Russia's Afghanistan Policy: An Irresolute Strategy for an Uncertain Future
2014; Routledge; Volume: 33; Issue: 3 Linguagem: Inglês
10.1080/01495933.2014.926718
ISSN1521-0448
Autores Tópico(s)Politics and Conflicts in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Middle East
ResumoAbstractRussia's policy toward Afghanistan is at a critical juncture. This article aims to explain the evolution of Moscow's policy since 2001, and to assess its future options. The findings of this article are twofold. Moscow attempted to balance two overarching objectives: stabilize Afghanistan and maintain Russia's hegemony in Central Asia. Russian fluctuations toward Afghanistan since 2001 stemmed from changes in its perceived interests and its prioritization of these two objectives. Furthermore, Moscow is becoming increasingly concerned about Afghanistan. However, it has relatively few realistic policy options to address challenges that may develop once international military forces cease major combat operations. Notes1Term used by Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev. See Dmit Medvedev, "Interv'yu Dmitriia Medvedeva telekanalam 'Rossiia,' Pervomu," NTV, August 31, 2008, available at http://archive.kremlin.ru/text/appears/2008/08/205991.shtml2This article defines hegemony as the domination of one nation over another through economic, political, or military methods.3ISAF is the UN-mandated international coalition that is tasked to conduct counterinsurgency and security operations in support of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. ISAF consists of 50 troop-contributing nations as of 2012. See International Security Assistance Force, "International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Key Facts and Figures," available at http://www.isaf.nato.int/images/stories/File/2012-01-06%20ISAF%20Placemat.pdf4From 1989 to 1991, the Soviet Union still provided substantial aid worth between $250 and $300 million per month. Beyond this, little political support was given. On September 13,1991, the USSR and the United States agreed to stop supplying "the warring parties in Afghanistan." President Najibullah thus lost his patron. Later, Boris Yeltsin was also unwilling to come to the assistance of Najibullah's regime. See Kakar M. Hassan, Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response (Berkley: University of California Press, 1995), 272.5An additional source of distrust of the Taliban was the detention of a Russian aircrew by the Taliban in August 1995. The aircrew was transporting ammunition to Rabbani's forces in Kabul, but was intercepted by a Taliban MiG-21. The crew was held for a year before escaping. "Escape From Kandahar," BBC, October 29, 2001, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/world/monitoring/media_reports/1624821.stm6United States Secretary of State, "Discussing Afghan Policy with the Pakistanis," Declassified U.S. Department of State cable to American Embassy Islamabad, December 22, 1995, available at http://www.gwu.edu/∼nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB227/7.pdf7Russia had maintained border forces in the Central Asian countries surrounding Afghanistan since the collapse of the Soviet Union.8Steve Coll, Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001 (New York: Penguin Press, 2004), 345.9Ahmed Rashid, Taliban (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000), 76.10National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, The 9/11 Commission Report (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2004), p. 67.11Ahmed Rashid, Descent into Chaos: The United States and the Failure of Nation Building in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Central Asia (New York: Viking Penguin, 2008), 17.12National Commission, The 9/11 Commission Report, 115–134.13Russian Presidential Degree No. 24, "National Security Concept of the Russian Federation," January 10, 2000, available at http://www.mid.ru/bdomp/ns-osndoc.nsf/1e5f0de28fe77fdcc32575d900298676/36aba64ac09f737fc32575d9002bbf31!OpenDocument.14Russia's view of the international scene was articulated in the 2000 Foreign Policy Concept, which stressed Russia's role as a "great power" in a multi-polar world that is balanced by