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Framing the High North: Public Discourses in Norway after 2000

2011; Routledge; Volume: 28; Issue: 1 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1080/08003831.2011.575659

1503-111X

Leif Christian Jensen, Geir Hønneland,

Indigenous Studies and Ecology

Abstract Abstract The article presents an overview of the main public debates in Norway that can be said to have framed and defined the High North since the turn of the Millennium. It is based on a qualitative study of over 3000 articles published in four Norwegian newspapers issued between 2000 and 2006. Our discussion is structured around three overarching, interconnected narratives that we think capture the essence of the Norwegian public discourses on the High North between 2000 and 2006. These are "Fragments from the 1990s"; "The great narrative of the High North"; and "Mixing cold water with hot blood". The first half of the 2000s is characterised by an almost total absence of the High North as a discursive and politically coherent concept. From 2004, however, usage grew fivefold, alongside an extensive, dynamic discursive mobilisation. When the Russians decided in 2006 to shelve the Shtokman project and critical voices were heard condemning Norway's environmental performance in northwest Russia, public opinion swung back again. A feeling of cold reality replaced the sense of optimism towards the energy potential of the north, and an exercise in collective soul-searching commenced – similar to that of the early years of the decade. We believe the type of discursive change we document in this article constitutes policy trends in connection both with the High North and with other sectors where policy is subject to intense public debate and appraisal. We hope that discourse analysis has enabled us to investigate and share how Norwegian public discourses on the High North are socially produced, framed and maintained but at the same time are always in flux and open to "new" directions which should be possible – at least in theory – to trace by going back in time. Keywords: Norwegian High North politicsHigh NorthDiscourse analysisDiscourseStory line Acknowledgements We would like to thank the editor and two anonymous referees for valuable comments and suggestions that significantly helped improve the manuscript. LCJ would like to thank the Norwegian Ministry of Defence for funding a research project which this article is partly a result of. We would also like to thank Chris Saunders for language assistance. Notes 1. The phrase "High North" was introduced as the English equivalent of the Norwegian term nordområdene (the northern areas) in the mid-1980s, eventually becoming adopted by the Norwegian authorities at the beginning of the current century. The concept has no immediate corresponding counterpart in academic or political discourse outside Norway, and it is not self-explanatory to foreigners (Skagestad, 2010 Skagestad , O. G. 2010 . The "High North": An Elastic Concept in Norwegian Arctic Policy , FNI Report 10/2010 (Lysaker: FNI). Available at http://www.fni.no/doc&pdf/FNI-R1010.pdf (accessed 3 May 2011) . [Google Scholar]). 2. For a discussion on Norwegian and Russian official foreign policy discourses on the European Arctic, see Jensen and Skedsmo (2010). 3. For more on structuralist thoughts on the sign, the signifier, and the signified, see for instance Saussure ([1916] 1966 Saussure , F. de [1916] 1966 . Course in General Linguistics New York : McGraw-Hill . [Google Scholar]), Stavrakakis (1999) and Sanders (2004 Sanders, C. 2004. The Cambridge Companion to Saussure, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. [Google Scholar]). 4. Jensen (2007) analyses Norwegian petroleum politics and debates. 5. The search term was Nordområde* (=High North) 6. For more on the relationship between Russia and the West and the corresponding discourses of the 1990s which the following is compared with and contrasted against, see Hønneland (2003) and (2005). 7. The Barents cooperation was formally established on 11 January 1993, when the Kirkenes declaration was signed. The Barents cooperation is organised on two levels. The Barents Euro-Arctic Council (BEAC) operates at government level and the Regional Council operates at regional level. The purpose of the Barents cooperation is to strengthen east–west infrastructure, establish people-to-people contacts and thereby contribute to the economic, cultural and social development of the region. The Barents cooperation promotes people-to-people contacts and economic development and creates good conditions for interregional exchange in many different fields, e.g. culture, indigenous peoples, youth, education, trade, environment, transportation and health. The primary goal of BEAC is to promote sustainable economic and social development in the Barents region and thus contribute to peaceful development in the northernmost part of Europe (Barentsinfo.org). 8. For a general account of the discursive construction of regions see Neumann (1994 Neumann, I. B. 1994. A region-building approach to Northern Europe. Review of International Studies, 20(1): 53–74. [Crossref] , [Google Scholar]). For an analysis of the High North in particular, see Zachariassen (2008 Zachariassen, K. 2008. Rethinking the creation of North Norway as a region. Acta Borealia, 25(2): 113–137. [Taylor & Francis Online], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]). 9. Arctic produces a different set of associations, and "High North" ("det høye nord") has been arrived at as an adequate term when the subject is discussed in languages other than Norwegian. 10. StatoilHydro ASA changed its name to Statoil ASA on 2 November 2009. The name StatoilHydro was used temporarily for a period of two years after the merger between Statoil ASA and Norsk Hydro ASA's oil and gas division (statoilhydro.com). 11. On 25 October 2007, StatoilHydro signed a frame agreement with Gazprom to become partner in phase 1 of the Shtokman development together with Total. The agreement gives Statoil a 24% equity interest in Shtokman Development AG where Gazprom (51%) and Total (25%) are the two other partners. Shtokman Development AG, established on 21 February 2008, is responsible for planning, financing and constructing the infrastructure necessary for the first phase of the Shtokman development and will own the infrastructure for 25 years from start of commercial production. This includes offshore installations, pipeline to shore and the onshore processing plants for both LNG and piped gas (statoil.com). 12. For more on the agreement, see the Joint Statement on maritime delimitation and cooperation in the Barents Sea and the Arctic Ocean (available at http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/UD/Vedlegg/Folkerett/030427_english_4.pdf). 13. See for instance Aftenposten, 26 February 2007, where Lars Rowe from the Fridtjof Nansen Institute criticises Norwegian foreign policy towards Russia and argues that the new Russia will not and should not be seen as a country with a still broken back. It is, according to Rowe, time for the Norwegian government to realise that Russia has both the will and the means to tackle its own problems: the moment for Norway to stop throwing money at Russian problems is long overdue. 14. The treaty marks the end of a long process that started in 1970. The breakthrough in the negotiations was made public during President Medvedev's visit to Norway on 27 April 2010, when the Norwegian and Russian foreign ministers signed a joint statement announcing that the two countries' negotiating delegations had reached preliminary agreement on delimitation. The treaty must be approved by the Norwegian Storting and the Russian Duma before it can enter into force (http://www.barentsobserver.com/norway-and-russia-sign-maritime-delimitation-agreement.4819173-16149.html). 15. The rapid ongoing climate change is bringing vast change to the Arctic, and previous ice-covered areas are becoming more accessible for shipping. September 2010 was the first time in modern history that the Northern Sea Route was totally ice-free, with only some few places with drift ice that could be seen from the bridges of the vessels that sailed the route. Sailing from Europe to Asia along the top of Russia's Arctic coast takes only two-thirds of the time it takes to go through the Suez Canal to the south. (http://www.barentsobserver.com/preparing-for-next-years-northern-sea-route-season.4832790-16175.html).