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Should the Wealthy Be Able to "Buy Justice"?

1987; University of Chicago Press; Volume: 95; Issue: 6 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1086/261517

1537-534X

John R. Lott,

Corruption and Economic Development

Previous articleNext article No AccessShould the Wealthy Be Able to "Buy Justice"?John R. Lott, Jr.John R. Lott, Jr.PDFPDF PLUS Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditEmailPrint SectionsMoreDetailsFiguresReferencesCited by Journal of Political Economy Volume 95, Number 6Dec., 1987 Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1086/261517 Views: 90Total views on this site Citations: 45Citations are reported from Crossref Copyright 1987 The University of ChicagoPDF download Crossref reports the following articles citing this article:Massimo D'Antoni, Tim Friehe, Avraham Tabbach The Optimal Use of Fines and Imprisonment Revisited, American Law And Economics Review 24, no.22 (Mar 2023): 495–530.https://doi.org/10.1093/aler/ahac011Anastasia Antsygina, Madina Kurmangaliyeva Settlements under unequal access to justice, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 193 (Jan 2022): 237–268.https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2021.11.020Pablo Acosta, Emma Monsalve Montiel Public works programs and crime: Evidence for El Salvador, Review of Development Economics 25, no.33 (Mar 2021): 1778–1793.https://doi.org/10.1111/rode.12769Karin D. Martin "The Plurality of Perspectives on Monetary Sanctions": An Introductory Essay, Sociological Perspectives 63, no.66 (Dec 2020): 901–920.https://doi.org/10.1177/0731121420970676Josef Montag, James Tremewan Let the punishment fit the criminal: An experimental study, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 175 (Jul 2020): 423–438.https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2018.07.011Yanyu Xin, Tianji Cai Paying Money for Freedom: Effects of Monetary Compensation on Sentencing for Criminal Traffic Offenses in China, Journal of Quantitative Criminology 36, no.11 (Feb 2019): 1–28.https://doi.org/10.1007/s10940-019-09409-wNuno Garoupa, Murat Mungan Optimal imprisonment and fines with non-discriminatory sentences, Economics Letters 182 (Sep 2019): 105–108.https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2019.06.016Thomas J. Miceli The Social Cost of Crime: Deterrence, (Nov 2019): 23–45.https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-31695-2_2Nuno Garoupa, Murat C. Mungan Optimal Imprisonment and Fines with Non-Discriminatory Sentences, SSRN Electronic Journal (Jan 2019).https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3382839Thomas J. Miceli On proportionality of punishments and the economic theory of crime, European Journal of Law and Economics 46, no.33 (Jan 2016): 303–314.https://doi.org/10.1007/s10657-016-9524-5Madina Kurmangaliyeva Missing Rich Offenders: Traffic Accidents and the Impartiality of Justice, Review of Law & Economics 14, no.11 (Mar 2018).https://doi.org/10.1515/rle-2017-0001John R. 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Mitchell Polinsky The optimal use of fines and imprisonment when wealth is unobservable, Journal of Public Economics 90, no.4-54-5 (May 2006): 823–835.https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2005.05.006Nuno Garoupa, Frank H Stephen Optimal Law Enforcement with Legal Aid, Economica 71, no.283283 (Aug 2004): 493–500.https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0013-0427.2004.00382.xA. Mitchell Mitchell Polinsky The Optimal Use of Fines and Imprisonment When Wealth is Unobservable, SSRN Electronic Journal (Jan 2004).https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.583942Louis Hotte, Fabrice Valognes, Tanguy van Ypersele Property Crime with Private Protection: A Market-for-offenses Approach, SSRN Electronic Journal (Jan 2003).https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.412900Louis Hotte, Stefan Ambec