Portal de Periódicos da CAPES

Reconsidering American strategy in South Asia: destroying terrorist sanctuaries in Pakistan's tribal areas

2009; Routledge; Volume: 20; Issue: 1 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1080/09592310802573434

1743-9558

Vikram Jagadish,

Peacebuilding and International Security

Abstract Over seven years after the 11 September 2001 attacks on the United States, Afghanistan is again at the forefront of the headlines, faced with a brutal insurgency and a resurgent Taliban. Many scholars and policymakers attribute the instability in Afghanistan to a terrorist sanctuary in the neighboring Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). Pakistan has attempted to eliminate this sanctuary through negotiation and armed force. This paper argues that Pakistani strategy has failed to achieve its desired results because of local tribal norms, the weak nature of previous agreements, military units ill-equipped for a counterinsurgency and counterterrorism role, as well as ideological fissures in the Pakistani establishment. Afterward, the paper argues that the United States and Coalition forces should pursue their strategy remaining cognizant of local tribal norms, step up training efforts for Pakistani forces, promote development of the tribal areas, and cultivate options for eliminating the FATA sanctuary through covert means. Keywords: PakistanAfghanistanFederally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA)TalibanAl-Qa'edaUnited StatesterrorismsanctuaryPashtunPashtunwali Notes 1. See generally CitationOffice of the Director of National Intelligence, National Intelligence Council, National Intelligence Estimate, The Terrorist Threat to the US Homeland 6 (July 2007) (available at http://www.dni.gov/press_releases/20070717_release.pdf) (last visited 12 March 2008). 2. See, e.g., CitationBehuria, ‘The Rise of Pakistani Taliban and the Response of the State’, 703–4. 3. For example, President-elect Barack Obama has openly suggested when a candidate that the United States should take action in the face of Pakistani inability to take action against terrorists in the FATA. See Mike Dorning, Obama: If Pakistan doesn't hit Al Qaeda, US must; Strike unless ally acts, Clinton agrees; Biden, Dodd critical, Chicago Tribune, 2 August 2007, at 6. 4. See, e.g., CitationRubin, ‘Saving Afghanistan’. 5. According to one recent book, Lt. Gen. Usmani and four other senior Pakistani officers argued against giving the United States any assistance at all. See CitationLevy and Scott-Clark, Deception: Pakistan, the United States, and the Secret Trade in Nuclear Weapons, 312–14. [hereinafter ‘Levy and Clark’] 6. The name ‘Pashtun’ refers to members of the Pashtun people and their many tribes. Large numbers of Pashtuns inhabit both Pakistan and Afghanistan, separated by the Durand Line (1893), which most outsiders regard as the Pakistan–Afghanistan border. However, every Afghan government since 1919 has refused to recognize the Durand Line as the legal boundary between the two countries. Moreover, significant numbers of Pashtuns demanded an independent state known as Pashtunistan, incorporating the Pashtun areas of Pakistan as well as southern and eastern Afghanistan. Some scholars argue that modern Pashtun nationalism is largely directed as securing power within the Pakistani framework rather than through separation. See CitationJaffrelot, A History of Pakistan and its Origins, 15 (discussing the Pashtuns); see also CitationHussain, Pakistan and the Emergence of Islamic Militancy in Afghanistan, 4 (internal citations omitted) discussing Afghan policy towards the Durand Line. See also CitationKhan, ‘Pukhtun Ethnic Nationalism: From Separatism to Integrationism’, 83 (noting ‘Pukhtun nationalists have by now completely integrated into the state system of Pakistan and their main concern now is their place in the power hierarchy rather than their ethnicity.’). 