a few great powers. Specific emphasis is given to the maintenance of traditional great-power institutions such as the United Nations Security Council and the G-8. See Ministerstvo Inostrannykh Del Rossisko Federatsii, "Kontseptsiia vneshn politiki," June 28, 2000, available at http://www.mid.ru/Bl.nsf/arh/19DCF61BEFED61134325699C003B5FA315Jeffrey Mankoff, Russian Foreign Policy: The Return of Great Power Politics (New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2009), 13.16Michael Wines, "After the Attacks: In Moscow; Russia Takes Stand against Terrorism, but the Stance Wavers Quickly," The New York Times, September 16, 2001, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2001/09/16/us/after-attacks-moscow-russia-takes-stand-against-terrorism-but-stance-wavers.html?pagewanted=print17Vladimir Putin, "Zayavlenie Prezidenta Rossii," (speech, Moscow, September 24, 2001), available at http://2004.kremlin.ru/text/appears/2001/09/28639.shtml18While Russian approval was not technically required for the United States to gain basing rights in Central Asia, Central Asian leaders would have been reluctant to permit U.S. bases if Moscow was opposed.19Michael McFaul, US–Russia Relations After September 11, 2001 (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2001), available at http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=84020Robert H. Donaldson and Joseph Nye, The Foreign Policy of Russia: Changing Systems, Enduring Interests (New York: M.E Sharpe, 2005), 360.21Vladimir Putin, "Zayavlenie Prezidenta Rossii."22On September 26, White House Press Secretary Ari Fleisher echoed Putin's demands by calling on Chechen leaders to "immediately and unconditionally cut all contacts with international terrorist groups…" See James M. Goldgeier and Michael McFaul, Power and Purpose: U.S. Policy toward Russia after the Cold War (Washington, DC: Brookings Institute Press, 2003), 316.23Peter Baker and Susan Glasser, Kremlin Rising: Vladimir Putin's Russia and the End of Revolution (New York: A Lisa Drew Book/Scribner, 2005), 133–134.24Operation Enduring Freedom is the operational name given to the U.S.'s global war on terrorism.25United Nations Secretary General, Letter 1154, "Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-Establishment of Permanent Government Institutions," December 5, 2001, available at http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2001/115426For Russia's view on international relations and the importance of international institutions, see Ministerstvo Inostrannykh Del Rossisko Federatsii, "Kontseptsiia vneshn politiki."27Dmitri Trenin and Alexei Malashenko, Afghanistan: A View from Moscow (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2010), 17, available at http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=4067228Golnaz Esfandiari, "RFE/RL Afghanistan Report," Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, April 7, 2004, available at http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1340571.html29Trenin and Malashenko. "Afghanistan: A View from Moscow," 8.30Georgia's "Rose Revolution" occurred in 2002, followed by Ukraine's 2004 "Orange Revolution" and Kyrgyzstan's "Tulip Revolution."31Leon Aron, The United States and Russia: Ideologies, Policies and Relations (Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute, 2006), available at http://www.aei.org/files/2006/06/29/20060629_20281ROSummer06_g.pdf32Mankoff, Russian Foreign Policy, 269.33Denis Trifonov, "'Ivanov Doctrine' Reflects Moscow's Growing Confidence in the CIS and Beyond," Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, November 19, 2003, available at http://www.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/165734In 2005, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) consisted of Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan.35There were two major U.S. bases in Central Asia in 2005. Uzbekistan, with encouragement from Russia, threw the Americans out in 2005 after the U.S. government criticized the Uzbek's violent suppression of the Andijan riots. The second base in Kyrgyzstan remained open despite Russian pressure. Rashid, Descent into Chaos, 340.36Some Russian forces remained in Tajikistan, but they did not have the primary responsibility for guarding the border. The absence of Russian border guards contributed to a rapid increase in drug trafficking. See Andrei Kazantsev, "Russian Policy in Central Asia and the Caspian Sea Region," Europe-Asia Studies, vol. 60, no. 6 (August 2008): 1083.37Although opium production dropped initially after 2001, production levels began sharply rising. From 2005 to 2006, Afghanistan saw a 49% production increase, from an estimated 4,100 metric tons to 6,100. This accounted for 92% of worldwide opium production. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2007 World Drug Report (New York: United Nations Publication, 2007), 195–196, available at http://www.unodc.org/pdf/research/wdr07/WDR_2007.pdf38CSTO currently has seven members: Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan.39During this period, Russia sought to increase the role and visibility of these organizations as part of its strategy in Central Asia. Russia hoped to strengthen its position in Central Asia through its leadership in these organizations. See, for example, Mankoff, Russian Foreign Policy, 175, 196.40"Kabul Interested in CSTO, Cooperation, Russian Armament— Govt," RIA Novosti, March 17, 2007, available at http://en.rian.ru/world/20070314/62000929.html41"Afghanistan Freezes Ties with Regional Security Group," RIA Novosti, September 15, 2008, available at http://en.rian.ru/world/20080915/116806890.html42Anna Matveeva and Antonio Giustozzi, The SCO: Regional Organization in the Making, Crisis States Working Paper Series, 2nd ser., 39 (2008), 16.43The Rome Declaration, replacing the Permanent Joint Council, established the NATO–Russia Council (NRC) in 2002. The NRC is the mechanism for coordination and consultation on security-related issues between Russia and NATO.44North Atlantic Treaty Organization, "Launch of Counternarcotics Training Sponsored by the NATO-Russia Council," news release, September 2006, available at http://www.nato.int/docu/update/2006/09-september/e0915a.htm45Kazantsev, "Russian Policy in Central Asia and the Caspian Sea Region," 1080.46For a discussion on Russian's real and perceived interests in Afghanistan, see Trenin and Malashenko, "Afghanistan: A View from Moscow," 13–16.47The deterioration in US–Russia relations reached its nadir during the August 2008 Russian-Georgian war. See, for example, James F. Collins, "Opportunities for the US–Russia Relationship" (speech, Tucson Committee on Foreign Relations, Tucson, AZ, March 12, 2009), available at http://www.carnegie.ru/publications/?fa=2288948Speaking at the Munich Security Conference in February 2009, Vice President Biden announced that the White House wanted to "press the reset button." He identified Afghanistan as one of the major areas on which Russia and the U.S. needed to cooperate. See official transcript: Joseph Biden, "Remarks by Vice President Biden at the 45th Munich Security Conference" (speech, Munich, February 7, 2009), available at http://moscow.usembassy.gov/tr_biden020709.html49"Russia, NATO Agree on Transit of Non-Lethal Cargo to Afghanistan," RIA Novosti, April 4, 2008, available at http://en.rian.ru/russia/20080404/103017125.html; Sayed Salahuddin, "Russia Agrees to Afghan Request for Defense Aid," Reuters, January 19, 2009, available at http://in.reuters.com/article/idINIndia-37527720090119; and "Russia May Resume Arms Sales to Afghanistan," RIA Novosti, June 9, 2008, available at http://en.rian.ru/world/20080609/109648809.html50M. K. Bhadrakumar, "Russia Joins the War in Afghanistan," Asia Times Online, June 25, 2008, available at http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Central_Asia/JF25Ag01.html511 For Russia's official position on Afghanistan, see its current Foreign Policy Concept: Ministerstvo Inostrannykh Del Rosssk Federatsii, "Kontseptsiia vneshn politi Rosssk Federatsii," February 12, 2013, available at http://www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/0/6D84DDEDEDBF7DA644257B160051BF7F52Trenin and Malashenko, "Afghanistan: A View from Moscow," 17.53For a detailed account of the growth of radical Islamic groups in Tatarstan, see Sergei Markedonov, "The Rise of Radical and Nonofficial Islamic Groups in Russia's Volga Region," Center for Strategic and