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The Russo-Georgian war and beyond: towards a European great power concert

2012; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 21; Issue: 1 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1080/09662839.2012.656595

1746-1545

Henrik Larsen,

European Politics and Security

Abstract The brief war between Georgia and Russia in August 2008 provoked vigorous international reactions among the European states as consequence of the sudden shift in the strategic balance. This article argues for a focus on the great powers France, Germany and Britain as crucial actors for understanding the policy reactions towards Russia. It argues furthermore that reactions must be explained from the perspective of experience based on past geopolitics which translate the external pressures into concrete foreign policy: France oriented towards the creation of a strong EU as global actor, Germany influenced by her self-imposed restraint in foreign affairs and Britain influenced by Atlanticist commitments in her balancing behaviour. Beyond the Russo-Georgian war, the article points to an interest-based foreign policy approach towards Russia in the longer term driven by a great power concert with the Franco-German axis as stable element but increasingly with backing from Britain, thus contributing to transatlantic foreign policy convergence on the issue. Keywords: GeorgiaRussiaNATO ESDPFranceGermanyGreat Britain Acknowledgements This article has been written as part of the project on 'The "Presence of the Past": Theorising the Interplay of Past and Present Geopolitics in Contemporary Foreign Policy' in conjunction with the Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS) and the University of Copenhagen. I am grateful to Hans Mouritzen, DIIS, the participants at the 'Realism and Foreign Policy' Conference held at DIIS 12-13 November 2009 as well as three anonymous reviewers for valuable comments to previous versions of this article. Notes 1. An additional number of Western, Central European and West Balkan states plus Turkey. Italy – represented by Prime Minister Berlusconi – represents the only case of a veritable Russia supporter. 2. Possibly related to preferences for further EU enlargements. For both Georgia and Russia, EU membership has been a less salient issue than NATO membership but can meaningfully be taken as expression of general preferences for approaching the eastern neighbourhood countries to the West. 3. According to diplomatic sources, during one of the meetings with Sarkozy, Putin had threatened to overthrow the regime in Tbilisi and string up Saakashvili, cf. Fox News (2008 Fox News , 2008 . Aide to France's Sarkozy Reveals Putin wanted to Hang Georgian President ' By the …'. Available from: http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,451426,00.html [Accessed 28 September 2010] . [Google Scholar]). 4. 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