7. Ahmed, ‘The United States and Terrorism in Southwest Asia; September 11 and Beyond’, 79 (citing CitationAskari-Rizvi, ‘Pakistan in 1998: The Policy under Pressure’, 184.). 8. Ibid. 9. CitationKhalilzad and Byman, ‘Afghanistan: The Consolidation of a Rogue State’, 65. 10. See generally CitationAhmed Rashid, ‘The Taliban: Exporting Extremism’, passim. 11. CitationGossman, ‘Afghanistan in the Balance’, 11. 12. CitationAhmed Rashid, Taliban: Islam, Oil, and the New Great Game in Central Asia, 134. 13. CitationRoy, ‘Rivalries and Power Plays in Afghanistan: The Taliban, the Shari'a and the Pipeline’, 37. 14. Although then Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto supported only limited assistance, evidence generally suggests that the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence Agency (ISI) went further and liberally supported the group. See CitationColl, Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001, 292–4, 329–31. 15. Rubin, ‘Saving Afghanistan’. 16. CitationWirsing, ‘Precarious Partnership: Pakistan's Response to US Security Policies’, 72. 17. Ibid. 18. CitationBasu, ‘Backgrounder: Afghan Government: Transitional Regime Taking over; Challenge Put on Karzai for Peace, Order’, 10A. 19. See Rashid, ‘The Taliban’. 20. See, e.g. Barry Schlachter, ‘Holdouts Forced to Higher Ground’, Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, 7 December, 2001 at A-14. 21. CitationJohnson, ‘Afghanistan's Post-Taliban Transition: the State of State-building After War’, 4. 22. Ibid. 23. Ibid., 6–7. 24. Ibid., 8. 25. The two largest Pashtun tribal confederations are the Durranis and the Ghilzais. Ghilzais and Durranis frequently competed against each other throughout history and this bitter rivalry has continued to today. See generally CitationRubin, The Fragmentation of Afghanistan: State Formation and Collapse in the International System, 28; Rashid, Taliban, 10–11. 26. CitationTellis, ‘Pakistan's Record on Terrorism: Conflicted Goals, Compromised Performances’, 14. 27. CitationLiebl, ‘Pushtuns, Tribalism, Leadership, Islam, and Taliban: A Short View’, 498–9. 28. Tellis, ‘Pakistan's Record on Terrorism’, 14. 29. Ibid. 30. Ibid., 11. 31. Ibid. 32. See Wirsing, ‘Precarious Partnership’, 72. 33. For a good discussion of Pakistan's strategic rationale for supporting Islamic militant groups in Kashmir, see CitationAskari-Rizvi, ‘Pakistan's Strategic Culture’, 320–4. 34. The International Institute for Strategic Studies Armed Conflict Database 2008, ‘India-Pakistan (Jammu and Kashmir).’ See also CitationBlank, ‘Kashmir: Fundamentalism Takes Root’, 38 (citing at least 25,000 casualties in the first decade). 35. John F. Burns, ‘Pakistan Moves Against Groups Named by India’, New York Times, 29 December 2001 at A1. 36. Glenn Kessler, ‘Pakistan Fails to Rein In Guerrillas; Infiltration of Kashmir Continues Despite Promises, U.S. Official Says’, Washington Post, 18 April 2003 at A14. 37. For an excellent discussion of the Pakistan Army's history and practices, see CitationCohen, The Idea of Pakistan, 97–131. 38. Tellis, ‘Pakistan's Record on Terrorism’, 13. 39. See Pakistan president addresses National Students Convention, BBC Monitoring South Asia, 25 May 2004 (transcribing PTV World television broadcast, Pakistan president addresses National Students Convention, Islamabad, in English, 0500 GMT, 24 May 2004) (Gen. Musharraf justified the Pakistan Army's foray into the FATA in an address, noting that ‘They [Taliban and Al-Qa'eda] are involved and are carrying out terrorist activity in Pakistan from there [FATA], also in Afghanistan, and also in the world. Nobody should have any doubt about that.’). 