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Scientific Thought in Fourteenth‐Century Paris: Jean Buridan and Nicole Oresme

1978; Wiley; Volume: 314; Issue: 1 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1111/j.1749-6632.1978.tb47788.x

1749-6632

Edward Grant,

History of Science and Medicine

Annals of the New York Academy of SciencesVolume 314, Issue 1 p. 105-126 Scientific Thought in Fourteenth-Century Paris: Jean Buridan and Nicole Oresme EDWARD GRANT, EDWARD GRANT Department of History and Philosophy of Science, Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana 47401Search for more papers by this author EDWARD GRANT, EDWARD GRANT Department of History and Philosophy of Science, Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana 47401Search for more papers by this author First published: October 1978 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1749-6632.1978.tb47788.xCitations: 5AboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onEmailFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditWechat NOTES AND REFERENCES 1 For the details of Buridan's life and works, I have relied on Ernest A. Moody's article, "Buridan, Jean," in the Dictionary of Scientific Biography, ed. Charles Coulston Gillispie, Vol. 2 (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1970)x, pp. 603–608. 2 The scientific treatises on which Buridan commented, or on which he wrote questiones, include the Physics, On the Heaven (De caelo), Metaphysics, On the Soul (De anima), Posterior Analytics, On Generation and Corruption, Meteorology, and the Short Natural Treatises (Parva Naturalia). Moody (Dict, of Scientific Biography, Vol. 2, p. 608) cites early and modern editions of Buridan's works as well as a useful list of secondary works. For a comprehensive list of editions and manuscripts of Buridan's commentaries on the works of Aristotle, see Charles H. Lohr, S.J., "Medieval Latin Aristotle Commentaries, Authors Jacobus-Johannes Juff," in Traditio, Vol. 26 (1970), 161–183. A lengthy list of articles on Buridan appears on pp. 161–163. Despite his significance, only a few of Buridan's works have received modern editions. 3 For the most recent list of Oresme's works and an excellent summary of his scientific thought, see Marshall Clagett, "Oresme, Nicole," in Dictionary of Scientific Biography, Vol. 10, pp. 229–230. The manuscripts and editions of Oresme's Aristotelian commentaries, as well as a lengthy bibliography on his life and works, appear in Lohr, "Medieval Latin Aristotle Commentaries, Authors: Narcissus-Richardus," Traditio, Vol. 28 (1972), 290–298. 4 On the neologisms which Oresme introduced into Le Livre du ciel et du monde, his French translation of the Latin text of Aristotle's On the Heavens (De caelo), see Nicole Oresme: Le Livre du ciel et du monde, edited by Albert D. Menut and Alexander J. Denomy, translated with an introduction by Albert D. Menut (Madison, Wis.: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1968), p. 13. 5 For a sketch of Oresme's life, see Nicole Oresme: "De proportionibus proportionum" and "Ad pauca respicientes," edited with introductions, English translations, and critical notes by Edward Grant (Madison, Wis.: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1966), pp. 3–10; Clagett, "Oresme," Dictionary of Scientific Biography, Vol. 10, p. 223. 6 Oresme found occasion to discuss music in various works. Perhaps the most extensive discussion appears in his De configurationibus qualitatum, which has been edited, translated, and commented upon by Marshall Clagett, Nicole Oresme and the Medieval Geometry of Qualities and Motions: A Treatise on the Uniformity and Difformity of Intensities Known as "Tractatus de configurationibus qualitatum et motuum" ( Madison , Wis. : The University of Wisconsin Press, 1968), pp. 37–39, 304–336 (also see the General Index, under "music" and "musical intervals and scales"). 7 For Oresme's dedication of his Algorismus proportionum to Philippe, see Edward Grant, "Part I of Nicole Oresme's Algorismus proportionum," Isis, Vol. 56 (1965), p. 328 and n.5. Whether Oresme was personally acquainted with de Vitry cannot be determined from the dedicatory prologue. On the ars nova, see Willi Apel, Harvard Dictionary of Music, second edition, revised and enlarged (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 969), pp. 58–60. 