Political Opposition and Reform Coalitions in Jordan
2011; Routledge; Volume: 38; Issue: 3 Linguagem: Inglês
10.1080/13530194.2011.621699
ISSN1469-3542
Autores Tópico(s)Middle East Politics and Society
ResumoAbstract Jordanian politics has seen decades of pro-reform and pro-democracy political activism, but with little effective change on the Jordanian political system itself. This analysis explains how and why the regime has resisted more than cosmetic reform and democratic change. It also examines in detail old and new avenues of opposition reformist activism in the kingdom, from leftist political parties and the Islamist movement to new forms of pro-democracy activism in the form of grassroots coalitions, youth movements and social media activism. As both government and opposition in Jordan are affected by the 2011 Arab uprisings, this analysis examines the past and present possibilities for democratic political opposition and for an effective and unified coalition for reform in Jordan. Notes 1 The largest ethnic division within Jordanian politics is that between Palestinian Jordanians (those whose roots are west of the Jordan river, many of whom came to Jordan as refugees of the Arab-Israeli wars of 1948 and 1967) and East Jordanians, also known as Transjordanians or East Bankers, since they trace their roots east of the Jordan river. In general, the Hashemite state, army, security services and public sector have been dominated by East Jordanians, while Palestinian Jordanians have come to dominate the private sector. As the regime's own neoliberal economic reforms shift Jordan's economy from the public to the private sector, ethnic tensions have increased within the kingdom. 2 See, for example, D. Brumberg, 'The Trap of Liberalized Autocracy', Journal of Democracy, 13(4) (2002), pp. 56–68; T. Carothers, 'The End of the Transition Paradigm', Journal of Democracy, 13(2) (2002), pp. 5–21; and C. Ryan and J. Schwedler, 'Return to Democratization or New Hybrid Regime? The 2003 Elections in Jordan', Middle East Policy, 11(2) (2004), pp. 138–151. 3 Throughout this analysis, the phrase 'reform coalition' refers to organised alliances between political parties, professional associations, trade unions, civil society organisations and other political movements to collectively seek specific political and economic reform and change. For a further discussion of the 'reform coalition', see also the introductory contribution by H. Kraetzschmar, 'Mapping Opposition Cooperation in the Arab World: From Single-Issue Coalitions to Transnational Networks'. The analysis draws on extensive field research and interviews with individuals in all the above types of groups, reform activists and government officials (including those for and against democratic change) conducted on frequent visits to Jordan between 1989 and 2011. 4 See also E. Lust, 'Elections under Authoritarianism: Preliminary Lessons from Jordan', Democratization, 13(3) (2006), pp. 456–471; and J. Gandhi and E. Lust, 'Elections under Authoritarianism', Annual Review of Political Science, 12(1) (2009), pp. 403–422. 5 R. Brynen, 'Economic Crisis and Post-Rentier Democratization in the Arab World: The Case of Jordan', Canadian Journal of Political Science, 25(1) (1992), pp. 69–97; M. Mufti, 'Elite Bargains and the Onset of Political Liberalization in Jordan', Comparative Political Studies, 32(1) (1999), pp. 100–129; and G.E. Robinson, 'Defensive Democratization in Jordan', International Journal of Middle East Studies, 30(3) (1998), pp. 387–410. 6 C.R. Ryan, 'Elections and Parliamentary Democratization in Jordan', Democratization, 5(4) (1998), pp. 194–214; Ryan and Schwedler, 'Return to Democratization or New Hybrid Regime?', pp. 138–151; H. Hourani et al., Dirasat fi al-Intakhabat al-Niyabiyya al-Urduniyya [Studies in the 1997 Representative [Parliamentary] Elections] (Amman: Al-Urdun al-Jadid Research Center, 2002). 