: A Philosophical Study and 'Intentionality and the Mental'. 19 See Martin Davies, 'Consciousness and the Varieties of Aboutness'. 20 For a useful overview of the problem of representation, see David Pitt, 'Mental Representation'. See also Kim Sterelny, The Representational Theory of Mind. An Introduction. 21 Edmund Husserl refers to Kant's 1772 letter to Herz in his Thing and Space lectures of 1907, see E. Husserl, Ding und Raum, Vorlesungen 1907, ed. U. Claesges, Husserlianaa 16, p. 139; trans. R. Rojcewicz, Thing and Space: Lectures of 1907, Husserl Collected Works VII, p. 117. 22 Brandom, Tales of the Mighty Dead, p. 23. 23 For an overview of different positions, see John Haugeland, 'The Intentionality All Stars'; and Dermot Moran, '"Our Germans are Better Than Their Germans": Continental and Analytic Approaches to Intentionality Reconsidered'. 24 See John J. Drummond, 'Intentionality without Representationalism'. Of course, it all depends on how 'representationalism' is defined but phenomenologists tend to be suspicious of representationalist language as suggesting something 'in the head' that is directly apprehended. On the other hand, Tim Crane's version of represesentationalism has very much in common with Husserlian 'anti-representationalism'.The very idea that perception has content need not itself imply commitment to an indirect theory of perception. Thus Alva Noë says that perception has representational content while promoting a Husserlian-style analysis in his Perception in Action. 25 See Kevin Mulligan, 'How Perception Fixes Reference' and 'Perception'. 26 The title of Brentano's University of Vienna lecture course for 1888–9 was 'descriptive psychology or descriptive phenomenology' (Deskriptive Psychologie oder beschreibende Phänomenologie), see Franz Brentano, Descriptive Psychology, trans. and ed. Benito Müller. 27 With regard to medieval discussions of intentionality, much can be learned from Leen Spruit's two-volume study, Species intelligibilis: From Perception to Knowledge; and Dominik Perler, Theorien der Intentionalität im Mittelalter. 28 See Peter Simons, 'Prolegomenon to an Adequate Theory of Intentionality (Natural or Otherwise)', p. 12. 29 See Alexius Meinong, 'The Theory of Objects'. See also Arkadiusz Chrudzimski, Gegenstandstheorie und Theorie der Intentionalität bei Alexius Meinong. 30 See John R. Searle, Intentionality, op. cit., p. 26. 31 See U. Kriegel, 'Is Intentionality Dependent upon Consciousness?'; and Charles P. Siewert, The Significance of Consciousness. 32 Husserl in the Logical Investigations (and in Ideas I), for instance, regarded sensations as non-intentional components in intentional states. 33 Terence Horgan and J. Tienson, 'The Intentionality of Phenomenology and the Phenomenology of Intentionality'; and David Bourget, 'Consciousness is Underived Intentionality'. 34 See D. W. Hamlyn, 'Unconscious Intentions'. 35 Martin Heidegger for instance, claims in Being and Time that anxiety differs from fear in having nothing as its intentional object – although more precisely it is one's whole being-in-the-world which is the intentional object. See also Julien Deonna, Raffaele Rodogno, and Fabrice Teroni, In Defense of Shame: The Faces of an Emotion, and Julien Deonna and Fabrice Teroni, The Emotions: A Philosophical Introduction. See also B. J. Fish, 'Emotions, Moods and Intentionality'. Shaun Gallagher and Dan Zahavi defend the intentionality of moods in their The Phenomenological Mind, op. cit., 'moods are not without a reference to the world', but distinguish between a narrower 'object-intentionality' and a broader openness to the world. 36 See, for example, Roy W. Perrett, 'Intentionality and Self-Awareness'. 37 See Uriah Kriegel, 'The Dispensability of (Merely) Intentional Objects'. Kriegel proposes to distinguish between two kinds of adverbialism: inferentialist adverbialism and phenomenological adverbialism. According to inferentialist adverbialism, on his account, thinking something is a matter of being in a mental state that has that something in an inferential or functional role (he sees Robert Brandom and Hartry Field as advocates of versions of this position). According to phenomenological adverbialism, thinking something is a matter of being in a mental state that has that something's phenomenal character. 