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Does Social Exchange Increase Voluntary Cooperation?

1996; Wiley; Volume: 49; Issue: 4 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1111/j.1467-6435.1996.tb02073.x

1467-6435

Simon Gächter, Ernst Fehr, Christiane Kment,

Game Theory and Voting Systems

KyklosVolume 49, Issue 4 p. 541-554 Does Social Exchange Increase Voluntary Cooperation? Simon Gächter, Simon GächterSearch for more papers by this authorErnst Fehr, Ernst FehrSearch for more papers by this authorChristiane Kment, Christiane Kment Institute for Empirical Economic Research. University of Zurich, Blumlisalpstrasse 10, CH-8006 Zürich; University of Linz, Department of Economics, Altenbergerstrasse 69. A-4040 Linz. We would like to thank seminar participants at the Universities of Zurich and Linz. the Institute for Advanced Studies. Vienna. and Iris Bohnet, Armin Falk and Claudia Keser for helpful comments. Financial support by the Swiss National Science Foundation under project number 12-43590.95 is gratefully acknowledged.Search for more papers by this author Simon Gächter, Simon GächterSearch for more papers by this authorErnst Fehr, Ernst FehrSearch for more papers by this authorChristiane Kment, Christiane Kment Institute for Empirical Economic Research. University of Zurich, Blumlisalpstrasse 10, CH-8006 Zürich; University of Linz, Department of Economics, Altenbergerstrasse 69. A-4040 Linz. We would like to thank seminar participants at the Universities of Zurich and Linz. the Institute for Advanced Studies. Vienna. and Iris Bohnet, Armin Falk and Claudia Keser for helpful comments. Financial support by the Swiss National Science Foundation under project number 12-43590.95 is gratefully acknowledged.Search for more papers by this author First published: November 1996 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6435.1996.tb02073.xCitations: 17 AboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL References Becker, Gary S. (1974): A Theory of Social Interactions, Journal of Political Economy. 82: 1063– 1093. Blau, Peter (1964): Exchange und Power in Social life. New Brunswick : Transaction Publishers. Bohnet, Iris (1996): Kooperation und Kommunikation. 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John Castellan, Jr. (1988): Nonparametric Statistics for the Behavioral Sciences. 2nd edition, New York : McGraw Hill. Citing Literature Volume49, Issue4November 1996Pages 541-554 ReferencesRelatedInformation