International Studies, January 23, 2013, available at http://csis.org/publication/rise-radical-and-nonofficial-islamic-groups-russias-volga-region54"Dlya reabilitatsii narkozavisimykh pravonarushitel v Rossii sozdadut edinuyu bazu dannykh" ITAR-TASS, December 27, 2012, available at http://fskn.gov.ru/includes/periodics/review/2012/1228/151921990/detail.shtml55Russia reportedly offered the Kyrgyz government a $300 million loan and write-off of $180 million of Kyrgyz debt. See German Priks, "Reports: Kyrgyzstan to Close Key US Base," CNN, February 3, 2009, available at http://articles.cnn.com/2009-02-03/world/kyrgyz.base_1_manas-air-base-kyrgyzstan-military-base?_s=PM:WORLD56"Putin protiv ukhoda NATO iz Afganistana," Izvestiia, August 1, 2012, available at http://izvestia.ru/news/53195257"Lavrov vyyasnit, zachem NATO bazy v Afganistane," Golos Rossii, September 26, 2012, available at http://rus.ruvr.ru/2012_09_26/Lavrov-vijasnit-zachem-NATO-bazi-v-Afganistane/58Eugene B. Rumer and Angela E. Stent, Repairing U.S-Russian Relations: A Long Road Ahead (Washington, DC: INSS/CERES, 2009), 12.59NATO–Russia Council, "NATO–Russia Council Joint Statement," news release, November 20, 2010, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2010/11/20/nato-russia-council-joint-statement60Plans for a 2012 NRC summit were scrapped, likely because of disputes over missile defense and a host of other issues.61"Russia, NATO Complete Talks on New Afghan Transit Deal (Update 1)," RIA Novosti, November 20, 2010, available at http://en.rian.ru/russia/20101120/161424327.html62Paul D. Shinkman, "U.S. Purchases All Afghanistan Fuel from Russians, Former Soviet Countries," U.S. News and World Report, August 29, 2013, available at http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2013/08/29/us-purchases-all-afghanistan-fuel-from-russians-former-soviet-countries63Elena Chernenko, "'My smozhem nachat' stroit' sovmestnuyu PRO': Zamestitel' genseka NATO ob otnosheniyakh s RF," Kommersant', April 1, 2013, available at http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/215991364Marlène Laruelle, "Russia's Strategies in Afghanistan and Their Consequences for NATO," NATO Defense College, November 2011, 2–3, available at http://www.gwu.edu/∼ieresgwu/assets/docs/Laruelle_NATO_Nov11.pdf65North Atlantic Treaty Organization, "NATO to Expand Counterdrug Training Project," April 10, 2013, available at http://en.rian.ru/world/20130410/180563702.html66Russia and the U.S. have occasionally cooperated on counter-narcotics missions. For instance, on October 28, 2010, Russian forces conducted a joint operation with the United States to destroy drug laboratories in eastern Afghanistan, marking the first time Russian forces have conducted military operations in Afghanistan since the Soviet withdrawal two decades earlier. In March 2013, Russian Federal Drug Control Service personnel again participated in an operation that seized 21 tons of heroin and destroyed drug labs (the extent of Russia's participation is unknown). See "Russia and US Collaborate in Afghanistan Drug Raid," BBC, October 29, 2010, available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-11651469; and "V Afganistane pri uchastii FSKN udalos' iz''yat' bolee 20 tonn geroina," Rossiskaya gazeta, March 12, 2013, available at http://www.rg.ru/2013/03/12/ivanov-anons.html67For a discussion of the effectiveness of the ISAF counter-narcotics strategy, see Vanda Felbab-Brown, "Afghanistan Trip Report VI: Counternarcotics Policy in Afghanistan: A Good Strategy Poorly Implemented," Brookings Institution, May 10, 2012, available at http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2012/05/10-counternarcotics-felbabbrown68"U SShA i Rossii odni tseli v bor'be s narkotikami v Afganistane," Interfax, June 6, 2011, available at http://www.interfax.ru/world/txt.asp?id=19796269Elena Chernenko, "Antinarkoticheskuyu initsiativu zablokirovali v Vene," Komersant', February 2, 2012, available at http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/187464270The Pentagon opted for the Mi-17 because that is what ANAAF currently uses. Switching to American-built helicopters would degrade the ANAAF capability and readiness because all ANAAF pilots would have to be