The election of the eleventh President of the Italian Republic
2006; Routledge; Volume: 11; Issue: 4 Linguagem: Inglês
10.1080/13545710600979776
ISSN1469-9583
Autores Tópico(s)Populism, Right-Wing Movements
ResumoAbstract In a tense political situation marked by the bitter confrontation between a razor thin center-left electoral and parliamentary majority and an aggressive opposition of the center-right Casa delle Libertà, the Italian parliament elected life senator Giorgio Napolitano to the Presidency of the Republic. A former prominent leader of the Italian Communist Party, Napolitano was voted in by the center-left on the fourth ballot. This article explains how and why he was selected. First, it recounts briefly the criteria adopted by the center-left to choose the Speakers of the two branches of Parliament. Then, it explores the reasons why the center-left had to stand behind a candidate of its own, initially Massimo D'Alema, and when it was clear that he could not muster all the necessary support from within the center-left, Napolitano, and why the center-right decided not to vote for Napolitano. In conclusion, the article offers some reflections on the role to be played by the President of the Republic in the next seven years and on the proposals of constitutional reforms affecting his position in the overall framework of the Italian parliamentary Republic. Keywords: Italian politicsPresident of the RepublicParliamentcenter-left and center-rightconstitutional reforms Notes 1 An accomplished and prolific writer, he has told the story of his life Napolitano (Citation2005). Two political biographical aspects must be stressed. The first one is his explanation, in substance, an apology, for not having criticized the Soviet invasion of Hungary in 1956 instead supporting the official line of the party, which he now considers to have been a major mistake. The second aspect is that with great consistency he always sponsored reformist, quasi-social-democratic positions and policies within the PCI. He always believed and openly stated that the PCI had the duty to try to introduce improvements (miglioramenti) in the Italian political and socio-economic system. No major revolutionary transformation had to be expected. For his beliefs and statements he was often criticized within the party and the label migliorista, applied to him and his supporters, definitely contains a negative connotation. In 1991 Napolitano gave his approval to the transformation of the PCI into the Partito Democratico della Sinistra (Democratic Party of the Left). His partisan activities slowly faded away. By 2006 the label ‘Communist’ could not in any significantly appropriate way describe the politics of Giorgio Napolitano. Even the aggressive and embittered center-right spokesmen quickly stopped couching their criticisms with reference to Napolitano's Communist past. 2 These are the highly demanding tasks the Constitution attributes to the President. However, there are two recent important developments to take into account: one concerning the doctrinal interpretation of the overall presidential role, the other the practical fulfillment of those tasks by at least the last three Presidents. First, divergent interpretations have been put forward by Italian scholars most of whom now claim that the President's role in substantially ill defined (see, especially, Fusaro Citation2003; Tebaldi Citation2005). Second, a highly controversial package of constitutional reforms has been approved by the Casa delle Libertà significantly curtailing the powers of the President. For the content see the discussion below. Submitted to a popular referendum held on 25 June 2006, the entire package has been repealed by the voters, but the issue of the reform related to the strengthening of executive governmental power (the creation of a strong premiership) also to the expense of the President of the Republic and/or to the introduction of a French type semipresidentialism remains outstanding. On most of these issues Napolitano's declarations and positions have been, in line with his political style, cautious and moderate, if not outright conservative. 3 I have provided a detailed analysis of those events, their premises and consequences in Pasquino (Citation1999). 4 The survey ‘Demos LaPolis’ periodically conducted by the respected political scientist Ilvo Diamanti has always recorded a high level of trust for President Ciampi. In December 2005, he had by far the highest level of trust: 80 per cent. By contrast the percentages for Parliament, the Government and political parties were respectively: 22.5, 18.0 and 8.7 per cent. See La Repubblica, 18 December 2005, p. 18. 5 Several important criticisms are formulated by Fusaro (Citation1998), an essay that is fundamentally an attempt to discredit the French semi-presidential model and its Italian supporters suggesting that Scalfaro was in practice playing the improper role of a semi-presidential President in a parliamentary Republic. On Scalfaro's difficult election in traumatic times see Pasquino (Citation1993). 6 See Pasquino (Citation2003a). The preliminary evaluation can be found in Pasquino (Citation2003b). For the legislation concerning the judiciary and its activities, see Newell (Citation2005). 7 On both topics, see Hine (Citation2002). 8 In fact, the package of constitutional reforms approved by the Casa delle Libertà contains a drastic curtailment of the powers of the President of the Republic. The President will no longer appoint the Prime Minister, but will simply and automatically nominate the leader of the winning coalition. The President will no longer have the power to dissolve Parliament (or not to dissolve it and allow the parliamentarians to replace a fallen government without returning to the polls). The power of dissolution will be given to the Prime Minister and his (her) parliamentary majority. 9 A very flattering portrait has been painted by the deputy editor of the daily La Repubblica (Giannini Citation2006). Though positive, my evaluation contains some criticisms because I believe that in some cases the President did not fully use his powers. See Pasquino (Citation2003a). 10 I have duly analyzed and criticized the new largely proportional electoral law (that I have dubbed ‘de-personalized proportional representation with a majority bonus') in Pasquino (Citation2007, forthcoming). 11 Curiously, in 1992 Republican Giovanni Spadolini was elected Speaker of the Senate and Christian Democrat Scalfaro Speaker of the House. Giorgio Napolitano replaced Scalfaro when he was hastily elected President of the Republic in the wake of the dramatic assassination of Judge Falcone, his wife and escort by the Mafia. 12 The Northern League had very often and very harshly criticized the President for his ‘representation of the national unity’ and for his emphasis on the national symbols such as the flag, the anthem, and, most important, the Constitution: his ‘bible’, the President declared. The Northern League Minister of Justice, Roberto Castelli, had not refrained from open confrontations with the President concerning the reform of the judicial system and the autonomy of the presidential power of pardon. Belatedly, the Constitutional Court has indeed stated that the right to grant pardons is an autonomous prerogative of the President. On his part, Berlusconi had never hidden his annoyance with President Ciampi's behavior. In any case, as I have already hinted, the Casa delle Libertà package of constitutional reforms seemed a sort of reckoning with President Ciampi's constitutional stances and powers. 13 Though, I will add, several of them, in spite of their advanced age, would have liked to: Giuseppe Saragat (73 years old at the end of his term); Sandro Pertini (89 years old), and Oscar Luigi Scalfaro (81 years old). 14 The quotation is from Il Corriere della Sera, 4 May 2006, p. 2, but, of course, Ciampi's declaration was published in all major Italian newspapers. 15 Incidentally, both in 1994 and in 2001, the center-right ‘occupied’ the office of the Speakers of both Houses. In 1994, in order to win the Speakership of the Senate, Berlusconi made several offers to Senators elected by the former Christian Democrats. Some of them were later rewarded with parliamentary and governmental spoils.
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