40. Tellis, ‘Pakistan's Record on Terrorism’, 13. 41. Ibid. 42. CitationWagner and Maass, Peace in Waziristan: Success or Setbacks in the Fight against Terrorism in Afghanistan and Pakistan?, SWP Comments, 5 [hereinafter ‘Wagner and Maass’]. 43. CitationCohen, The Idea of Pakistan, note 37 at 111. 44. Levy and Clark, Deception, 317. 45. Ibid. 46. Ibid. 47. CitationCNN Special Investigations Unit, ‘Pakistan: Terror Central’, CNN television broadcast, 27 December 2007 23:00 EDT) (transcript available at http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0712/27/se.01.html) (last visited 4 May 2008). 48. David Wastell, ‘Pakistani spy agency accused of arming Taliban in secret’, Sunday Telegraph (London), 12 September 2001, 16. 49. Author interview with Brig. Gen. (ret.) Naeem Salik, in Washington, DC, 27 February 2008. 50. Ibid. 51. Tellis, ‘Pakistan's Record on Terrorism’, 11. 52. Chiefly, both Islamist extremists and the professional officers share an interest in seeing a powerful Pashtun-dominated government in Afghanistan and a suspicion of long-term US interests in the region. 53. Staff writers, ‘Pakistan Reportedly Aiding Taliban’, Oakland Tribune (California), 9 December 2001, 1. 54. Ibid. 55. Rubin, ‘Saving Afghanistan’ (http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20070101faessay861 05-p50/barnett-r-rubin/saving-afghanistan.html). 56. Ibid. 57. CitationSchaffer and Linda Robinson, ‘The Unseen Power’, 33 (quoting retired Lt. Gen. Hamid Gul.). 58. CitationJohnson, ‘On the Edge of the Big Muddy: The Taliban Resurgence in Afghanistan’, 110 (internal citation omitted.). 59. CitationFair and Chalk, Fortifying Pakistan: The Role of Internal U.S. Security Assistance, 10–13. 60. Johnson, ‘On the Edge of the Big Muddy’. 61. CitationLeventis, ‘The Waziristan Accord’, 24–5 (internal citation omitted). 62. At the outset, as many as 250 soldiers were killed, and the Taliban rather than the Pakistani government provided compensation to the families of their dead Pashtun kin. See CitationCanfield, ‘Fraternity, Power, and Time in Central Asia’, 231. 63. Leventis, ‘The Waziristan Accord’, 24. 64. Ibid., 25. 65. Tellis, ‘Pakistan's Record on Terrorism’, 18. 66. Candace Rondeaux and Imtiaz Ali, ‘Culture, Politics Hinder US Effort to Bolster Pakistani Border Forces’, Washington Post, 30 March 2008 at A17. 67. Ibid. 68. Ibid. 69. Memorandum from [Excised] to DIA Washington, DC, ‘IIR [Excised] Pakistan Involvement in Afghanistan’, 7 November 1996, Confidential, 2 pp. [Excised], Declassified 2007, posted 14 August 2007, in Pakistan: ‘The Taliban's Godfather’? Documents Detail Years of Pakistan Support for Taliban, Extremists, States News Service, George Washington University National Security Archive, National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 227, Barbara Elias, ed. 70. Ann Scott Tyson, ‘Border Complicates War in Afghanistan; Insurgents Are Straddling Pakistani Line’, Washington Post, 4 April 2008, at A1. 71. Ibid. 72. Ahmed Rashid, ‘Pakistan Crisis “Hits Army Morale”’, BBC News, 13 September 2007 (available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/low/south_asia/6978240.stm) (last visited 12 March 2008). 73. Ibid. 74. CitationBehuria, ‘The Rise of Pakistani Taliban and the Response of the State’, 713. 75. Ibid. 76. Ibid. 77. Leventis, ‘The Waziristan Accord’, 25. 78. Ibid., 26. (internal citation omitted.) 79. CitationCenter for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC, ‘Musharraf's Waziristan Deal: Shrewd Strategy or Tacit Surrender?’, 1–2. 