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Adaptation, Poverty and Well‐Being: Some Issues and Observations with Special Reference to the Capability Approach and Development Studies1

2009; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 10; Issue: 1 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1080/14649880802675051

1945-2837

David Clark,

Sustainable Development and Environmental Policy

Abstract The idea that people adapt to poverty and deprivation by suppressing their wants, hopes and aspirations has gained a lot of currency in development ethics. While the 'adaptation problem' is often cited as one of the primary arguments for abandoning utility‐based concepts of well‐being in favor of the capability approach, it also has serious implications for the capability approach and development studies generally. These implications are not normally discussed or acknowledged in the well‐being and development literature. Fortunately for development studies, the available evidence suggests that adaptation is not ubiquitous. Moreover, where adaptation occurs, there is some evidence to suggest that it takes a different — and far less damaging — form than the type discussed in work on human well‐being and development. Keywords: AdaptationAspirationsCapabilityDemocracy and participationHuman valuesPaternalismPoverty and human developmentUtility and well‐being Acknowledgements This is a substantially revised and shortened version of a paper presented at the Sixth International Conference of the Human Development and Capability Association (HDCA) in Groningen, The Netherlands, 29 August–1 September 2006. A later version of this paper was presented at the Global Poverty Research Group workshop, University of Oxford, 11 December 2006. The author is grateful to Abigail Barr, Marcel Fafchamps, David Hulme, Richard Jolly, Daniel Neff, Mozaffar Qizilbash, two anonymous referees, conference delegates and workshop participants for helpful comments and suggestions. The research has been funded by a grant from the UK Economic and Social Research Council to the Global Poverty Research Group at the Universities of Manchester and Oxford (grant no. M571255001). Notes 1. This paper is intended to highlight some key issues relating to adaptation, poverty and well‐being from a development studies perspective. At times some arguments are left hanging, partly through lack of data and partly through the complexity of following through every part of the argument, in areas where much is still under debate. 2. The CA can be traced back to Sen's Tanner Lecture 'Equality of What?' delivered at Stanford University in 1979 (see Sen, 1980 Sen, A. K. 1980. "'Equality of what?'". In The Tanner Lectures on Human Values, Edited by: McMurrin, S. M. 195–220. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. [http://www.tannerlectures.utah.edu/lectures/sen80.pdf] [Google Scholar]). The CA was first outlined in detail in Sen's (1985a Sen, A. K. 1985a. Commodities and Capabilities, Oxford: Elsevier Science Publishers. [Google Scholar]) book Commodities and Capabilities. See also Sen (1987b Sen, A. K. 1987b. 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For brief introductions to the CA see Sen (1990 Sen, A. K. 1990. "'Development as capability expansion'". In Human Development and the International Development Strategy for the 1990s, Edited by: Griffin, K and Knight, J. 41–58. London: Macmillan. [Crossref] , [Google Scholar], 1993a Sen, A. K. 1993a. "'Capability and well‐being'". In The Quality of Life, Edited by: Nussbaum, M. C and Sen, A. K. 30–53. Oxford: Clarendon Press. [Crossref] , [Google Scholar]), Saith (2001 Saith, R. 2001. "'Capabilities: the concept and its operationalisation'". In QEH Working Paper Series 66, Oxford: Queen Elizabeth House, University of Oxford. [Google Scholar]) and Clark (2006a Clark, D. A. 2006a. "'Capability approach'". In The Elgar Companion to Development Studies, Edited by: Clark, D. A. 32–45. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. [Crossref] , [Google Scholar]). 3. See Haq (1995 Haq, M. ul. 1995. Reflections on Human Development, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 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"Adaptation, in its broadest sense, refers to any action, process or mechanism that reduces the effects (perceptual, physiological, attentional, motivational, hedonic, and so on) of a constant repeated stimulus" (Frederick and Loewenstein, 1999 Frederick, S. and Loewenstein, G. 1999. "'Hedonic adaptation'". In Well‐Being: The Foundations of Hedonic Psychology, Edited by: Khaneman, D, Diener, E and Schwarz, N. 302–373. New York: Russell Sage Foundation. [Google Scholar], p. 302). 6. This would be a useful project in itself, although it is clearly beyond the scope and purpose of the present paper. 