On the Redistributive Impact of Privatizing a Resource under Imperfect Enforcement, SSRN Electronic Journal (Jan 2003).https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.453940John C. Goodman, Philip Porter Is the criminal justice system just?, International Review of Law and Economics 22, no.11 (Jul 2002): 25–39.https://doi.org/10.1016/S0144-8188(02)00066-2Hugh Gravelle, Nuno Garoupa Optimal Deterrence with Legal Defense Expenditure, Economic Inquiry 40, no.33 (Jul 2002): 366–379.https://doi.org/10.1093/ei/40.3.366Isaac Ehrlich Criminal Justice, (Jan 2017): 553–560.https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-74173-1_107John R. Lott Criminal Conviction and Future Income, (Jan 2017): 550–553.https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-74173-1_106 By Daniel Kessler and Steven D. Levitt Using Sentence Enhancements to Distinguish between Deterrence and Incapacitation Kessler & Levitt, The Journal of Law and Economics 42, no.S1S1 (Jul 2015): 343–364.https://doi.org/10.1086/467428 By Jeffrey S. Parker and Raymond A. Atkins Did the Corporate Criminal Sentencing Guidelines Matter? Some Preliminary Empirical Observations Parker & Atkins, The Journal of Law and Economics 42, no.S1S1 (Jul 2015): 423–454.https://doi.org/10.1086/467431Henning Curti Theoretische Größen und ihre empirische Approximation, (Jan 1999): 97–129.https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-322-91513-9_5Hope Corman, Naci H. Mocan A Time-Series Analysis of Crime, Deterrence and Drug Abuse in New York City, SSRN Electronic Journal (Jan 1999).https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.159028Daniel P. Kessler, Steven D. Levitt Using Sentence Enhancements to Distinguish Between Deterrence and Incapacitation, SSRN Electronic Journal (Jan 1999).https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.168613Steven D. Levitt Incentive compatibility constraints as an explanation for the use of prison sentences instead of fines, International Review of Law and Economics 17, no.22 (Jun 1997): 179–192.https://doi.org/10.1016/S0144-8188(97)00002-1Tadiboyina Venkateswarlu Law and Economics Course Readings: A Survey of North American Universities, The American Economist 41, no.11 (Mar 1997): 89–93.https://doi.org/10.1177/056943459704100110Bruce H. Kobayashi, John R. Lott In defense of criminal defense expenditures and plea bargaining, International Review of Law and Economics 16, no.44 (Dec 1996): 397–416.https://doi.org/10.1016/S0144-8188(96)00034-8JAMES ANDREONI CRIMINAL DETERRENCE IN THE REDUCED FORM: A NEW PERSPECTIVE ON EHRLICH'S SEMINAL STUDY, Economic Inquiry 33, no.33 (Jul 1995): 476–483.https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1465-7295.1995.tb01875.xC.Y.Cyrus Chu, Neville Jiang Are fines more efficient than imprisonment?, Journal of Public Economics 51, no.33 (Jul 1993): 391–413.https://doi.org/10.1016/0047-2727(93)90073-3John R. Lott DO WE PUNISH HIGH INCOME CRIMINALS TOO HEAVILY?, Economic Inquiry 30, no.44 (Oct 1992): 583–608.https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1465-7295.1992.tb01283.xBruce H. Kobayashi, John R. Lott Low-probability-high-penalty enforcement strategies and the efficient operation of the plea-bargaining system, International Review of Law and Economics 12, no.11 (Mar 1992): 69–77.https://doi.org/10.1016/0144-8188(92)90006-DJohn R. Lott The effect of conviction on the legitimate income of criminals, Economics Letters 34, no.44 (Dec 1990): 381–385.https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(90)90149-UGilbert Geis Crime and Criminal Justice: Where Have We Been, Where Are We Going?, Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice 6, no.44 (Dec 1990): 254–263.https://doi.org/10.1177/104398629000600406John R. Lott Juvenile delinquency and education: A comparison of public and private provision, International Review of Law and Economics 7, no.22 (Dec 1987): 163–175.https://doi.org/10.1016/0144-8188(87)90018-4