80. Ibid. 81. Ibid. 82. Ibid. 83. The term Mujahideen refers to ‘[f]ighters (esp. guerillas) who seek to propagate or defend Islam; an organization or group of such fighters’. The Oxford English Dictionary (Draft Revision March 2003). 84. CitationMaloney, ‘Conceptualizing the War in Afghanistan: Perceptions from the Front’, 38 (internal citation omitted.). 85. Leventis, ‘The Waziristan Accord’, 26. 86. Carlotta Gall and Ismail Khan, ‘Taliban and Allies Tighten Grip in Northern Pakistan’, New York Times, 11 December 2006 at A1. 87. Afghanistan: A plan to turn the tide? Panel II of a Hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 110th Cong. (31 January 2008) (statement of General James Jones.). Gen. Jones has been nominated National Security Advisor in the Barack Obama administration due to take office from 20 January 2009. 88. Canfield, ‘Fraternity, Power, and Time in Central Asia’, 231. 89. CitationJalali, ‘Afghanistan: Regaining Momentum’ (citing Hassan Abbas, ‘Increasing Talibanization in Pakistan's Seven Tribal Agencies’, Terror Monitor 5 (27 September 2007) (available at https://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/07winter/jalali.htm) (last visited 4 May 2008). 90. Gall and Khan, ‘Taliban and Allies Tighten Grip in Northern Pakistan’. 91. Ibid. 92. Wagner and Maass, Peace in Waziristan, 5. 93. CitationUS Congress, U.S. Pakistan Relations, Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Foreign Aff., Subcommittee on The Middle East And South Asia, 110th Cong. (16 January 2008) Foreign Affairs (Statement of Lisa Curtis). 94. Ahmed Rashid, ‘A Wild, Cruel and Merciless Country Outside the Law’, Daily Telegraph (London), 20 March 2004, 4. 95. Liebl, ‘Pushtuns, Tribalism, Leadership, Islam, and Taliban’, 492. 96. Ibid. 97. Ibid., 496–7. 98. Ibid., 500. 99. Ibid., 503. 100. Ibid., 506. 101. Ibid., 494. 102. ‘In the Dark; Afghanistan's Tribal Complexity’, The Economist, 2 February Citation2008. 103. Pamela Constable and Kamran Khan, ‘In Pakistan, Recent Attacks Shred Hopes for Regional Peace Model’, Washington Post, 11 November 2006 at A01. 104. See generally CitationSpain, The Pathan Borderland, esp. 64–6. 105. One former CIA station chief suggests that the Pashtunwali erodes dramatically if proper monetary rewards are given for violating certain norms. See Hirsh, Hosenball and Yousafzai, ‘Predator and Prey; More than four years after 9/11, bin Laden issues another threat. Can new technology help to silence him?, Newsweek, 30 January Citation2006. 106. Spain, The Pathan Borderland, 64. 107. Ibid., 65. 108. Ibid. 109. See e.g., Mohamad Bazzi, ‘Offering Refuge for the Lawless; Pakistan border area that won't be governed’, Newsday, 28 December 2001 at A3; see also Isabel Hilton, ‘The Pashtun Code; How a long-ungovernable tribe may determine the future of Afghanistan’, New Yorker, 3 December 2001 at 59. 110. Spain, The Pathan Borderland, 64. 111. Ibid. 112. Liebl, ‘Pushtuns, Tribalism, Leadership, Islam, and Taliban’, 494. 113. See e.g., Sharon Behn, ‘Civilian Casualties Rising, Analysts Report; Iraq numbers also in hundreds’, Washington Times, 5 February 2008, at A13 (noting that ‘[t]he number of civilians inadvertently killed by US and NATO forces in Afghanistan doubled in 2007 from the previous year as coalition forces dropped about 1 million pounds of bombs on the country’). 114. Johnson, ‘On the Edge of the Big Muddy: The Taliban Resurgence in Afghanistan’, 126–7 (citing Sami Yousafzai and Ron Moreau, ‘Collateral Disasters’, Newsweek, 6 May 2007). 115. Scholars note that badal is taken so seriously that it is a large impediment to the development of modern law in the region. See generally, CitationKamali, Law in Afghanistan: A Study of the Constitutions, Matrimonial Law, and the Judiciary, 4. 