38 See Robert Brandom, Tales of the Mighty Dead: Historical Essays in the Metaphysics of Intentionality, who claims his approach is, broadly speaking, functionalist, inferentialist, holist, normative, and social pragmatist. 39 The image comes from Colin McGinn, The Problem of Consiousness, p. 37. 40 Uriah Kriegel evaluates similar objections against his adverbialism in his The Sources of Intentionality, see esp. pp. 138–88. 41 See Ben Blumson, 'Images, Intentionality and Inexistence'. 42 See Dermot Moran, 'The Inaugural Address: Brentano's Thesis', Inaugural Address to the Joint Session of the Aristotelian Society and the Mind Association; see also Mauro Antonelli, Seiendes, Bewusstsein, Intentionalität im Frühwerk von Franz Brentano, and A. Chrudzminski, Intentionalitätstheorie beim frühen Brentano. 43 See Barry Smith, Austrian Philosophy. The Legacy of Franz Brentano, 37–63. 44 See Dermot Moran, '"Let's Look at it Objectively": Why Phenomenology Cannot be Naturalized' and 'Husserl's Transcendental Philosophy and the Critique of Naturalism'. 45 F. Brentano, Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1973) 3 Vols, trans. A. C. Rancurello, D. B. Terrell, and L. L. McAlister, Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, 2nd ed. with New Introduction by Peter Simons (London: Routledge, 1995). Hereafter 'PES' followed by the pagination of English translation. 46 PES, p. 88; The German is: "Jedes psychische Phänomen ist durch das charakterisiert, was die Scholastiker des Mittelalters die intentionale (auch wohl mentale) Inexistenz eines Gegenstandes genannt haben, und was wir, obwohl mit nicht ganz unzweideutigen Ausdrücken, die Beziehung auf einen Inhalt, die Richtung auf ein Objekt (worunter hier nicht eine Realität zu verstehen ist), oder die immanente Gegenständlichkeit nennen würden. Jedes enthält etwas als Objekt in sich, obwohl nicht jedes in gleicher Weise. In der Vorstellung ist etwas vorgestellt, in dem Urteile ist etwas anerkannt oder verworfen, in der Liebe geliebt, in dem Hasse gehaßt, in dem Begehren begehrt usw.", Brentano, Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt, § 5, op. cit., pp. 124–5. 47 Liliana Albertazzi, Immanent Realism: An Introduction to Franz Brentano, p. 110. 48 See Dale Jacquette, 'Brentano's Concept of Intentionality', and Frederick Kroon, 'Intentional Objects, Pretence, and the Quasi-relational Nature of Mental Phenomena – A New Look at Brentano on Intentionality', in this Special Issue. 49 See Tim Crane, 'Brentano's Concept of Intentional Inexistence'. 50 See Liliana Albertazzi, M. Libardi, and R. Poli (eds) The School of Franz Brentano, and Robin D. Rollinger, Austrian Phenomenology: Brentano, Meinong, Husserl, and Others on Mind and Object. 51 Kazimir Twardowski, Zur Lehre vom Inhalt und Gegenstand der Vorstellungen. Eine psychologische Untersuchung, trans. Robert Grossmann, On the Content and Object of Presentations. A Psychological Investigation, p. 1. 52 See Reinhardt Grossmann, 'Meinong's Doctrine of the Aussersein of the Pure Object'. These objects (e.g. golden mountains, round squares) do not exist but have properties and can be parts of states of affairs. See also Dale Jacquette, 'Meinong's Doctrine of Implexive Being'. 53 See Allesandro Salice, Urteile und Sachverthalte. Ein Vergleich zwischen Alexius Meinong und Adolf Reinach. 54 See Alexius Meinong, On Assumptions, trans. J. Heanue, and On Emotional Presentation, ed. and trans. Marie-Luise Schubert-Kalsi. 55 Roderick M. Chisholm, 'Intentionality'. 56 On Plato see David Bostock 'Plato on "Is Not" (Sophist 254–9)'. For recent studies, see Graham Priest, Towards Non-Being. The Logic and Metaphysics of Intentionality; Dale Jacquette, Meinongian Logic: The Semantics of Existence and Nonexistence; and Jocelyn Benoist, Représentations sans objet. Aux origines de la phénoménologie et de la philosophie analytique. 57 See Myles Burnyeat, 'Is an Aristotelian Philosophy of Mind still Credible (a draft)'. 58 See Richard Sorabji, 'Intentionality and Physiological Processes: Aristotle's Theory of Sense Perception', and 'From Aristotle to Brentano: The Development of the Concept of Intentionality'. 59 Victor Caston, 'Aristotle and the Problem of Intentionality'. 60 See Jacques Brunschwig, 'Sur une façon stoicienne de ne pas être'. Dominik Perler has done invaluable work in relation to the classical and medieval history of intentionality, see Perler (ed.) Ancient and Medieval Theories of Intentionality, and the review by Lloyd P. Gerson, 'Ancient and Medieval Theories of Intentionality'. 