7. There are many other forms of adaptation that have not been extensively discussed in the development literature. For example, diminished aspirations due to straitened circumstances or social conditioning are rarely distinguished from 'normal' processes of socialization (Qizilbash, 2006c Qizilbash, M. 2006c. 'Well‐being, adaptation and human limitations'. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplements, 81: 83–110. [Crossref] , [Google Scholar], p. 92) or 'character planning' (Elster, 1982 Elster, J. 1982. "'Sour grapes – utilitarianism and the genesis of wants'". In Utilitarianism and Beyond, Edited by: Sen, A. K and Williams, B. 219–238. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. [Crossref] , [Google Scholar], p. 224), which both preserve autonomy. In fact, some texts give the impression that processes of socialization — particularly under capitalism — are ubiquitously harmful (for example, Crocker and Linden, 1998 Crocker, D and Linden, T, eds. 1998. Ethics of Consumption: The Good Life, Justice, and Global Stewardship, Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield. [Google Scholar]; Gasper, 2002 Gasper, D. 2002. 'Is Sen's capability approach an adequate basis for considering human development?'. Review of Political Economy, 14(4): 435–461. [Taylor & Francis Online] , [Google Scholar]). Jon Elster (1982) distinguishes between several different notions of adaptation, some of which are not discussed in this paper. 8. Adaptation could conceivably occur through either one of these mechanisms to varying degrees or through both mechanisms as people become better or worse off. The only way of distinguishing between them empirically is through the analysis of panel data, which allows us to distinguish between changes in actual and aspired variables. 9. It is not the only argument for preferring the CA, however (see below). The adaptation argument might also be used to justify falling back on an income or resource based approach to well‐being. There are, however, strong arguments for preferring the CA. In particular, the CA recognizes that while income and resources are instrumentally important for promoting human well‐being and development, there is not always a strong link between income and material things on the one hand and the realization of intrinsically valuable capabilities on the other (see Sen, 1985a Sen, A. K. 1985a. Commodities and Capabilities, Oxford: Elsevier Science Publishers. [Google Scholar]; Crocker, 1992 Crocker, D. 1992. 'Functioning and capabilities: the foundation of Sen's and Nussbaum's development ethic'. Political Theory, 20(4): 584–612. [Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]; Nussbaum, 2000 Nussbaum, M. C. 2000. Women and Human Development: The Capabilities Approach, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. [Crossref] , [Google Scholar]; Clark, 2002b Clark, D. A. 2002b. Visions of Development: A Study of Human Values, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. [Google Scholar], ch. 2, 2006a Clark, D. A. 2006a. "'Capability approach'". In The Elgar Companion to Development Studies, Edited by: Clark, D. A. 32–45. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. [Crossref] , [Google Scholar]). 10. In a virtually identical passage, Sen (1987a Sen, A. K. 1987a. On Ethics and Economics, Oxford: Blackwell. [Google Scholar], p. 46) attributes the same problem to the 'happiness' view of utility. 11. Following the recent celebrations to mark the 200th anniversary of the abolition of the Atlantic Slave Trade, Richard Jolly has reminded me of "the extreme and brutal process used to 'break in' slaves, much like horses are broken‐in. Such social conditioning sometimes appeared to involve a total psychological reconditioning, sometimes no more than a conscious and deliberate act of submission in response to overwhelming force" (personal communication). The long and diverse history of slavery also shows that individual acts of rebellion on the one hand, and collective action and interaction on the other, can awaken or reawaken the human spirit to opposition (for some pertinent examples, see Rodriguez, 2007, inter alia). Ironically it has been estimated that more slaves are alive today than were taken from Africa during the Atlantic Slave Trade (Garstang, 2007 Garstang. 2007. 'Slavery today'. Garstang Fair Trade Website. [www.garstangfairtrade.org.uk/slavery_today.htm], accessed 9 August 2007 [Google Scholar]). A relatively recent submission to the UN Commission on Human Rights by the non‐governmental organization Anti‐Slavery International documents the violence and coercion, social conditioning, societal pressure and lack of education or 'perceived alternatives' that help retain control over slaves in contemporary Niger (Anti‐Slavery International, 2003 Anti‐Slavery International. 2003. 