7 L.A. Brand, 'The Effects of the Peace Process on Political Liberalization in Jordan', Journal of Palestine Studies, 28(2) (1999), pp. 52–67; J. Schwedler, 'Don't Blink: Jordan's Democratic Opening and Closing', MERIP Press Information Note, 3 July 2002, http://www.merip.org/mero/mero070302. 8 For a broader analysis of the four major transitions in Jordanian politics since 1989 (political liberalisation, economic liberalisation, peace with Israel, and the royal succession), see C.R. Ryan, Jordan in Transition: From Hussein to Abdullah (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2002). 9 K. Abdul-Wahab, 'Reaping What We've Sown: The Economic Protests', JO Magazine, 28 April 2011. On the economic reform process, see A.M. Peters and P.W. Moore, 'Beyond Boom and Bust: External Rents, Durable Authoritarianism, and Institutional Adaptation in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan', Studies in Comparative International Development, 44(3) (2009), pp. 256–285; and S. Alissa, Rethinking Economic Reform in Jordan: Confronting Socioeconomic Realities (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Carnegie Papers Number 4, July 2007). 10 M. Hamarneh, 'Political Truths: Interview', Jordan Business, March 2009, p. 58. 11 For a detailed discussion of this phenomenon in the context of the Arab world, see C. Ryan, 'Security Dilemmas in Arab Politics', in C. Ryan, Inter-Arab Alliances: Regime Security and Jordanian Foreign Policy (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2009), pp. 23–42. 12 International Crisis Group, 'The Challenge of Political Reform: Jordanian Democratisation and Regional Instability', Middle East Briefing, Amman/Brussels, 8 October 2003, p. 1. 13 International Crisis Group, 'The Challenge of Political Reform: Jordanian Democratisation and Regional Instability', Middle East Briefing, Amman/Brussels, 8 October 2003, p. 1 14 International Crisis Group, 'The Challenge of Political Reform: Jordanian Democratisation and Regional Instability', Middle East Briefing, Amman/Brussels, 8 October 2003, p. 1, p 2. 15 J. Diehl, 'Jordan's Democracy Option', The Washington Post, 21 September 2003. 16 See Muasher's own discussion of the struggle for the National Agenda for reform. M. Muasher, The Arab Center: The Promise of Moderation (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008), pp. 246–253. 17 See Muasher's own discussion of the struggle for the National Agenda for reform. M. Muasher, The Arab Center: The Promise of Moderation (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008), pp. 246–253 19 Interview with the author, Amman, Jordan, May 2005. 20 Author interview with Dr. Marwan Muasher, Washington, DC, 1 May 2010. 18 Interview with the author, Amman, Jordan, May 2005. 21 For a discussion of resurgent ethnic identity politics in Jordan, see C.R. Ryan, '"We Are All Jordan" … But Who is We?', Middle East Report Online, 13 July 2010, http://www.merip.org/mero/mero071310 (accessed 13 July 2010). 22 The Hashemite monarchy banned political parties in 1957, following a failed military coup attempt against the regime by Nasserist and leftist officers. The overthrow of the neighbouring Hashemite monarchy in Iraq in 1958, and the killing of the entire Hashemite royal family there, served to underscore the regime's conviction that the greatest threat to its survival—in the 1950s—came from Nasserist, leftist, and Pan-Arab parties and movements. On this period, see U. Dann, King Hussein and the Challenge of Arab Radicalism, 1955–1967 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989); and K. Salibi, The Modern History of Jordan (London: I.B. Tauris, 1998), pp. 197–221. 