116. The Nerkhs (price schedule) of the Wazir Tribe, as well as the Nerkhs of some Ahmad Zais (if there is no plan for badal currently in place) allow accepting a fine as compensation, but scholars of the Pashtunwali note that many tribes require feuding parties to exchange property in addition to money to end badal. The Pashtunwali generally treats women as equal to property, which is clearly incompatable with Western values, systems of justice, and modern understandings of human rights. (See generally, CitationKhurram and Rea, The Customary Laws of Afghanistan, A Report by the International Legal Foundation, 6–17, [hereinafter ‘Rea and Khurram’]). Consequently, coalition forces should only concentrate on those tribal clans willing to accept monetary payment only for the purposes of ending badal. 117. Liebl, ‘Pushtuns, Tribalism, Leadership, Islam, and Taliban’, 506. 118. Spain, The Pathan Borderland, 65. 119. Ibid. 120. Ibid., 66. 121. One treatise surmises that ‘Pashtuns regard Jirgas as the main foundation for Pashtunwali. In their view, Jirgas illustrate their republican and democratic spirit. Pashtuns strongly believe in the words of Khoshal Khatak that: A community who knows the abundance of Jirgas will never undertake something not decided by a Jirga.’ See generally Rea and Khurram, The Customary Laws of Afghanistan, 9. 122. Ibid., 8. 123. Ibid. 124. Ibid., 9. 125. Rashid, Taliban, 10. 126. Tellis, ‘Pakistan's Record on Terrorism’, 14. 127. Ibid. 128. Sami Yousafzai and Ron Moreau, ‘Votes In An Era Of Fear’, Newsweek, 25 February 2008 at 8. 129. Farhan Bokhari, ‘Islamists Lash out After Heavy Defeat’, Financial Times, 20 February 2008 at 8; Staff Writers, ‘Revenge by Democracy’, Hindustan Times, 19 February 2008. 130. Paul Wiseman and Zafar M. Sheikh, ‘Pakistan Faces Crucial Elections; Fundamentalist Support has Dropped Dramatically’, USA Today, 18 February 2008 at 5A. 131. For an excellent discussion of specific reasons why anti-Americanism abounds in the FATA, see BBC Monitoring South Asia, translating Jang (Urdu) ‘Abduction of and attacks on security personnel in FATA: causes and remedies’, 17 September Citation2007. 132. See CitationAkbar S. Ahmed, Journey into Islam: The Crisis of Globalization, 105; (noting that in settled areas of the Punjab, ‘tribal customs have become less pronounced and their ideals of honor more compromised with the influx of settled communities, greater interference from the outside world, and the influence of foreign values. In other words, such communities are tribes only in an ethnic sense. Unlike the more isolated and pure tribes such as the Bugti in Baluchistan or those in Waziristan, these are more tribal in name than in practice.’) 133. CitationUS Congress, Security Challenges Involving Pakistan and Policy Implications For the Department of Defense, Hearing of the House.Armed Services Comm. 110th Cong. (10 October 2007) (Statement of Hussain Haqqani.) 134. Ibid. 135. See BBC Monitoring South Asia, ‘Abduction of and Attacks on Security Personnel in FATA: Causes and Remedies’. 136. Ibid. 137. CitationUS Government Accountability Office, Combating Terrorism: The United States Lacks Comprehensive Plan to Destroy the Terrorist Threat and Close the Safe Haven in Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas, 2. (available at http://www.hcfa.house.gov/110/GAO041708.pdf) (last visited 23 April 2008). 138. For a detailed description of these programs, see generally, current USAID Programs in Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), available at http://www.usaIbIbid.gov/pk/mission/news/fata.htm (last visited 23 April 2008). 139. CitationUS Congress, The Defense Department's Fiscal Year 2009 Budget, Hearing of the H. Armed Services Comm., 110th Cong. (6 February 2008) (statement of Robert Gates, Secretary of Defense). 