61 See Victor Caston, 'Connecting Traditions: Augustine and the Greeks on Intentionality'. Caston makes the point that the history of intentionality has too often focused on the occurrence of the word 'intention', whereas the problem can be discussed without invoking the term 'intention' and this is particularly the case in ancient Greek discussions. 62 See Richard Sorabji, 'From Aristotle to Brentano: The Development of the Concept of Intentionality'; but see also David Wirmer, 'Der Begriff der Intention und seine erkenntnistheoretische Funktion in den De-anima-Kommentaren des Averroes'. 63 Kwame Gyeke, 'The Terms "Prima Intentio" and "Secunda Intentio" in Arabic Logic'; and Christian Knudsen, 'Intentions and Impositions'. See also Deborah L. Black, 'Intentionality in Medieval Arabic Philosophy', Later Medieval Perspectives on Intentionality, Special Issue, Quaestio vol. 10 (2010): 65–81, and 'Averroes on Spirituality and Intentionality in Sense Perception', in Peter Adamson (ed.) In the Age of Averroes: Arabic Thought at the End of the Classical Period (London: Warburg Institute, 2011): 159–74. 64 See, in this issue, Gyula Klima, 'Three Myths of Intentionality vs. Some Medieval Philosophers', International Journal of Philosophical Studies; and G. Klima, 'Tradition and Innovation in Medieval Theories of Representation', in G. Klima and A. Hall (eds) Mental Representation, Proceedings of the Society for Medieval Logic and Metaphysics, Vol. 4 (Cambridge: Cambridge Scholars, 2011), 7–16. 65 Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on Aristotle's De Anima, trans. Kenelm Foster, O. P. and Sylvester Humphries: 'Sensus recipit formam sine materia, quia alterius modi esse habet forma in sensu, et in re sensibili. Nam in re sensibili habet esse naturale, in sensu autem habet esse intentionale et spirituale' Aquinas, Sentencia de anima, lib. 2, l. 24, n. 3. See also Gyula Klima, 'Intentional Transfer in Averroes, Indifference of Nature in Avicenna, and the Representationalism of Aquinas'; and Myles Burnyeat, 'Aquinas on "Spiritual Change" in Perception'. Thomas allows that in some senses (e.g., touch) there is a physical transfer of the form, but in the case of sight it is 'spiritual'. 66 See F. Brentano, Vom Dasein Gottes, ed. Alfred Kastil. 67 See Jasper Hopkins, A New, Interpretative Translation of St. Anselm's Monologion and Proslogion and St. Anselm's Proslogion, trans. and intro. by M. J. Charlesworth. 68 St Anselm, St. Anselm's Proslogion, trans. Charlesworth, pp. 119–21. The Latin reads: 'Aliter enim cogitator res cum vox eam significans cogitator, aliter cum id ipsum quod res est intelligitur'. 69 Gaunilo, 'A Reply on Behalf of the Fool', St. Anselm's Proslogion, trans. Charlesworth, pp. 160–61. 70 Anselm, 'The Author's Reply to Gaunilo', ch. II, St. Anselm's Proslogion, trans. Charlesworth, pp. 172–5. 71 See Lilli Alanen, 'Sensory Ideas, Objective Reality and Material Falsity'; Dan Kaufman, 'Descartes on the Objective Reality of Materially False Ideas'; and Lionel Shapiro, 'Objective Being and "Ofness" in Descartes'. 72 For the medieval discussion, see Alain de Libera, La référence vide. Théories de la proposition. 73 See Linda L. McAlister, 'Chisholm and Brentano on Intentionality'. 74 Gustav Bergmann, 'Intentionality'. On Bergmann, see Jay Rosenberg, 'Phenomenological Ontology Revisited: A Bergmannian Retrospective'. 75 William Van Orman Quine, Word and Object. 76 Ibid., p. 220. 77 Ibid., p. 221. 78 Ibid. 79 Ibid. 80 For a discussion of the import of Quine's rejection of indirect quotation, see Murray Murphey, The Development of Quine's Philosophy, 119ff. See also David Woodruff Smith, 'How to Husserl a Quine – and a Heidegger Too'. 81 Dennett was an undergraduate at Harvard and a graduate student at Oxford. He summarises his intellectual evolution as follows: 'Quine's message stuck with me, and all Ryle could do is add his own to it', see his review of Thomas Nagel, Other Minds, in Journal of Philosophy 93(8) (August 1996): 425–28. 82 Dennett cites this remark in his review of Thomas Nagel, Other Minds, in Journal of Philosophy, op. cit. 83 Daniel C. Dennett, Content and Consciousness. 