8 See Menut's discussion in Oresme: Le Livre du ciel et du monde, p. 3. 9 Oresme's mathematical techniques for graphing variations in intensities, or configurations, of qualities, which he developed in his De configurationibus qualitatum et motuum, were indirectly of enormous influence. Although by the fifteenth century, Oresme's name was rarely mentioned in connection with the graphing techniques he had devised and the variety of proofs and theorems which he had developed to illustrate the doctrine of the configuration of qualities, all this had been adopted by others, almost always without acknowledgment, and in this manner was eventually disseminated throughout Europe, ultimately influencing even Galileo and other seventeenth-century scientific luminaries. For the details, see Clagett, Nicole Oresme and the Medieval Geometry of Qualities and Motions, pp. 73–111. 10 I refer here to the De proportionibus proportionum and Ad pauca respicientes. In my edition of these two treatises, cited above, see pp. 130–132. 11 For a translation of the statute, see Lynn Thorndike (ed.), University Records and Life in the Middle Ages ( New York : Columbia University Press, 1944), pp. 85–86; reprinted in Edward Grant (ed.), A Source Book in Medieval Science (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1974), pp. 44–45. 12 This occurred in connection with Buridan's consideration of whether a vacuum, the natural existence of which Aristotle had denied, could be brought into being by the actions of any agent, including the deity. The concept of vacuum touched theology because it raised the question whether God required an empty space in which to create the world and because all Catholics had to concede the possibility that God could, if He wished, create a vacuum. In his discussion, Buridan acknowledged that he had been reproached by theological masters for intermingling theological matters in some of his physical disputations. He insisted, however, that despite the oath he had taken, it was necessary to invoke some theology in order to meet the demands of the question, for otherwise he would have to perjure himself by omitting relevant material from the argument. In the end, he chose to introduce a modest degree of theological discussion. For the relevant part of this question, see the translation in E. Grant, A Source Book in Medieval Science, pp. 50–51. 13 Here we may cite two instances. In the first, Buridan suggested that the celestial spheres might not be moved by intelligences, but rather by internal force, or impetus, as he called it, which God had impressed within them at the creation. Aware of the theological implications of his suggestion, Buridan quickly added that he was speaking only tentatively and that in this matter he sought guidance from the theological masters In the second instance, Buridan first upholds Aristotle's claim that no body whatever exists beyond the world, and then advises the reader "to have recourse to the theologians [in order to learn] what must be said about this according to the truth or constancy of faith." For the references and passages, see Grant, A Source Book in Medieval Science, p. 51, n. 4. 14 The Latin text of the articles in their original order appears in H. Denifle and E. Chatelain, Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis, Vol. 1 (Paris, 1889), pp. 543–555. A regrouping by subject matter was made by Pierre Mandonnet, Siger de Brabant et l'Averroisme Latin aux XIIIme siècle, deuxième édition revue et augmentée: IIme Partie: Textes inédits (Louvain, 1908), pp. 175–191. Mandonnet's rearrangement of the articles was translated into English by Ernest L. Fortrin and Peter D. O'Neill in Medieval Political Philosophy: A Sourcebook, eds. Ralph Lerner and Muhsin Mahdi (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1963), pp. 337–354; it was reprinted in Arthur Hyman and James J. Walsh (eds.), Philosophy in the Middle Ages: The Christian, Islamic, and Jewish Traditions (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 1973), pp. 540–549. Selected articles relevant to medieval science have been translated in Grant, A Source Book in Medieval Science, pp. 45–50. 