140. See generally CitationGregory, ‘The ISI and the War on Terrorism’, 1016–19. 141. See generally CitationFederation of American Scientists, International Military Education and Training, available at http://www.fas.org/asmp/campaigns/training/IMET2.html (last visited 8 March 2008). [hereinafter ‘FAS Report.’] 142. Ibid. 143. CitationDefense Security Cooperation Agency, Professional Military Education, available at http://www.dsca.mil/home/professional_military_education.htm (last visited 8 March 2008). 144. Ibid. 145. See FAS Report. 146. Ibid. 147. Ibid. 148. Ibid. 149. CitationUS Congress, US Aid to Pakistan, Hearing of the Int'l. Development and Foreign Assistance, Econ. Aff. and Int'l Envtl. Prot. Subcomm. of the Senate Foreign Relations Comm., 110th Cong. (6 December 2007) (Statement of Richard Boucher, Asst. Sec. of State for South and Central Asian Affairs) [hereinafter ‘Boucher’.] 150. General Zia-ul-Haq (1924–88), who ruled Pakistan for over a decade until his death, had enrolled in the US Army Command and Staff College at Fort Leavenworth in 1963. 151. See Boucher. 152. Ibid. 153. CitationUS Department of Defense, ‘Military Contacts Focus on Pakistan Counterinsurgency Needs’. 154. CitationUS Congress, U.S. Policy Options in Post-Election Pakistan, Hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Comm. 110th Cong. (28 February 2008) (Testimony of Deputy Secretary of State John Negroponte). 155. Liebl, ‘Pushtuns, Tribalism, Leadership, Islam, and Taliban’, 506. 156. Arnaud de Borchgrave, ‘Talibanization and nukes’, UPI Energy, 30 January Citation2008. 157. Ibid. 158. Aziz-ud-din Ahmad, ‘Increase US Military Presence’, The Nation (Pakistan), 9 January 2008. 159. Ibid. 160. Eric Schmitt and Thom Shanker, ‘US Plan Widens Role in Training Pakistani Forces in Qaeda Battle’, New York Times, 2 March 2008 (available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/02/world/asia/02military.html?ei = 5040&en = 5ed00fe00e9a0a03&ex = 1205038800&partner = MOREOVERNEWS&pagewanted = all) (last visited 4 May 2008.) 161. Ahmad, ‘Increase US Military Presence’. 162. K. Alan Kronstadt, ‘Pakistan-US Relations’, Congressional Research Service, 1 October Citation2007. 163. CitationUS Congress, US Strategy and Operations in Afghanistan and the Way Ahead, Hearing of the House. Armed Services Comm., 110th Cong. (23 January 2008) (Testimony of Karl Inderfurth). 164. De Borchgrave, ‘Talibanization and Nukes’. 165. See FAS report. 166. CitationUS Congress, FY 2009 Budget, Hearing of the Senate. Foreign Relations Comm., 110th Cong. (13 February 2008) (Testimony of Condoleezza Rice.). 167. See Defense Security Cooperation Agency, Professional Military Education. 168. Although some disputes exist, a slight consensus suggests that the recent elections were free and fair. The International Human Rights Commission, for instance, described the elections as ‘fair, free, transparent, and peaceful’. See ‘Pakistan polls fair, free, transparent, peaceful – international rights body’, BBC Monitoring South Asia, Thursday, 21 February Citation2008. (transcribing Geo-TV News Broadcast, Dubai). Nationally, voter turnout at 45% was up on the two previous elections and 59 Islamist MPs were reduced to 3. 169. Staff writers, ‘Out with the president's men; Pakistan's election’, The Economist, 23 February Citation2008. 170. Wajahat Latif, ‘Going Down’, The Nation (Pakistan), Thursday 21 February 2008. 171. One recent poll noted that only 23% of Pakistanis supported military operations in the tribal areas. See CitationC. Fair, Ramsay, and Kull, Pakistani Public Opinion on Democracy, Islamist Militancy, and Relations with the US, A Joint Study of WorldPublicOpinion.org and the United States Institute of Peace, 7 January 2008, at 18, available at http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/pdf/jan08/Pakistan_Jan08_rpt.pdf (last visited 22 April 2008). 