23 Jordanians were so ready for the resumption of multi-party elections, in fact, that a series of studies had already been published on Jordanian political parties in anticipation of the return of party life. See, for example, A. Abu Khusa, Al-Dimuqratiyya wa al-Ahzab al-Siyasiyya al-Urduniyya [Democracy and Jordanian Political Parties] (Amman: Middle East Publishing Company, 1991); M.A.S. al-Abdalat, Kharita al-Ahzab al-Siyasiyya al-Urduniyya [Map of Jordanian Political Parties] (Amman: Dar al-Ubra, 1992); S. Sways, 'Kharita al-Ahzab al-Siyasiyya fi al-Urdun' [A Map of Political Parties in Jordan] (Amman: Al-Urdun al-Jadid, 1990), pp. 122–141; R. al-Khatib Iyad, Al-Tayarat al-Siyasiyya fi al-Urdun wa Nas al-Mithaq al-Watani al-Urduni [Political Tendencies in Jordan and Text of the Jordanian National Charter] (Amman: al-Matba'a al-Wataniyya (National Printing House), 1991). 24 E.M. Lust-Okar, 'The Decline of Jordanian Political Parties: Myth or Reality?', International Journal of Middle East Studies, 33(4) (2001), pp. 545–569. 25 M. Browers, Political Ideology in the Arab World: Accommodation and Transformation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), p. 176. 26 M. Kerr, The Arab Cold War: Gamal 'Abd al-Nasir and His Rivals, 1958–1970 (London: Oxford University Press, 1970). 27 On Jordanian parties and the party system, see Al-Dimuqratiyya fi al-Hayat al-Dakhiliyya li al-Ahzab al-Siyasiyya al-'Arabiyya [Democracy in the Practice of Arab Political Parties] (Amman: Al-Quds Center for Political Studies, 2010); and Al-Qu'anin al-Nazimat li al-'Amal al-Hizbi fi al-Urdun [Revisiting Political Party Legislation in Jordan] (Amman: Al-Quds Center for Political Studies, 2010). 28 J. Schwedler, Faith in Moderation: Islamist Parties in Jordan and Yemen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006); Q. Wiktorowicz, The Management of Islamic Activism: Salafis, the Muslim Brotherhood, and State Power in Jordan (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2000). 29 C.R. Ryan, 'Islamist Political Activism in Jordan: Moderation, Militancy, and Democracy', Middle East Review of International Affairs, 12(2) (2008), pp. 1–13. 30 In the 1989 elections, all candidates technically ran as independents since parties remained illegal. From the 1993 elections onwards, however, candidates have been able to run with legal party affiliations. Underscoring the weakness of the Jordanian party system, however, most candidates in any election have been non-partisan or independent, rather than from Islamist, leftist, or nationalist parties. On the 1989 elections, see K.S. Abu Jaber and S.H. Fathi, 'The 1989 Jordanian Parliamentary Elections', Orient, 31 (1990), pp. 67–86. 31 Author interviews with opposition activists, journalists and government officials, Amman, Jordan, June 2010, December 2010 and June 2011. 32 M.C. Wilson, 'Jordan: Bread, Freedom, or Both?', Current History (February 1994), pp. 87–90. For details on the 1993 elections, see also Robinson, 'Defensive Democratization in Jordan'; and Ryan, 'Elections and Parliamentary Democratization in Jordan'. 33 For further details on the 1989, 1993 and 1997 elections, see Ryan, Jordan in Transition, pp. 15–45. 34 On the 2003 elections, see Ryan and Schwedler, 'Return to Democratization or New Hybrid Regime?'. 35 A. Susser, 'Jordan: Preserving Domestic Order in a Setting of Regional Turmoil', Middle East Brief No. 27, Crown Center for Middle East Studies, Brandeis University, March 2008, pp. 4–5. 36 The 2010 electoral law kept the uneven districts, but added four new seats for Amman, Irbid and Zarqa (cities with large Palestinian populations), and doubled the women's quota from six to 12 seats in parliament. For an analysis of the details and reactions, see C.R. Ryan, 'Jordan's New Electoral Law: Reform, Reaction, or Status Quo?', Foreign Policy, Middle East Channel, 24 May 2010, http://mideast.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/05/24/jordan_s_new_electoral_law_reform_reaction_or_status_quo (accessed 24 May 2010). 