A New Paradigm for Monetary Policy?
2013; Wiley; Volume: 16; Issue: 2 Linguagem: Inglês
10.1111/j.1468-2362.2013.12030.x
ISSN1468-2362
Autores Tópico(s)Global Financial Crisis and Policies
ResumoInternational FinanceVolume 16, Issue 2 p. 273-288 Commentary A New Paradigm for Monetary Policy?† Otmar Issing, Corresponding Author Otmar Issing Center for Financial Studies, Goethe University, Frankfurt, GermanyFormer member of the Executive Board and chief economist, ECB. Otmar Issing Center for Financial Studies Goethe University Frankfurt Grüneburgplatz 1 60323 Frankfurt Germany [email protected]Search for more papers by this author Otmar Issing, Corresponding Author Otmar Issing Center for Financial Studies, Goethe University, Frankfurt, GermanyFormer member of the Executive Board and chief economist, ECB. Otmar Issing Center for Financial Studies Goethe University Frankfurt Grüneburgplatz 1 60323 Frankfurt Germany [email protected]Search for more papers by this author First published: 19 September 2013 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2362.2013.12030.xCitations: 2 †I would like to thank Francesco Drudi, Marvin Goodfriend, Florian Hense, Heinz Herrmann, Allan Meltzer, Massimo Rostagno and John Taylor for their valuable comments. Read the full textAboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onEmailFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditWechat References Alesina, A., and L. 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