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Marketing cooperatives and financial structure: a transaction costs economics analysis

2001; Wiley; Volume: 26; Issue: 3 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1016/s0169-5150(00)00122-5

1574-0862

George Hendrikse,

Business Strategy and Innovation

Agricultural EconomicsVolume 26, Issue 3 p. 205-216 Marketing cooperatives and financial structure: a transaction costs economics analysis George W.J. Hendrikse, Corresponding Author George W.J. Hendrikse Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus University Rotterdam, Office F3-51, P.O. Box 1738, 3000 Rotterdam, The Netherlands*Corresponding author. Tel: +31-10-408-8660; fax: +31-10-408-9016. E-mail address:[email protected] (G.W.J. Hendrikse).Search for more papers by this authorCees P. Veerman, Cees P. Veerman Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus University Rotterdam, Office F3-51, P.O. Box 1738, 3000 Rotterdam, The Netherlands Tilburg University and President of Wageningen University & Research Centre.Search for more papers by this author George W.J. Hendrikse, Corresponding Author George W.J. Hendrikse Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus University Rotterdam, Office F3-51, P.O. Box 1738, 3000 Rotterdam, The Netherlands*Corresponding author. Tel: +31-10-408-8660; fax: +31-10-408-9016. E-mail address:[email protected] (G.W.J. Hendrikse).Search for more papers by this authorCees P. Veerman, Cees P. Veerman Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus University Rotterdam, Office F3-51, P.O. Box 1738, 3000 Rotterdam, The Netherlands Tilburg University and President of Wageningen University & Research Centre.Search for more papers by this author First published: 09 August 2005 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1574-0862.2001.tb00064.xCitations: 62 AboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onEmailFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditWechat Abstract The relationship between the financial structure of a marketing cooperative (MC) and the requirement of the domination of control by the members is analysed from a transaction costs perspective. A MC receives less favourable terms on outside equity than a conventional firm because the decision power regarding new investments is not allocated to the providers of these funds. This is a serious threat to the survival of a MC in a market where efficient investments are characterised by an increasing level of asset specificity at the processing stage of production. A MC is predicted to be an efficient organisational form when the level of asset specificity at the processing stage of production is at a low or immediate level compared to the level of asset specificity at the farming stage of production. References Aghion, P., Bolton, P., 1992. An incomplete contracts approach to financial contracting. 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