37 On the 2010 elections and their aftermath, see C.R. Ryan, 'Déjà Vu All Over Again? Jordan's 2010 Elections', Foreign Policy, Middle East Channel, 15 November 2010, http://mideast.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/11/15/jordanians_go_to_the_polls (accessed 15 November 2010). 38 Author interview with democracy activist, Amman, Jordan, June 2001. 39 On the state and the Islamist movement, see Al-Dawla wa al-Ikhwan 1999–2008 [The State and the Brotherhood 1999–2008] (Amman: Al-Quds Center for Political Studies, 2008); and Al-Din wa al-Dawla: al-Urdun [Religion and the State: Jordan] (Amman: Al-Quds Center for Political Studies, 2010). 40 Browers, Political Ideology in the Arab World; F. Cavatorta, 'Divided They Stand, Divided They Fail: Opposition Politics in Morocco', Democratization, 16(2) (2009), pp. 137–156; and F. Cavatorta, 'More Than Repression: Strategies of Regime Survival: The Significance of Divide et Impera in Morocco', Journal of Contemporary African Studies, 25(2) (2007), pp. 187–203. See also Haugbolle/Cavatorta and Wegner/Pellicer in this issue for theoretical and empirical discussions demonstrating the limits of ideological cooperation. 41 Opposition to the 1994 Jordanian-Israeli peace treaty led leftist and Islamist activists to organise, through the political parties and the professional associations, an 'anti-normalisation' campaign from 1994 onwards, so that the peace remains a cold one between the two governments, but with limited links between the two societies. See P.L. Scham and R.E. Lucas, '"Normalization" and "Anti-Normalization" in Jordan: The Public Debate', Israel Affairs, 9(3) (2003), pp. 141–164. 42 For extensive analysis of cross-ideological cooperation and its limits in Jordan, see J. Clark, 'Threats, Structures and Resources: Cross-ideological Coalition Building in Jordan', Comparative Politics, 43(3) (2010), pp. 101–120; J.A. Clark, 'The Conditions of Islamist Moderation: Unpacking Cross-ideological Cooperation in Jordan', International Journal of Middle East Studies, 38(4) (2006), pp. 539–560; and J. Schwedler and J.A. Clark, 'Islamist-Leftist Cooperation in the Arab World', ISIM Review, 18 (2006), pp. 10–11. 43 F. Sawalha, 'Opposites Attract on Petition to Declare War on Iraq "Illegal"', Jordan Times, 1 April 2003. 44 E. Lust-Okar, 'Divided They Rule: The Management and Manipulation of Political Opposition', Comparative Politics, 36(2) (2004), p. 169; E. Lust-Okar, Structuring Conflict in the Arab World: Incumbents, Opponents, and Institutions (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005). 45 See Scham and Lucas, '"Normalization" and "Anti-Normalization" in Jordan'. 46 C.R. Ryan, 'Peace, Bread, and Riots: Jordan and the International Monetary Fund', Middle East Policy, 6(2) (1998), pp. 54–66. 47 Lust-Okar, 'Divided They Rule', p. 172. 48 Clark, 'The Conditions of Islamist Moderation', p. 555. 49 Clark, 'The Conditions of Islamist Moderation', pp. 555–556. 50 O. al-Rantawi, 'Coalition Presses for Electoral Reform in Jordan', Arab Reform Bulletin, 14 April 2010. 51 Similarly, even when groups do overlap considerably, most activists do not seem to view one group as subsuming another, or one as being above another. They simply overlap, and individuals therefore are often participants in multiple organisations, groups or coalitions. Author's interviews with democracy activists, Amman, Jordan, June 2010, December 2010 and June 2011. 52 Author interview with a youth and social media activist, Amman, Jordan, June 2011. 53 Ryan, 'Jordan's New Electoral Law'. 56 H. Bustani, 'The Alternative Opposition in Jordan and the Failure to Understand the Lessons of the Tunisian and Egyptian Revolutions', Jadaliyya, 20 March 2011, http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/959 (accessed 20 March 2011). 54 This point was made to me consistently in interviews with democracy activists, journalists and government officials, especially in June 2010, December 2010 and June 2011. 