15 Article 147 condemned the opinion "That the absolutely impossible cannot be done by God or another agent.—An error, if impossible is understood according to nature." See Grant, Source Book, p. 49. As special cases, it had to be conceded that God could create a single world (articles 87 and 98 condemned the eternity of the world), or many worlds (article 34); that He could move our allegedly immobile, spherical world with a rectilinear motion (article 49); and that He could create an accident without a subject in which to inhere (articles 140 and 141). Grant, Source Book, pp. 48–49. 16 That not even God could produce a logical contradiction was widely accepted in the Middle Ages. For Aquinas's support of this position, see the translation of his De aeternitate mundi in St. Thomas Aquinas, Siger of Brabant, St. Bonaventure, On the Eternity of the World (De Aeternitate Mundi), translated from the Latin with an Introduction by Cyril Vollert, Lottie H. Kendzierski, and Paul M. Byrne (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1964), p. 22. 17 See Anneliese Maier, "Das Prinzip der doppelten Wahrheit," Metaphysische Hintergründe der spätscholastischen Naturphilosophie (Rome: Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, 1955), p. 27. 18 "Tamen sciendum est quod licet per naturam non sit possibile esse alium mundum ab isto, tamen simpliciter hoc est possibile; quia tenemus ex fide quod sicut deus fecit istum mundum, ita posset adhuc facere alium vel alios plures."Questions on De caelo, Bk.1, Question 18 in Ernest Moody (ed.), Iohannis Buridani Quaestiones super libris quattuor De caelo et mundo (Cambridge, Mass.: The Medieval Academy of America, 1942), p. 84; see also p. 89, for the same sentiment. 19 After conceding that one could not demonstrate that beyond the world there is no magnitude and space, Buridan declares: "Tamen ego opinor quod illic non sit spacium vel magnitudo vel alius mundus et ad hoc adducit Aristoteles rationes naturales in primo Celi, que illic tractande sunt. Ideo solum ad hoc pono persuasionem talem quia non est verisimile quod Deus ibi fecit alium mundum vel alios mundos quia si plures creaturas mundanas voluisset fecisse quam fecerit, non oportebat facere alios mundos quia potuisset istum mundum fecisse in duplo vel centuplo maiorem; et si non fecit ibi Deus alium mundum vel alios mundos, non apparet ratio quare fecisse illic spacium quia illud de nichilo deserviret ultra istum mundum et apparet esse frustra."Questions on the Physics, Bk. 3, Question 15 in Acutissimi philosophi magistri Johannis Buridani subtilissime questiones super octo Phisicorum libros Aristotelis diligenter recognite et revise magistro Johanne Dullaert de Gandavo antea nusquam impresse (Paris, 1509; reprinted in facsimile under the title Johannes Buridanus, Kommentar zur Aristotelischen Physik by Minerva G.M.B.H., Frankfurt a.M., 1964), fol. 57v, col. 2. 20 "Secundo etiam dico quod non est ponendum modo supernaturali spatium infinitum extra caelum sive extra istum mundum, quia non debemus ponere quae non apparent nobis per sensum vel experientiam aut per rationem naturalem aut per auctoritatem sacrae scripturae, sed per nullum istorum apparet nobis quod sit spatium infinitum extra istum mundum. Bene tamen esset concedendum quod extra istum mundum posset deus creare spatium corporeum et substantias corporeas quantascumque sibi placeret, sed non est propter hoc ponendum quod ita sit."Questions on De caelo, Bk. 1, Question 17, Moody, lohannis Buridani Quaestiones super libris quattuor De caelo et mundo, p. 79. 21 "Modo in naturali philosophia nos debemus actiones et dependentias accipere ac si semper procederent modo naturali; …" Questions on De caelo, Bk. 2, Question 9, edition of Moody, p. 164. Also cited by Maier, Metaphysische Hintergründe, pp. 18 and 328, n. 22. 22 "Et potest responderi ad rationes Aristotelis, quod ipse multa posuit contra veritatem catholicam, quia nihil voluit ponere nisi posset deduci ex rationibus ortum habentibus ex sensatis et expertis; ideo non oportet in multis credere Aristoteli, scilicet ubi dissonat sacrae scripturae." Questions on De caelo, Bk. 2, Question 6, edition of Moody, p. 152. 