'Slavery in Niger'. submission to the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, Anti‐Slavery International, London. [http://www.antislavery.org/archive/submission/submission2003‐niger.htm], accessed 19 July 2007 [Google Scholar]). It follows that a lot could be learned from integrating the conceptual discussions of adaptation found in development ethics and philosophy with applied work on the social and psychological processes associated with slavery and emancipation. 12. Martha Nussbaum's version of the CA (in contrast to Sen's) places a strong emphasis on educating those who are going to participate in public discussions about the ends of life (for example, Nussbaum, 2006 Nussbaum, M. C. 2006. 'Education and democratic citizenship: capabilities and quality education'. Journal of Human Development, 7(3): 385–395. [Taylor & Francis Online] , [Google Scholar]). Some social theorists remain extremely skeptical of the role public reasoning and democracy can play in uncovering the capabilities people have reason to value (for example, Deneulin, 2005 Deneulin, S. 2005. 'Promoting human freedoms under conditions of inequalities: a procedural framework'. Journal of Human Development, 6(1): 75–92. [Taylor & Francis Online] , [Google Scholar]). Doyal and Gough (1991 Doyal, L. and Gough, I. 1991. A Theory of Human Need, London: Macmillan. [Crossref] , [Google Scholar]) specify criteria (which include intellect, understanding and communication with others) for achieving the 'minimal autonomy' required for formulating needs. They propose juxtaposing the 'experiential knowledge' or ordinary people, cultures and societies (which do not actually feature in their work) with the codified knowledge of so called 'experts' to resolve disputes over needs (Doyal and Gough, 1991 Doyal, L. and Gough, I. 1991. A Theory of Human Need, London: Macmillan. [Crossref] , [Google Scholar], p. 141). 13. It is therefore particularly ironic that some middle‐class intellectuals continue to believe they know best. Such views are especially common among philosophers and social theorists on the Left who have little — if any — direct contact with ordinary poor people. Arguably, such beliefs amount to a new kind of 'false consciousness' not acknowledged or discussed in the well‐being or development literature: namely, that some intellectuals are blissfully unaware that they 'do not always know best'. 14. Sen is aware that there are more sophisticated forms of utilitarianism involving, for example, interpersonal scaling (for example, Sen, 1980 Sen, A. K. 1980. "'Equality of what?'". In The Tanner Lectures on Human Values, Edited by: McMurrin, S. M. 195–220. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. [http://www.tannerlectures.utah.edu/lectures/sen80.pdf] [Google Scholar], pp. 200–201), which can address social issues. 15. Sen makes these remarks in the context of discussing possible tensions between traditional values and the process of economics and social change. It is clear, however, that Sen favors a form of democracy that guarantees the liberty of individuals to "live whatever kind of life [they] desire" (Sen, 2006b Sen, A. K. 2006b. 'Reason, freedom and well‐being'. Utilitas, 18(1): 80–96. [Crossref] , [Google Scholar], p. 89). 16. Ultimately the question of whether values or aspirations are more or less susceptible to adaptation than subjective well‐being becomes an empirical issue. Moller (1996 Moller, V, ed. 1996. Perceptions of Development in Kwa‐Zulu Natal, Durban: Social Indicators Press. [Google Scholar]), Clark (2002b Clark, D. A. 2002b. Visions of Development: A Study of Human Values, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. [Google Scholar], 2003 Clark, D. A. 2003. 'Concepts and perceptions of human well‐being: some evidence from South Africa'. Oxford Development Studies, 31(2): 173–196. [Taylor & Francis Online] , [Google Scholar]) and Clark and Qizilbash (2008 Clark, D. A. and Qizilbash, M. 2008. 'Core poverty, vagueness and adaptation: a new methodology and some results for South Africa'. Journal of Development Studies, 44(4): 519–544. [Taylor & Francis Online], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]) present evidence to suggest that values and aspirations have not been crushed by the harsh realities of life in South Africa (see also below). 17. Sen (2005a Sen, A. K. 2005a. 'Human rights and capabilities'. Journal of Human Development, 6(2): 151–166. [Taylor & Francis Online] , [Google Scholar], p. 160) writes: "public discussion and reasoning can lead to a better understanding of the role, reach and significance of particular capabilities". 18. I do not wish to be misread here. Democracy is an ideal to be strived for; not an unworkable idea that should abandoned. 