retrained to fly American helicopters. See Craig Whitlock, "U.S. Military Criticized for Purchase of Russian Copters for Afghan Air Corp," The Washington Post, June 19, 2010, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/06/18/AR2010061805630.html71"Pentagon to Buy Russian Helicopters despite Ban," RIA Novosti, April 4, 2013, available at http://en.rian.ru/military_news/20130405/180451358.html72North Atlantic Treaty Organization, "NATO–Russia Council Expands Helicopter Maintenance Trust Fund Project for Afghanistan," April 23, 2013, available at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-19694350-9959BB54/natolive/news_100106.htm73This technology will be tested for the first time in June 2013. See ibid.74Ministerstvo Inostrannykh Del Rosssk Federatsii, "Kontseptsiia vneshn politiki Rosssk Federatsii," February 12, 2013, sec. IV.91.75For Russia's views on China's growing influence, see David Kerr, "Central Asia and Russian Perspectives on China's Strategic Emergence," International Affairs, vol. 86, no. 1 (2010), 127–152.76The post-2014 U.S. troop levels are currently being debated. See Michael R. Gordon and Mark Landler, "Decision on Afghan Troop Levels Calculates Political and Military Interest," The New York Times, February 12, 2013, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/13/us/politics/obama-to-announce-troops-return.html?_r=077Joshua Kucera, "What Military Equipment Should the U.S. Give Uzbekistan?" Eurasianet, March 10, 2013, available at http://www.eurasianet.org/node/6666778For a detailed account of U.S. military assistance to Central Asia, see Joshua Kucera, "US Military Aid to Central Asia: Who Benefits?" Open Society Foundations, Occasional Paper no. 7, September 2012, available at http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/us-military-aid-central-asia-who-benefits-20121015.pdf79Roger McDermott, "Moscow Fears Shift in Central Asia's Strategic Balance Post-2014," European Dialogue, July 4, 2012, available at http://eurodialogue.org/nato/Moscow-Fears-Shift-in-Central-Asia-Strategic-Balance-Post-201480Harsh V. Pant, "India–Russia Ties and India's Strategic Culture: Dominance of a Realist Worldview," India Review, vol. 12, no. 1 (2013): 10.81Putin has routinely emphasized the CSTO over the SCO for dealing with the Afghan problem in recent years. One likely explanation is that China is not a member of the former.82Alexei Anishchuk, "Putin: Russia Needs Stronger Defense against Afghan Threats," Reuters, May 8, 2013, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/05/08/us-russia-afghanistan-idUSBRE9470S72013050883Russian troops no longer have the lead responsibility for securing the Tajik-Afghan border. That responsibility transferred to the Tajik military in 2005.84Joshua Kucera, "Great Game in Central Asia," The Diplomat, March 27, 2013, available at http://thediplomat.com/2013/03/27/the-great-game-in-central-asia-after-afghanistan/85"Rossiia ne planiruet razmeshchat' voennye bazy v Afganistane," RIA Novosti, April 5, 2013, available at http://ria.ru/defense_safety/20130405/931107277.html86Kenneth Katzman, "Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security and U.S. Policy," Congressional Research Service, April 9, 2013, 53, available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL30588.pdf87Toby Dodge and Nicholas Redman, eds., Afghanistan to 2015 and Beyond (New York: Routledge, 2011), 215.88Ibid., 54.Additional informationNotes on contributorsScott BohnScott Bohn (sbohn100@gmail.com) is a Major in the Air Force Reserve, serving as an Eurasian specialist. He is currently on active duty orderswith theU.S. Strategic Command's Standing Joint Force Headquarters for Elimination of Weapons of Mass Destruction. His multiple active duty and reserve tours included postings at the Defense Intelligence Agency and the Office of the Secretary of Defense. He also deployed to Afghanistan in 2009, where he aided in the development of President Obama's new counterinsurgency strategy. Major Bohn recently completed a master's degree in Russian and East European Studies at Georgetown University; as a component of this graduate program, he spent a year conducting research in Moscow.
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