23 In considering "whether every corruptible thing is corrupted from necessity" ("Utrum omne corruptibile de necessitate corrumpetur"), Buridan offers three distinctions, of which the second is: "Alia distinctio est, quod possimus loqui de potentia divina, et secundum ea quae tenemus ex fide; aliter possumus loqui secundum potentias naturales, vel ac si esset vera opinio Aristotelis de aeternitate mundi, …" Questions on De caelo, Bk. 1, Question 24, p. 118. Also cited by Maier, Metaphysische Hintergründe, p. 17. The italics are mine. Buridan was, however, not averse, on occasion, to use the divine power to his own advantage. In discussing the validity of the Aristotelian rules of motion, Buridan acknowledged that, although constant forces are required for their general validity, uniform motions and forces are not observed in nature. "And from these things it seems to me it must be inferred that these rules are rarely, or never, found to produce their effect. Nonetheless, these rules are conditional and true, for if the conditions stated in the rules were observed, everything would occur just as the rules assert. For this reason it ought not to be said that the rules are useless and fictitious because although these conditions are not fulfilled by natural powers, it is nevertheless possible, in an absolute sense, for them to be fulfilled by the divine power." My translation as it appears in Edward Grant, "Hypotheses in Late Medieval and Early Modern Science," The Voice of America Forum Lectures, History of Science Series, 3 (1964), p. 5. For the Latin text, see Buridan, Questions on the Physics, Bk. 7, Question 7, ed. cit., fol. 108v, col. 1. The passage is also quoted by Anneliese Maier, Die Vorläufer Galileis im 14. Jahrhundert. Studien zur Naturphilosophie der Spätscholastik (Rome: Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura. 1949), p. 101, n. 41, and discussed by William A. Wallace, Causality and Scientific Explanation (2 vols.; Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1972, 1974), Vol. 1, pp. 107–108. For Buridan, the rules of motion are logically consistent and would produce the predicted effects provided that the conditions are realized in nature, which might occur if God chose to intervene. It is a significant argument for the acceptance of idealized scientific laws, which though not realized in nature, ought yet to be accepted as valid. 24 Buridan uses this expression in his Questions on the Metaphysics, Bk. 2, Question 1 ("Utrum de rebus sit nobis possibilis comprehensio veritatis") in In Metaphysicen Aristotelis, Questiones argutissimae Magistri Ioannis Buridani in ultima praelectione ab ipso recognitae et emissae … (Paris, 1518; reprinted in facsimile under the title Johannes Buridanus, Kommentar zur Aristotelischen Metaphysik by Minerva G.M.B.H., Frankfurt a.M., 1964), fol. v, col. 2. In the title page added by Minerva, the edition is mistakenly dated 1588. 25 See Moody, "Buridan," Dictionary of Scientific Biography, p. 605. It was probably Autrecourt's opinion which Buridan had in mind when he offered the following as an argument against the possibility that we can comprehend the truth: "Et difficultas augmentatur multum per ea que credimus ex fide quia Deus potest in sensibus nostris formare species sensibilium sine ipsis sensibilibus et longo tempore potest eas conservare. Et tunc iudicamus ac si essent sensibilia presentia…. Immo cum nihil scias de voluntate Dei, tu non potes esse certus de aliquo." Questions on the Metaphysics, Bk. 2, Question 1, ed cit., fols. 8r, col. 2–8v, col. 1. 26 Translated by Moody, "Buridan," Dictionary of Scientific Biography, p. 605. For Buridan's text, see his Questions on the Metaphysics, Bk. 2, Question 1, ed. cit., fol. 9r, col. 1. 27 Moody, "Buridan, " Dictionary of Scientific Biography, p. 605. 28 "Immo concludendum est quod querebatur, scilicet quod nobis est possibilis comprehensio veritatis cum certitudine." Questions on the Metaphysics, Bk. 2, Question 1, ed. cit., fol. 9r, col. 1. On Buridan's nominalism and his insistence that "knowledge is to be objectively grounded in particular existents," see T. K. Scott, Jr., "John Buridan on the Objects of Demonstrative Science," Speculum, Vol. 40, Nr. 4 (1965), 654–673; for the quotation, see p. 659. 