Portal de Periódicos da CAPES

The reputation of punishers

2015; Elsevier BV; Volume: 30; Issue: 2 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1016/j.tree.2014.12.003

1872-8383

Nichola Raihani, Redouan Bshary,

Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment

•Punishment can evolve via reputation benefits to the punisher but the reputation consequences of punishment are unclear. •We argue that punishers could gain a competitive or a cooperative reputation, depending on the circumstances. •Punishers benefit from a competitive reputation in forced play interactions but may be avoided when partner choice is possible. •If competitive motives underpinning punishment can be ruled out, punishers may be perceived in the same way as helpful individuals. Punishment is a potential mechanism to stabilise cooperation between self-regarding agents. Theoretical and empirical studies on the importance of a punitive reputation have yielded conflicting results. Here, we propose that a variety of factors interact to explain why a punitive reputation is sometimes beneficial and sometimes harmful. We predict that benefits are most likely to occur in forced play scenarios and in situations where punishment is the only means to convey an individual's cooperative intent and willingness to uphold fairness norms. By contrast, if partner choice is possible and an individual's cooperative intent can be inferred directly, then individuals with a nonpunishing cooperative reputation should typically be preferred over punishing cooperators. Punishment is a potential mechanism to stabilise cooperation between self-regarding agents. Theoretical and empirical studies on the importance of a punitive reputation have yielded conflicting results. Here, we propose that a variety of factors interact to explain why a punitive reputation is sometimes beneficial and sometimes harmful. We predict that benefits are most likely to occur in forced play scenarios and in situations where punishment is the only means to convey an individual's cooperative intent and willingness to uphold fairness norms. By contrast, if partner choice is possible and an individual's cooperative intent can be inferred directly, then individuals with a nonpunishing cooperative reputation should typically be preferred over punishing cooperators. typically used to describe punishment that occurs in n-player games, such as the public goods game (see below). Punishment is described as altruistic because the punisher pays the cost of punishment while any benefits of increased within-group cooperation are shared among punishers and nonpunishers. Note that punishment need not impose lifetime fitness costs on punishers and, therefore, is not necessarily altruistic in the true sense of the word. punishment that is aimed at individuals whose actions benefit, rather than harm, the group. the outcome of a social interaction in which all players gain lifetime direct fitness benefits. an n-player game where individuals make contributions to a communal venture. Collective benefits are greatest if everyone contributes to the resource but individuals do best to withhold investment and free ride on the investments of others. the act of paying to reduce the payoff of another individual. There are many ways that a punisher might ultimately gain direct fitness benefits from this investment. Efficient punishment: fee to fine ratio >1; inefficient punishment: fee to fine ratio ≤1. information about the previous behaviour of an individual that can be used to predict how they might behave in future. involves harming another individual but without incurring the cost involved in punishment. typically refers to a scenario where a cheating individual is punished by an uninvolved bystander. a two-player game where the truster is endowed with a sum of money that they can entrust to the trustee. Any money sent to the trustee is multiplied by the experimenter and the trustee can then choose how much of the endowment to send back to the truster. Mutual benefits are highest if the truster trusts the trustee and the trustee returns half the endowment to the truster. However, trustees gain higher payoffs by keeping any money endowed to them and, thus, trusters are selected to not trust. n-player public goods game where the benefit of the public good is produced so long as one player chooses to cooperate. Thus, benefits follow a nonlinear increase with the number of cooperators.