19. The pitfalls described here might include differences in people's capacity to make an argument for a particular point of view. I do not wish to imply, however, that professional philosophers or intellectuals will always 'win' the argument in question or be able to persuade the lay person of their 'enlightened' views. As I have been reminded by Mozaffar Qizilbash, there is no reason to suppose that the poor and disadvantaged are strangers to wisdom or reason. In fact, many amongst the poor and deprived are, in my experience, great thinkers and philosophers, even though their thoughts are not published in so called 'scholarly' journals. Crocker's (2006 Crocker, D. 2006. "'Sen and deliberative democracy'". In Capabilities and Equality: Basic Issues and Problems, Edited by: Kaufmann, A. 155–197. New York: Routledge. [Google Scholar]) discussion of the type of 'skills and virtues' deliberators ought to possess suggests that many poor and disadvantaged people might be excluded from public discussions! Sen briefly comments on the importance of giving voice to the poor and disadvantaged in his introduction to The Argumentative Indian: "It is sometimes asserted that the use of dialectics is largely confined to the more affluent and more literate, and is thus of no value to the common people. The elitism that is rampant in such beliefs is not only extraordinary, it is made more exasperating through the political cynicism and impassivity it tends to encourage. The critical voice is the traditional ally of the aggrieved, and participation in arguments is a general opportunity, not a particularly specialized skill (like composing sonnets or performing trapeze acts)" (Sen, 2005b Sen, A. K. 2005b. The Argumentative Indian: Writings on Indian Culture, History and Identity, London: Penguin. [Google Scholar], p. xiii). 20. There is a great deal of confusion in the literature regarding Sen's views on this matter. Contrary to Sugden (2006 Sugden, R. 2006. 'What we desire, what we have reason to desire, whatever we might desire: Mill and Sen on the value of opportunity'. Utilitas, 18(1): 33–51. [Crossref] , [Google Scholar]), Sen is against permitting the 'collective tyranny' of the majority to override individual values and choices (Sen, 2006b Sen, A. K. 2006b. 'Reason, freedom and well‐being'. Utilitas, 18(1): 80–96. [Crossref] , [Google Scholar], esp. p. 89). 21. In this paper I set aside the fact that these voices may provide other types of useful information (e.g. factual information). 22. I do not wish to imply that the late Denis Goulet would agree with the substantive conclusions of this paper. 23. Whether or not middle‐class researchers should strive to experience poverty themselves is a moot point. It is by no means clear that these experiences are transferable. Moreover, as Williamson (2003 Williamson, J. 2003. 'Lady bountiful tries life in the slums'. New Statesman, 20: 25–26. [Google Scholar], p. 26) points out, we live in a "class culture and it is typical of the upper middle class to want all experience for themselves, even poverty: what they are incapable of doing is just shutting up and listening". 24. More recently, Chambers has presented the case for 'putting the first last', which he says is harder to accomplish (1997, p. 2). Chambers has not considered the adaptation argument in his extensive writings on participatory development (Robert Chambers, personal communication, 21 July 2007). 25. One bone of contention is that the World Bank has asserted copyright over the voices of the poor. Another bone of contention is that these voices have been interpreted through the lens of social capital and used to legitimize the Bank's development framework. 26. Nussbaum (2000 Nussbaum, M. C. 2000. Women and Human Development: The Capabilities Approach, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. [Crossref] , [Google Scholar], pp. 113–114) describes a similar case involving malnourished women living in unsanitary conditions in the desert outside Mahabubnagar, Andhra Pradesh. Nussbaum observes that these women were resigned to their fate until a government 'consciousness‐raising' initiative generated anger and discontent and spurred demands for clean water, electricity and health workers, inter alia. In related writings, Sen (1993b Sen, A. K. 1993b. 'Positional objectivity'. Philosophy and Public Affairs, 22(2): 127–145. [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar], 2002 Sen, A. K. 2002. 'Health: perception versus observation'. British Medical Journal, 324: 860–861. [Crossref], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]) has argued that self‐reported morbidity has serious limitations and can be extremely misleading. 27. The classic reference is Easterlin (1974 Easterlin, R. 1974. "'Does economic growth improve the human lot? Some empirical evidence'". In Nations and Households in Economics Growth: Essays in Honour or Moses Abramowitz, Edited by: David, P. A and Reder, M. W. 89–125. New York: Academic Press. [Crossref] , [Google Scholar]). 28. One exception is Chan et al. (2002 Chan, A., Ofstedal, M. B. and Hermalin, A. I. 2002. 