29 In discussing whether the heavens can be said to have matter, Buridan declares that "in nature nothing ought to be assumed in vain; and yet it is vain to assume more when all appearances could be saved by fewer [assumptions]." ("… quod in natura nihil debet poni frustra, et tamen frustra ponuntur plura quia omnia apparentia possent salvari pauciora." Questions on De caelo, Bk. 1, Question 11 ("Utrum caelum habeat materiam"), edition of Moody, p. 52. The same sentiment is expressed even more clearly in Bk. 2, Question 22, where Buridan explains that "just as it is better to save the appearances by fewer than by more [assumptions], if this is possible, so it is better to save [the appearances] by the easier path than the more difficult path." ("… sicut melius est salvare apparentia per pauciora quam per plura, si hoc sit possibile, ita melius est salvare per viam faciliorem quam per viam difficiliorem." Questions on De caelo, Bk. 2, Question 22 ["Utrum terra semper quiescat in medio mundi"], ibid., pp. 228–229.) In the very same question (p. 232), while discussing whether the earth rests in the milddle of the world, Buridan declares: "si terra quiescat, ideo frustra moveretur si moveretur; et nihil est ponendum frustra in natura." Ibid., p. 232. See also the concluding sentence of the Latin text cited in note 24, above. 30 Questions on De caelo, Bk. 1, Question 11, edition of Moody, pp. 52–53. Instead of matter, Buridan assumed that the celestial region was composed of a simple, uncompounded substance, which is, nevertheless, subject to magnitude. It is the magnitude which provides extension to the substance, and is also subject to motion and other accidents. 31 For the Latin text, see Questions on De caelo, Bk. 2, Question 22, edition of Moody, pp. 226–233. The major part of the question has been translated by Marshall Clagett, The Science of Mechanics in the Middle Ages, pp. 594–598 and has been reprinted in Grant, A Source Book in Medieval Science, pp. 500–503. A summary account of Buridan's arguments appears in Edward Grant, Physical Science in the Middle Ages (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1971), pp. 64–66. 32 The two passages appear in the unpublished, and as yet unedited, part of Oresme's Quodlibeta, and are quoted twice by Marshall Clagett. See his "Some Novel Trends in the Science of the Fourteenth Century," Charles S. Singleton (ed.), Art, Science and History in the Renaissance (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1968), p. 280, n. 12 and Nicole Oresme and the Medieval Geometry of Qualities and Motions, p. 12 and n. 6. A possible source for Oresme's statement is Walter Burley's Liber de vita et moribus philosophorum, which was probably written in the early 1340s. In describing the life of Socrates, Burley says: "Et licet esset sapientissimus nihil se scire putabat. Unde et illud sepe dicebat, ut ait Hieronymus ad Paulinum: hoc unum scio, quod nescio." Hermann Knust (ed.), Gualteri Burlaei Liber de vita et moribus philosophorum, mit einer Altspanischen Übersetzung der Eskurialbibliothek. Bibliothek des Litterarischen Vereins in Stuttgart, Vol. 177 (Tübingen, 1886), p. 110. In note f, in addition to St. Jerome's 53d letter to Paul, Kunst cites a number of other authors who quoted or paraphrased this famous Socratic pronouncement, the ultimate source of which is Plato's dialogues, especially the Apology and Phaedrus. 33 George Molland observes that, although Oresme sought to advance science, he was sceptical about attaining empirical scientific knowledge ("Nicole Oresme and Scientific Progress," Miscellanea Mediaevalia Veröffentlichungen des Thomas-Instituts der Universität zu Köln, ed. Albert Zimmermann, Vol. 9: Antiqui und Moderni, Traditionsbewusstein und Fortschrittsbewusstein im späten Mittelalter [Berlin/New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1974], pp. 206–220). 34 The three lengthiest and most fundamental discussions occur in Oresme's De proportionibus proportionum, Ad pauca respicientes (for the title of my edition of these two works, see above, n. 5). and Tractatus de commensurabilitate vel incommensurabilitate motuum celi (for the edition, see Nicole Oresme and the Kinematics of Circular Motion, Tractatus de commensurabilitate vel incommensurabilitate motuum celi. Edited with an Introduction, English Translation, and Commentary by Edward Grant [Madison, Wis.: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1971]). Oresme also discussed incommensurability of celestial motions in his Questiones super de celo, Le Livre du ciel et du monde, Quodlibeta, Questiones de sphera, and Quaestiones super geometriam Euclidis. See Nicole Oresme and the Kinematics of Circular Motion, pp. 56–76, nn. 89–114. 