84 Searle, Intentionality, p. 6. Searle thinks that intentional attitudes can have objects as part of their representational content, e.g., 'Love (Sally)'. He acknowledges that most of his discussion in Intentionality is about propositional content but not all 'Intentional states have the an entire proposition as intentional content', see ibid., p. 7. Searle agrees with Husserl that perception can have as its object an individual object or property. 85 Searle follows Russell and the British tradition for using the term 'proposition' to mean the state-of-affairs expressed by the linguistically expressed or thought 'sentence', see Intentionality, p. 6. 86 Searle, Intentionality, p. 22. 87 See Dennett, Intentional Stance, p. 288. 88 John R. Searle, 'The Mystery of Consciousness', and 'The Mystery of Consciousness, Part II'. 89 See Dennett, Intentional Stance, p. 288. 90 John R. Searle, The Rediscovery of the Mind, p. 1. 91 Ibid., p. 87. 92 Daniel C. Dennett, 'Intentional Systems'. 93 Dennett, Kinds of Minds. Towards an Understanding of Consciousness, p. 27. 94 Daniel C. Dennett, 'True Believers: The Intentional Strategy and Why it Works'. 95 Daniel C. Dennett, 'Real Patterns'. 96 See John R. Searle, The Rediscovery of the Mind and Daniel C. Dennett, Darwin's Dangerous Idea. Evolution and the Meanings of Life. 97 See Daniel C. Dennett, The Intentional Stance, p. 7. 98 See John R. Searle, 'Foreword', p. 11. 99 See Daniel C. Dennett, 'Kinds of Things – Towards a Bestiary of the Manifest Image', p. 103. 100 It is not possible to enter into the debate here as to whether Searle and Dennett are both non-reductive, evolutionary naturalists of broadly similar kind (Searle calls himself a 'biological naturalist' – consciousness is a biological process, yet defends subjective states as part of objective nature; whereas Dennett is a scientific naturalist who defends our everyday way of interpreting the world in terms of the intentional stance). I maintain, on the other hand, that phenomenology regards 'nature' and the scientific outlook as dependent on the intentional way of understanding humans and the world. For a debate about whether phenomenology can be naturalised, see Dan Zahavi 'Naturalized Phenomenology: A Desideratum or a Category Mistake', in Havi Karel and Darian Meacham (eds) Philosophy and Naturalism, Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 72 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012): 23–42, and Dermot Moran, '"Let's Look at it Objectively": Why Phenomenology Cannot be Naturalized', ibid., pp. 89–115. 101 Daniel C. Dennett, 'The Myth of Original Intentionality', in K. A. Said et al. (eds) Modelling the Mind (Oxford: Clarendon, 1990). 102 Ibid., p. 59. 103 Dennett, Intentional Stance, p. 310. 104 Ibid, p. 306. 105 Daniel Dennett, 'Heterophenomenology Reconsidered'; and 'Heterophenomenology'. 106 See Dennett, 'Kinds of Things'. 107 See John R. Searle, 'The Phenomenological Illusion'. 108 Although some phenomenologists believe it is compatible with naturalism, see Francisco J. Varela, 'The Naturalization of Phenomenology as the Transcendence of Nature. Searching for Generative Mutual Constraints'; J.-M. Roy, J Petitot, B. Pachoud, and F. J. Varela, 'Beyond the Gap: An Introduction to Naturalizing Phenomenology'; and Dan Zahavi, 'Naturalizing Phenomenology'. 109 See Lilian Alweiss, 'Beyond Existence and Non-Existence', in this Special Issue. 110 M. Heidegger, Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie, GA Band 24 (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1989), trans. A. Hofstadter, Basic Problems of Phenomenology (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982), p. 61. Hereafter 'BP' followed by the page number of the English translation and GA volume and page number of German original. The reference here is: BP, p. 61; GA 24 88. 111 Husserl's letter to Marvin Farber, 18 June 1937, translated in Kah Kyung Cho, 'Phenomenology as Cooperative Task: Husserl-Farber Correspondence during 1936–37'. For Husserl's complex adoption and critique of Brentano, see Dermot Moran, 'Husserl's Critique of Brentano in the Logical Investigations'; Karl Schuhmann, 'Intentionalität und intentionaler Gegenstand beim frühen Husserl'; and Peter Varga, 'Brentano's Influence on Husserl's Early Theory of Intentionality'. Varga makes the point that the early Husserl tends to replace the concept of intentional relation with the part-whole relation. 