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PRIVATE PROVISION OF PUBLIC GOODS AND INFORMATION DIFFUSION IN SOCIAL GROUPS

2014; Wiley; Volume: 55; Issue: 4 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1111/iere.12081

1468-2354

Kimberley Scharf,

Economic Policies and Impacts

International Economic ReviewVolume 55, Issue 4 p. 1019-1042 Original Article PRIVATE PROVISION OF PUBLIC GOODS AND INFORMATION DIFFUSION IN SOCIAL GROUPS Kimberley Scharf, Corresponding Author Kimberley Scharf University of Warwick and CEPR, U.K. I am grateful to Tony Atkinson, Roland Bénabou, René Bekkers, Andreas Lange, Thomas Piketty, Sarah Sandford, Matt Skellern, two anonymous referees, and participants to the 2011 Paris CEPR Conference on Altruism and Charitable Giving for comments and suggestions and to the Economic and Social Research Council for financial support.Please address correspondence to: Kimberley Scharf, Department of Economics, University of Warwick, Coventry CV4 7AL, U.K. E-mail: [email protected].Search for more papers by this author Kimberley Scharf, Corresponding Author Kimberley Scharf University of Warwick and CEPR, U.K. I am grateful to Tony Atkinson, Roland Bénabou, René Bekkers, Andreas Lange, Thomas Piketty, Sarah Sandford, Matt Skellern, two anonymous referees, and participants to the 2011 Paris CEPR Conference on Altruism and Charitable Giving for comments and suggestions and to the Economic and Social Research Council for financial support.Please address correspondence to: Kimberley Scharf, Department of Economics, University of Warwick, Coventry CV4 7AL, U.K. E-mail: [email protected].Search for more papers by this author First published: 28 October 2014 https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.12081Citations: 8 Read the full textAboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditWechat Abstract I describe a dynamic model of costly information sharing where private information affecting collective-value actions is transmitted by social proximity. Individuals make voluntary contributions toward the provision of a pure public good, and information transmission about quality of provision is a necessary condition for collective provision to take place in a stationary equilibrium. I show that unlike in the case of private goods, better informed individuals face positive incentives to incur a cost to share information with their neighbors and that these incentives are stronger and provision of the pure public good greater the smaller are individuals' social neighborhoods. Citing Literature Volume55, Issue4November 2014Pages 1019-1042 RelatedInformation