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Analysing the new Taliban Code of Conduct ( Layeha) : an assessment of changing perspectives and strategies of the Afghan Taliban

2012; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 31; Issue: 1 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1080/02634937.2012.647844

1465-3354

Thomas H. Johnson, Matthew DuPee,

Turkey's Politics and Society

Abstract Periodically, Afghanistan's Taliban leadership formally issues Layeha or ‘codes of conduct’ for their fighters and supporters. Layeha offer important insights into the Afghan Taliban's objectives, strategies and the psyche/perspective of Taliban leadership. This article presents an analysis of the Taliban's code of conduct and examines what Layeha tell us about Taliban objectives, strategy and organization. Such information would seem particularly important as the United States as well as its coalition allies assess their Afghan operational strategy as well as exit strategy from Afghanistan. This analysis of the Layeha suggests that the Taliban remain most concerned with: chain of command principles preventing the fragmentation of the various Taliban networks; obtaining and maintaining public support by winning ‘hearts and minds’ of local residents; ensuring enough fighters remain engaged in combat; and galvanizing the perception that the Taliban represent a capable, desirable and fair alternative to the current Afghan political establishment. Keywords: Taliban Layeha information operationsTaliban organization and leadershipTaliban ‘shadow government’ Notes For example, on the rise of the Taliban see Maley Citation(1998), Griffin Citation(2001), Rashid Citation(2001) and Coll Citation(2004). On the Taliban generally see Dorronsoro Citation(2005), Chayes Citation(2007), Crews and Tarzi Citation(2008), Giustozzi Citation(2008), Barfield Citation(2010) and Isby Citation(2010). Since the Layeha is published in Pashto, it is not strikingly apparent that the intention of the document was to convey messages solely to Western audiences. For an assessment of the Taliban as an organization, see Sinno Citation(2008). On the post-2001 organization and how the Taliban evolved as an effective insurgent force, see Johnson (2007a) and Sky Citation(2007). For a comparison of actual events pursed by the Taliban and the Layeha, see Afghanistan-Pakistan Center Citation(2011). The 2010 Layeha was published (and became ‘operational’) on 9 May 2010. The copy assessed here was recovered by Coalition forces in the Sangin Valley, Helmand. Just how many fighters have a copy of this document on their person in Afghanistan, how many Taliban operators can even read the code, and what implications this manual has for the overall insurgent infrastructure in Afghanistan is difficult, if not impossible, to ascertain. It is pertinent however, to understand what the Taliban leadership is saying and how they are communicating within their own chain of command. Berader was reportedly released by the Pakistanis in Autumn 2010; see Shahzad Citation(2010) and Swami Citation(2010). Territorial disputes, personality and ideological differences, cronyism, corruption and even the presence or allegiance to foreign fighters is causing rifts among some local Taliban fronts. Even among the much-vaunted Haqqani Network of eastern Afghanistan, ideological differences and corruption cause significant cleavages among various cells and commanders. Nevertheless, the extent of these differences and their significance is still open for judgment. For examinations of cleavages among Taliban factions see DuPee Citation(2008), Qureshi Citation(2009), Hotak Citation(2010) and van Bijlert Citation(2010). It is important to note that different analysts translated the Pashto of the 2009 and 2010 Layeha, and where discrepancies in the language were found an additional, senior translator was used to assess if fact the translations were accurate. To receive copies of the 2009 and 2010 Layeha used in this analysis please contact the authors. This Layeha was comprised of 29 rules of conduct. The 2009 document had 13 chapters and 67 rules or laws, code of conduct. Chapter 10, Health Related Issues: The Islamic Emirate Health Commission has its own work plan for carrying out and co-ordinating its activities. Treatment of the mujahedeen will be done according to that work plan. Provincial representatives are bound to obey instructions of the commission in carrying out tasks related to health issues. Chapter 1, Rule number 4 of the 2009 Layeha states, ‘If a person breaks his ties to the infidels, and the Mujahedeen gives him guarantees for full protection and this person is killed by a Mujahid or harmed in some way, then the person who committed the crime will not be supported by the Islamic Movement, and he will be dealt according to the laws of Shari'a’. Literally ‘way’ or code of the Pashtun; relevant Pashtun codes are: Melmastia – the provision of hospitality; Nenawati – the provision of sanctuary; Ghairat – bravery/courage; Nang – honor, esteem. For sources on the Pashtun, generally see Spain (Citation1961, 1962), Caroe (1958), Ahemed Citation(1980) and Glatzer Citation(1998). Taliban beheaded six security personnel following a raid on their checkpoint in the northern province of Baghlan on 21 July 2010. Villager Lal Mohammad