35 The mathematical proof appears in De proportionibus proportionum, Ch. 3, Proposition X and the application to physical magnitudes in Ch. 4, Proposition XII (see my edition, pp. 247–55 and for discussion pp. 40–42; also pp. 303–309). For a summary, see Nicole Oresme and the Kinematics of Circular Motion, pp. 73–76, n. 113. Oresme was well aware that the incommensurability of celestial or terrestrial motions was not empirically demonstrable, "for by the part of a movement which would be imperceptible to the senses, even if it were a hundred thousand times larger, two such movements or similar motions could be incommensurable and yet appear to be comsurable." Le livre du ciel et du monde, p. 197. Oresme was, however, convinced that he had demonstrated the probability that any two given motions were incommensurable. 36 See Nicole Oresme and the Kinematics of Circular Motion, pp. 54–55, 142. 37 See Nicole Oresme and the Kinematics of Circular Motion, pp. 319–321. 38 Article 6, which reads: "That when all celestial bodies have returned to the same point—which will happen in 36,000 years—the same effects now in operation will be repeated." ("Quod redeuntibus corporibus celestibus omnibus in idem punctum, quod fit in xxx sex milibus annorum, redibunt idem effectus, qui sunt modo." Chartularium, Vol. 1, p. 544. 39 De natura deorum 2.20.51–52 in the translation by H. Rackham, Loeb Classical Library, London and New York, 1933), p. 173. In the Middle Ages, the period of the Great Year was often taken as 36,000 years, a figure determined by Ptolemy's value of 1 per hundred years for precession of the equinoxes. For a discussion of the Great Year in Greek antiquity and the Middle Ages, see Grant, Nicole Oresme and the Kinematics of Circular Motion, pp. 103–124. 40 In the fourth chapter of his De proportionibus proportionum, Oresme rejects the Great Year as an error in "philosophy and faith." The rejection is based on the probability of celestial incommensurability. See Grant, Nicole Oresme "De proportionibus proportionum" and "Ad pauca respicientes," p. 307. 41 For Aristotle's discussion, see De caelo, Bk. 1, chs. 10, 12. 42 All this is incorporated into the following statement by Oresme: "Afterwards Aristotle tries to prove that everything, whether substance or accident or any tendency whatsoever which had a beginning, will have an end and will cease of necessity and cannot possibly last forever; and that it is likewise impossible that anything which will ultimately perish can always have been there without a beginning. Since this is not true and is, in its first part, against the faith, I want to demonstrate the opposite according to natural philosophy and mathematics. In this way it will become clear that Aristotle's arguments are not conclusive. In the first place, I posit with Aristotle, although it is false, that the world and the motions of the heavens are eternal by necessity, without beginning or end." Menut, Le Livre du ciel et du monde, pp. 195–197. Beginning on p. 217, Oresme considers Aristotle's claim that what has no end cannot have had a beginning. In the De proportionibus proportionum, Oresme explained that when he assumes an eternity of future motion, he is "speaking naturally" (naturaliter loquendo). Indeed, for the sake of the discussion, he assumes all the principles enunciated by Aristotle in the second book of De caelo and elsewhere. See Grant, Nicole Oresme and the "De proportionibus proportionum," pp. 305–307. Oresme's discussion on things beginning and ending in the context of eternity is taken up briefly by A. Maier, Metaphysische Hintergründe, pp. 27–31. 43 Le Livre du ciel et du monde, p. 199. In his Questions on De caelo, Bk. 1, Question 24, Oresme applied similar reasoning to lunar eclipses, showing that the earth's shadow will never return twice to the same point on the lunar surface. See The "Questiones super de celo" of Nicole Oresme, edited and translated by Claudia Kren (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 1965), pp. 421–424, and Grant, Nicole Oresme and the Kinematics of Circular Motion, p. 63, n. 97. On the assumption of incommensurability, Oresme also conceived a perpetual circular motion which had a beginning but no end (Le Livre du ciel et du monde, p. 203). The fall of a heavy body through a successively more resistant medium was so devised that the motion, which had a beginning, never reaches its terminus (ibid., p. 205). 