112 E. Husserl, Formale und transzendentale Logik. Versuch einer Kritik der logischen Vernunft. Mit ergänzenden Texten, hrsg. Paul Janssen, Hua 17, § 97, p. 251; trans. D. Cairns, Formal and Transcendental Logic, p. 245. 113 For Husserl's draft review of Twardowski, see E. Husserl, Early Writings in the Philosophy of Logic and Mathematics, trans. Dallas Willard, pp. 388–95; Hua 22: 349–56. For Husserl's essay on 'Intentional Objects' see Early Writings, pp. 345-87; Hua 22: 303–48. 114 Husserl acknowledged that he was deeply influenced by Bernard Bolzano's distinction between 'objective' and 'subjective' presentations (Vorstellungen) as he read it in his Wissenschaftslehre, abridged and trans. by Rolf George as Theory of Science. 115 E. Husserl, Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie. Erstes Buch: Allgemeine Einführung in die reine Phänomenologie 1, hrsg. K. Schuhmann, Hua III/1 (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1977), trans. F. Kersten as Ideas pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy, First Book (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1983). Hereafter 'Ideas I' followed by the page number of the English translation and the Husserliana (abbreviated to 'Hua') volume and page number. 116 See J. N. Mohanty, Husserl and Frege, and Claire Ortiz Hill and Guillermo Rosado Haddock, Husserl or Frege? Meaning, Objectivity and Mathematics. 117 See E. Husserl, Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale Phänomenologie, ed. W. Biemel, Hua VI, trans. David Carr, The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology. An Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy, § 48, p. 166n; Hua VI 169n1. 118 LU V § 9, II, p. 353 n.1; Hua 19(1) 378n; LU V § 11. 119 LU VI Appendix, II, p. 340; Hua 19(2) 760. 120 LU V § 11, II, p. 98; Hua 19(1) 371. 121 Husserl makes the same distinction in Ideas I §36: intentionality is neither a real relation with an existent object nor a psychological relation. 122 LU V § 11, II, p. 99; Hua 19(1) 373. 123 For a recent discussion, see Walter Hopp, 'Husserl on Sensation, Perception, and Interpretation'. 124 LU V § 14, II, p. 104; Hua 19(1) 396. Husserl adds in the Second Edition: 'We must note, further, that the object's real being [wirkliches Sein] or non-being is irrelevant to the true essence of the perceptual experience' (LU V § 14, II, p. 104; Hua 19(1) 396). 125 LU V § 14, II, p. 105; Hua 19(1) 399. 126 One of the problems with Husserl's account, especially of the Auffassungssinn, is that all the 'meaning-loading', as it were, is on the side of the subject. Sensations, for instance, are 'bearers of interpretation' or 'bases of interpretation' (Fundamente der Auffassung, Hua 19(1) 399). How the interpreting of 'raw feels' takes place is left unclear. The later account of noema attempts to overcome this problem of an uninterpreted given as prior to the meaningful encounter in the perception itself. Of course, even in Ideas I where the noema account is first publicly presented, there is still an element of 'matter' (now called 'hyle') but these are as it were abstract parts of the concrete experience of the object. Husserl's account of the sensory content of experience involves recognizing various stratified layers of constitution right down to the level of non-sensational time-consciousness, but Aron Gurwitsch, for instance, prefers to understand sensational contents as products of the phenomenological method of analysis or 'unbuilding' (Abbau) rather than as being encountered directly. See Aron Gurwitsch, The Field of Consciousness. 127 LU II § 23, I, p. 384–5; Hua 19(1) 168–9. 128 For further discussion of Husserl's critique of Brentano's account of intentionality, see Dermot Moran, 'Heidegger's Critique of Husserl's and Brentano's Accounts of Intentionality'. 129 LU V § 31. 130 Meinong made a similar distinction in his On Assumptions. 131 LU VI Appendix, II, p. 346; Hua 19/2 240. 132 LU VI, App., II, p. 341; Hua 19/2 232. 133 LU VI App. II, p. 346; Hua 19/2 240. 134 Ideas I Hua 3(1) 181. 135 See Dagfinn Føllesdal, 'Husserl's Notion of Noema'; and John J. Drummond, Husserlian Intentionality and Non-Foundational Realism. Noema and Object; and 'An Abstract Consideration: De-ontologizing the Noema'. 136 Ideas I, Hua 3(1) 182. 