172. Abrar Saeed, ‘Gilani elected PM’, The Nation (Pakistan), Monday, 24 March 2008. 173. Amir Mir, ‘Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gillani wants War on Terror reviewed’, IPS, Monday, 31 March 2008. 174. Jane Perlez, ‘Pakistan Leadership to Talk with Rebels; New Government Seeks to Stop Attacks; Policy Shift Rings Alarms in Washington’, International Herald Tribune, Saturday, 22 March 2008 at 1. 175. One Pakistani analyst suggests that this approach would require ‘the new government [to] formulate a homegrown anti-terror policy which upholds the rule of law at home, protect the lives, property and dignity of its citizens and oppose through strict enforcement of law any attempt to forcibly impose any system on the people of Pakistan’. See Mir, ‘Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gillani Wants War on Terror Reviewed’. 176. Perlez, ‘Pakistan Leadership to Talk with Rebels’. 177. Kevin Whitelaw, ‘Pakistan's Most Wanted’, US News & World Report, 11 February 2008 at 21. 178. Staff Writers, ‘Trade to the Forefront’, Financial Express, 20 April 2008. 179. See Curtis statement, note 93 and Rubin, ‘Saving Afghanistan’. 180. Eric Schmitt and David Sanger, ‘Pakistan Shuns CIA Buildup Sought by US’, New York Times, 27 January 2008 at A1. 181. CitationDe Borchgrave, ‘ISI's New Triumvirate’. 182. Testimony of Karl Inderfurth, above note 163. 183. Kenneth Ballen and Reza Aslan, ‘Radical Shift in Pakistan: Islamists’ Support Drops’, Baltimore Sun, 7 February 2008 at 11A. 184. Ibid. 185. One US lieutenant colonel described the pace of training the ANA as ‘measured in inches’. See Jim Landers, ‘Americana Prevails at Afghan Training Base before Dawn's Early Light, US Troops Root for Teams and Nation's Inductees’, Dallas Morning News, 4 February 2008 at 2A. 186. Ibid. 187. The Fifth Special Forces Group (5th SFG) has some of the best Arabic speakers in the US military. See Ron Moreau, Sami Yousafzai et al., ‘Into Thin Air’, Newsweek, 3 September 2007 at 24. The 5th SFG area of operations includes the Horn of Africa, South and Central Asia, the northern Red Sea, the Arabian peninsula, and Iraq. See CitationCline, ‘Special Operations and the Intelligence System’, 575–92 (internal citation omitted.) 188. Cheryl L. Reed, ‘Government wages uphill battle in search for Arabic translators: Four years after 9/11 attacks, US still short of qualified linguists’, Chicago Sun-Times, 18 December 2005 at A18. 189. See Cline, ‘Special Operations and the Intelligence System’, 585–6 (2005) (citing General Accounting Office, Strategic Planning and Distributive Learning Could Benefit the Special Operations Forces Foreign Language Program, September 2003, 8) (‘Overall, only about 28 percent of SOF personnel are deemed to have a language requirement, and even this requirement is stated to be “generally… only a limited command of the language for immediate survival needs.”’) 190. One report notes that ‘it takes on average two years to train special operators to their entry-level standard’ and for language ability significant additional training time is required. See CitationUS Department of Defense, ‘Special Ops Workload “Difficult, but Managable”’ FDCH Federal Department and Agency Documents, Regulatory Intelligence Data, Tuesday, 20 July 2004. 191. Arnaud de Borchgrave notes that Pakistan's ISI would be quick to catch on to any US unilateral covert operations in the FATA and would happily report such activities to the Pakistani media. See de Borchgrave, ‘Pakistan's Terror Inc.’, Washington Times, 14 January Citation2008 at A14. 192. Ibid.