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Homo Moralis--Preference Evolution Under Incomplete Information and Assortative Matching

2013; Wiley; Volume: 81; Issue: 6 Linguagem: Inglês

10.3982/ecta10637

1468-0262

Ingela Alger, Jörgen W. Weibull,

Economic theories and models

EconometricaVolume 81, Issue 6 p. 2269-2302 Homo Moralis—Preference Evolution Under Incomplete Information and Assortative Matching Ingela Alger, Ingela Alger Toulouse School of Economics (LERNA, CNRS), 21 Allée de Brienne, 31 015 Toulouse cedex 6, France and Institute for Advanced Study in Toulouse; [email protected]Search for more papers by this authorJörgen W. Weibull, Jörgen W. Weibull Stockholm School of Economics, P.O. Box 6501, 113 83 Stockholm, Sweden and Institute for Advanced Study in Toulouse; [email protected] We thank the editor and three anonymous referees for helpful comments. Earlier versions of this manuscript have been presented at an NBER workshop on culture and institutions, at Tel Aviv University, Stockholm School of Economics, IMEBE 2012, University of Southern California, UC Santa Barbara, UC Riverside, UC San Diego, the Becker-Friedman Institute conference “Biological Basis of Preferences and Behavior,” University of Warwick, Ecole Polytechnique (Paris), Lancaster University (UK), University of Oxford, Institute for International Economic Studies (Stockholm), Toulouse School of Economics, GAMES 2012, ITAM, Frankfurt University, University of York, and University of Zürich. We thank Rajiv Sethi, Immanuel Bomze, Avinash Dixit, Tore Ellingsen, Jens Josephson, Wolfgang Leininger, Klaus Ritzberger, François Salanié, and Giancarlo Spagnolo for comments. This research received financial support from the Knut and Alice Wallenberg Research Foundation. Ingela Alger is grateful to ANR, Carleton University, and SSHRC for financial support and to the Stockholm School of Economics for its hospitality.Search for more papers by this author Ingela Alger, Ingela Alger Toulouse School of Economics (LERNA, CNRS), 21 Allée de Brienne, 31 015 Toulouse cedex 6, France and Institute for Advanced Study in Toulouse; [email protected]Search for more papers by this authorJörgen W. Weibull, Jörgen W. Weibull Stockholm School of Economics, P.O. Box 6501, 113 83 Stockholm, Sweden and Institute for Advanced Study in Toulouse; [email protected] We thank the editor and three anonymous referees for helpful comments. Earlier versions of this manuscript have been presented at an NBER workshop on culture and institutions, at Tel Aviv University, Stockholm School of Economics, IMEBE 2012, University of Southern California, UC Santa Barbara, UC Riverside, UC San Diego, the Becker-Friedman Institute conference “Biological Basis of Preferences and Behavior,” University of Warwick, Ecole Polytechnique (Paris), Lancaster University (UK), University of Oxford, Institute for International Economic Studies (Stockholm), Toulouse School of Economics, GAMES 2012, ITAM, Frankfurt University, University of York, and University of Zürich. We thank Rajiv Sethi, Immanuel Bomze, Avinash Dixit, Tore Ellingsen, Jens Josephson, Wolfgang Leininger, Klaus Ritzberger, François Salanié, and Giancarlo Spagnolo for comments. This research received financial support from the Knut and Alice Wallenberg Research Foundation. Ingela Alger is grateful to ANR, Carleton University, and SSHRC for financial support and to the Stockholm School of Economics for its hospitality.Search for more papers by this author First published: 13 November 2013 https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA10637Citations: 198 AboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onEmailFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditWechat Abstract What preferences will prevail in a society of rational individuals when preference evolution is driven by the resulting payoffs? We show that when individuals' preferences are their private information, a convex combination of selfishness and morality stands out as evolutionarily stable. We call individuals with such preferences homo moralis. At one end of the spectrum is homo oeconomicus, who acts so as to maximize his or her own payoff. At the opposite end is homo kantiensis, who does what would be “the right thing to do,” in terms of payoffs, if all others would do likewise. We show that the stable degree of morality—the weight placed on the moral goal—is determined by the degree of assortativity in the process whereby individuals are matched to interact. References Akerlof, G., and R. Kranton (2000): “Economics and Identity,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 115, 715–753. DOI: 10.1162/003355300554881 Alexander, R. D. (1987): The Biology of Moral Systems. New York : Aldine De Gruyter. Alger, I. (2010): “Public Goods Games, Altruism, and Evolution,” Journal of Public Economic Theory, 12, 789–813. 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