'Changes in subjective and objective measures of economic well‐being and their interrelationship among the elderly in Singapore and Taiwan'. Social Indicators Research, 57: 263–300. [Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]), who uses two‐wave panel data for Singapore and Taiwan to show that actual income and changes in income are strongly related to changes in perceptions of income adequacy. There are also examples of longitudinal studies of adaptation in other (non‐income) domains such as unemployment (for example, Winkelman and Winkelman, 1998 Winkelmann, L. and Winkelmann, R. 1998. 'Why are the unemployed so unhappy? Evidence from panel data'. Economica, 65: 1–15. [Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]) and health (see Frederick and Loewenstein, 1999 Frederick, S. and Loewenstein, G. 1999. "'Hedonic adaptation'". In Well‐Being: The Foundations of Hedonic Psychology, Edited by: Khaneman, D, Diener, E and Schwarz, N. 302–373. New York: Russell Sage Foundation. [Google Scholar]). 29. In addition, some unpublished studies of adaptation that make use of time‐series data have been presented at various Human Development and Capability Association conferences since 2001 (http://cfs.unipv.it/sen/index.html). Some of these papers are not readily available. 30. Crucially, subjective well‐being depends on the "gap between aspiration and achievement" (Stutzer, 2004 Stutzer, A. 2004. 'The role of income aspirations in individual happiness'. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 54: 84–109. [Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar], p. 91). This gap is repeatedly closed following a rise in current income, as people adapt to new consumption levels and endeavor to keep up with the rest of society. 31. The available options respondents were asked to choose between were: 'no health care', 'traditional healer, family friend', 'clinic, public hospital, shop', 'pharmacy visit by PHC nurse' and 'private doctor'. 32. This point appears to apply to a broad range of ethical theories including the revealed preference approach and democratic versions of the CA, as people's behavior, abilities and values may adjust too. However, arguments are presented below to suggest that the type of adaptation that typically occurs is less problematic from the standpoint of investigating human values. Incidentally, falling back on non‐democratic (top down) accounts of human capabilities or needs is unlikely to improve matters, as so‐called 'experts' and ethical theorists may themselves be suffering from an acute bout of false consciousness (see note 13). 33. Stutzer (2004 Stutzer, A. 2004. 'The role of income aspirations in individual happiness'. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 54: 84–109. [Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar], p. 98), for example, found that, on average, a 10% increase in household income is associated with a 4.5% increase in 'minimum required income' in his analysis of Swiss data. 34. This is because there is no way of knowing for sure which 'missing' capabilities would be endorsed (or rejected) by a particular person, group or society in the absence of adaptation. It follows that any attempt to 'amplify' the voices of the poor should focus on raising the threshold in approved dimensions of well‐being instead of attempting to broaden the concept of well‐being to include new capabilities. In this respect, the process of amplifying the voices of the poor is incomplete (like many aspects of the CA). One way of extending this approach to include 'missing' capabilities might involve appealing to the values and experiences of other cultures and societies through some form of internal deliberation. I have considered the potential pitfalls of this approach above. 35. There are other more powerful arguments for listening to the poor. Ultimately, giving everyone a say, including the poor, is a matter of social justice. 36. Admittedly further research is required as most of the available econometric evidence focuses exclusively on income or expenditure. 37. The CA can also take comfort from the fact that both types of adaptation mentioned above suggest that utility is a bad proxy for human well‐being. On this, see Burchardt (2005 Burchardt, T. 2005. 'Are one man's rags another man's riches? Identifying adaptive expectations using panel data'. Social Indicators Research, 74: 57–102. [Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]). 38. More often than not, such views are expressed informally in seminars and workshops or behind closed doors rather than in scholarly writings. 39. Elsewhere I have criticized Baran and Sweezy's (1966 Baran, P. and Sweezy, P. 1966. Monopoly Capital, London: Monthly Review Press. [Google Scholar]) account of 'genuine human need' (Clark, 2002b Clark, D. A. 2002b. Visions of Development: A Study of Human Values, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. [Google Scholar], pp. 55–58) and Goulet's (1997 Goulet, D. 1997. 'Development ethics: a new discipline'. International Journal of Social Economics, 24(11): 1160–1171. 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