was mutilated (ears and nose cut off) in Daikundi for participating in the 2009 elections. For more, see ‘Taliban Behead Six Afghan Police’, CNN, 22 July 2010; ‘Taliban behead 11 Shia Afghans’, Press TV, 26 June 2010; and ‘The Man Who had His Ears and Nose Cut Off for Daring to Vote’, Mail Online, 1 Sept. 2009. ‘Commander of the Faithful’. In the 2009 Layeha, Mullah Omar is referred to as Imam in the document; Mullah Berader is referred to as Imam's Assistant. The abused children for sexual relationships are referred to widely as halekon, ashna or bacha bereeshs. While recent media efforts have focused on this heinous battlefield ritual, mostly confined to reports of bacha bauzi occurring in northern Afghanistan, this practice occurs widely throughout Afghanistan and among Afghanistan's diverse ethnic makeup. For more see Qobil Citation(2010) and Reuters Citation(2007). The New America Foundation claims that the Taliban in Afghanistan and Pakistan have adopted kidnapping as a means of raising capital. Between 2008 and 2009, kidnappings in Pakistan and increased two-and-a-half fold and by 6% in Afghanistan. Although only 10% of kidnappings in Pakistan are attributed to the Taliban, the ransoms they receive are between US$60,000–US$115,000, significantly more than what other insurgent groups receive in Pakistan. It is unclear how the money is distributed between Pakistan's Taliban network and Afghanistan's Quetta Shura. See Collins with Ali (Citation2010, p. 6) and National Counterterrorism Center (2008, p. 30, Citation2009, p. 21). Both Zabul and Ghazni provinces, hostile insurgent bastions south of Kabul, are prime examples of such activities. For instance, an infamous dispute between two Taliban commanders in the Shah joy district of Zabul erupted after a dispute over territory that each commander wanted to collect taxes from. Similar anecdotes have also occurred in Ghazni, Farah and Badghis provinces to name a few; see Reuter and Yunus Citation(2009), Zabulwal Citation(2009) and Van Biljert (2010, p. 16). Rules 2, 4, 8 and 9 respectively of the 2009 Layeha and rules 2, 6, 7, 10 and 12 of the 2010 Layeha. However, if the culprit is accused of something serious such as murder, the victim's families are usually obliged to fulfill their duty of Qisas, a retaliatory form of condoned vigilante justice. International Legal Foundation, The Customary Laws of Afghanistan, p. 10 (2004). Rule 5 of 2010 Layeha. Rule 6 of 2010 Layeha. Rule 7 of 2010 Layeha. The defecting group burned their police post down and left with their weapons, ammunition, food and police truck (Filkins and Sahak Citation2010). As Filkins and Sahak Citation(2010) suggest: ‘In the decades of war in Afghanistan, armed groups, whether fighting for the government or for someone else, have often changed sides to join the one they believe is winning.’ Rule 14 of the 2010 Layeha states: ‘Those soldiers or police who surrender to the mujahidin or repent will not be killed, and if these soldiers bring some weapons with them or accomplish an achievement, then they should be praised.’ Associated Press, ‘Afghanistan: Taliban Attack NATO Fuel Convoy, Killing 3’, New York Times, 23 Oct. 2010. Available from: http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/23/world/asia/23briefs-ATTACK.html [Accessed October 2010]. See Warlord, Inc. Extortion and Corruption Along the U.S. Supply Chain in Afghanistan, Report of the Majority Staff, Rep. John F. Tierney, Chair-Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, U.S. House of Representatives, June 2010. Rule 11 of 2010 Layeha. Rule 19 of 2010 Layeha. Rule 20 of 2010 Layeha. Rule 25 of 2010 Layeha. Rule 26 of 2010 Layeha. Rules 15, 16 and 22 of 2010 Layeha. Rule 22 of 2010 Layeha. During the authors' recent research trips to Afghanistan in August/September of 2008, and May–June 2009 and July–September 2010, community leaders, village elders and ordinary citizens confirmed the Taliban's creation of this parallel legal system and its popularity. Interviews with elders suggested that the shadow legal system organization and functions match the 2010 Taliban code of conduct rule on justice exactly. Other analysts have reached similar conclusions: Carter and Clark (Citation2010, pp. 20–22) and Gopal (Citation2010, pp. 7, 13). Recently obtained information suggests that the Taliban Court might have moved from Zangabad to a location in the Zhari District. Thomas H. Johnson interviews of Afghan citizenry, Kandahar City, September 2011. ‘Maiwand Report; the Pride of Afghanistan’, Governance, Reconstruction, & Development, 20 June 2010, and Thomas H. Johnson interviews of Afghan citizenry in Panjwayi, Kandahar, August 2010. Based on Section 7, ‘Internal Issues of the Mujahideen’, rule 40 details how the chain of command works for the Taliban military force structure. The Taliban continue to operate an uneven ‘shadow government’ structure, which varies widely in its strength given regional differences. For instance, the Taliban shadow government in the Andar and Deh Yak districts of Ghazni province remains robust, as ‘the Taliban runs 28 known schools; circulates public statements by leaflets at night; adjudicates land, water-rights and property disputes through religious courts; levies taxes on residents; and punishes Afghans labeled as collaborators’ (Chivers Citation2011).