44 See Livre du ciel et du monde, p. 243 and Grant, Nicole Oresme and the Kinematics of Circular Motion, p. 57 and all of note 90. 45 Aristotle, De caelo, 1.12.283a.11–24. 46 Aristotle further believed (De caelo) that if something could come into existence after an infinite past time or that something could endure through an eternal future after coming into being, then such a thing would simultaneously have the power of being and not-being. For Buridan's agreement with Aristotle, see his Questions on De caelo, Bk. 1, Question 23, edition of Moody, pp. 112–116. 47 Le Livre du ciel et du monde, p. 241. 48 In Le Livre du ciel et du monde (p. 289) Oresme actually likened celestial regularity to the workings of a clock. Just as a man could make a clock and let it run by itself, so also could God assign proportions of force and resistance in the heavens so as to produce regular and harmonious movements. See also Marshall Clagett, 'Nicole Oresme and Medieval Scientific Thought,' Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, Vol. 108, No. 4 (August, 1964), p. 300. 49 All of these arguments appear in De caelo, Bk. 1, chs. 8, 9. 50 The arguments described below appear in Le Livre du ciel et du monde, pp. 171–179, and are reprinted in Grant, Source Book in Medieval Science, pp. 550–554. Oresme distinguished three types of plurality of worlds, of which only the third and more commonly discussed variety is considered here. For a summary of Oresme's opinions on plurality, see Grant, Physical Science in the Middle Ages, pp. 74–75. Medieval discussions on a plurality of worlds, which includes Oresme, are detailed in Steven J. Dick, Plurality of Worlds and Natural Philosophy: An Historical Study of the Origins of Belief in Other Worlds and Extraterrestrial Life (Ph.D. dissertation, Indiana University, 1977), pp. 71–108. 51 For Oresme's consideration of the possible diurnal rotation of the earth, see Le Livre du ciel et du monde, pp. 519–539. Most of Menut's translation has been reprinted in Grant, Source Book in Medieval Science, pp. 503–510. A brief description of Oresme's arguments is given in Grant, Physical Science in the Middle Ages, pp. 66–70. 52 Oresme favored the idea of the probable incommensurability of the celestial motions because this made knowledge of future events impossible and also enabled us to obtain some knowledge, while yet always leaving some things unknown for further investigation. See Grant, Nicole Oresme and the Kinematics of Circular Motion, pp. 319–321. 53 This is the major theme of Oresme's Quodlibeta. See Nicole Oresme and the Marvels of Nature, A Critical Edition of his "Quodlibeta" with English Translation and Commentary by Bert Hansen (Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton University, 1974), p. 32; for Oresme's statement, see p. 85. 54 This attitude is nicely illustrated in the Quodlibeta, where, according to Hansen (Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton University, 1974, pp. 34–35), Oresme "sometimes even reminds us that no one but God alone can render causes for particular cases. Quite often this agnostic approach results in his being content merely to indicate the kinds of causes or factors operating, without even suggesting how these parameters might be related." Indeed, even in his more rigorous De configurationibus qualitatum et motuum, Oresme was usually tentative in his causal explanations (see Clagett, Nicole Oresme and the Medieval Geometry of Qualities and Motions, p. 35). Oresme was "agnostic" in his approach to natural causes even before he became a theologian. As a theologian, however, he came to stress the uncertainty of natural knowledge, an attitude which is quite apparent in his last work, Le Livre du ciel et du monde. Citing Literature Volume314, Issue1Machaut's World: Science and Art in the Fourteenth CenturyOctober 1978Pages 105-126 ReferencesRelatedInformation