137 In this chapter of Ideas I, Husserl unfortunately continues to describe the noema both as a 'content' and as 'immanent' in the flow of consciousness. It is not, however, a real part of the Erlebnis; it is a purely phenomenological concept but Husserl gives us no clearer account of what this might mean. 138 Ideas I § 89, 216; Hua 3(1) 184. 139 Of course, to be more precise, it belongs to the eidos of an apple tree that an apple tree is something that can be chopped up and burnt. 140 See, inter alia, Rudolf Bernet,'Husserls Begriff des Noema', Husserl-Ausgabe und Husserl-Forschung, ed. Samuel Ijsseling. Bernet finds three separate meanings of noema in Husserl: noema as the appearance as such, as the ideal meaning, and as the constituted entity. The ontological status of the noema is that it can be understood – somewhat like the Aristotelian form as that which supports in some way both the universal idealization and the individual existent entity. Husserl himself distinguished between free and 'bound idealities' in late texts such as Erfahrung und Urteil. Untersuchungen zur Genealogie der Logik, ed Ludwig Landgrebe; trans. J. S. Churchill and K. Ameriks, Experience and Judgment: Investigations in a Genealogy of Logic. 141 In Husserl, the term 'ontology' (Ontologie) refers to 'eidetic science' (cf. Ideas I, §§ 9 ff.) subdivided into 'formal' and 'material' domains. Phenomenology, on this account, is the ontology of pure consciousness. What is nowadays, following Quine, called ontology (answering the question 'what is there?'), would count as 'metaphysics' in Husserl's terminology. 142 Martin Heidegger, Sein und Zeit (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1993), trans. J. Macquarrie and E. Robinson, Being and Time (Oxford: Blackwell, 1967). Hereafter 'SZ' followed by the section number and page number of the English translation, followed by page number of German text. 143 In this footnote, SZ § 69, p. 363n23, which is a comment on Husserl's characterization of sensory perception as a 'making present' (das Gegenwärtigen) in the Sixth Logical Investigation §37, Heidegger promises to address the grounding of intentionality in 'the ecstatical temporality' of Dasein in the next Division, which, of course, was never published (the Macquarrie-Robinson translation erroneously has 'ecstatical unity' in place of 'ecstatical temporality'). The importance of this footnote is underscored by Heidegger himself in his 1928 Marburg lecture series, Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Logik im Ausgang von Leibniz, Gesamtausgabe (= GA) 26 (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1978), p. 215, trans. Michael Heim, The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992), p. 168. Hereafter 'MFL' followed by page number of English and then German. 'Gesamtausgabe' will be abbreviated to 'GA'. 144 BP, 58; GA 24 81. 145 M. Heidegger, Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Logik im Ausgang von Leibniz, GA 26, trans. Michael Heim. 146 'unzureichend und äusserlich', BP § 15 161; GA 24 230. 147 MFL § 9, 133; GA 26 167. 148 This view has been reformulated for cognitive science by Hubert Dreyfus, see his Being-in-the-World: A Commentary on Heidegger's Being and Time, Division I; Robert Brandom, 'Dasein, the Being that Thematizes'; Michael Wheeler, Reconstructing the Cognitive World: The Next Step; and John Haugeland, Dasein Disclosed. John Haugeland's Heidegger, ed. Joseph Rouse. 149 See Gerda Walther, Ein Beitrag zur Ontologie der sozialen Gemeinschaften, pp. 11, 55. 150 It is of course a matter of considerable debate as to whether non-human animals possess intentionality and in what sense. Various forms of perceptual and motor intentionality, empathy, capacity for deliberate deception, self-awareness, etc., can be identified in some species (from bees to gorillas). Some speak of a kind of 'proto-intentionality' of animals – and pre-linguistic human children – but this debate only further complicates an already complicated discussion. See Marian Stamp Dawkins Through Our Eyes Only?: The Search for Animal Consciousness; John R. Searle, 'Animal Minds'; Clive D. L. Wynne, Do Animals Think?; Susan Hurley and Matthew Nudds (eds) Rational Animals?; and Robert W. Lurz (ed.) The Philosophy of Animal Minds. 151 See, inter alia, Alva Noë, Action in Perception; Richard Menary, The Extended Mind: and Julian Kiverstein and Michael Wheeler (eds) Heidegger and Cognitive Science.