55 Author interview, Amman, Jordan, June 2011. 57 H. Bustani, 'The Alternative Opposition in Jordan and the Failure to Understand the Lessons of the Tunisian and Egyptian Revolutions', Jadaliyya, 20 March 2011, http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/959 (accessed 20 March 2011), and author interview with Hisham Bustani, Amman, Jordan, 12 June 2001. 58 Oraib Rantawi, director of the pro-democracy Al-Quds Center for Political Studies, estimated that the number of coalitions and youth movements had already reached more than 30, and was continuing to grow. Author interview with Oraib Rantawi, Amman, Jordan, 12 June 2011. 59 Author interview, Amman, Jordan, June 2011. 60 In my own personal observations of Jordanian politics over more than 20 years, I would argue that the pattern is for anti-reform journalists, activists or officials to insist that pro-democracy opponents are an ethnic or religious threat to the identity of Jordan. In short, anti-reformers try to create disunity by exploiting social divisions and fears, and then (ironically) accuse their opponents of threatening 'national unity'. Indeed, there is no more pervasive phrase in the anti-reform lexicon than invoking national unity against opponents, putting them instantly on the defensive, and effectively challenging their loyalty and patriotism. 61 BBC News, 'Jordan Tribes Criticize Queen Rania's "Political Role"', 8 February 2011. 62 T. Luck, 'Southern Protests Continue', Jordan Times, 8 July 2011. 63 While many Jordanian youth movements were inspired to reform activism by the Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions, the first of these movements actually emerged on 7 January 2011 (before the 25 January 2011 Egyptian revolution) in the form of the Theiban Popular Movement for Change in Theiban, Jordan, calling for an end to corruption and the ouster of the government of then-Prime Minister Samir al-Rifa'i. For a discussion of the dynamics of organisation of many of the movements, see T. Luck, 'Despite Differences, Youth Movements Still Depend on Traditional Parties to Materialise', Jordan Times, 29 July 2011. 64 N. Pelham, 'Jordan's Balancing Act', Middle East Report Online, 22 February 2011, http://www.merip.org/mero/mero022211 (accessed 22 February 2011). 67 Author interview in Amman, Jordan, June 2011. 65 See, for example, Muhammad Abu Rumman's analysis of state–opposition relations and divisions within the Islamist movement in 'Jordan's Parliamentary Elections and Islamist Boycott', Arab Reform Bulletin, 20 October 2010. 66 Author interview in Amman, Jordan, June 2011. 68 Since demonstrations took place across Jordan from the beginning of January onwards throughout 2011, they have varied in composition. Those in the hundreds tended to include either party activists (usually leftists and Islamists together) or youth movements, but those that grew to include thousands of demonstrators seemed to span the spectrum of traditional and newer forms of opposition. 69 See the account by democracy activist and blogger Naseem Tarawneh, 'The Quick Death of Shabab 24 and What it Means for Jordan', Black Iris of Jordan [blog], 26 March 2011, http://www.black-iris.com/2011/03/26/the-quick-death-of-shabab-march-24-and-what-it-means-for-jordan/ (accessed 30 July 2011). 70 The activists tweeted their reactions during the debate, while also receiving questions, via Twitter, from those who could not participate in person. See, for example, the Hashtag debate with former National Agenda for Reform leader, Dr. Marwan Muasher, at http://www.jordandays.tv/showVideo1.aspx?VidId = 1813 (accessed 25 July 2011). 71 Luck, 'Despite Differences'. 72 Some movements have gone further organisationally, such as the Karak Popular Youth Movement, by creating a steering committee to include representatives from parties and professional associations as well as independent activists. Luck, 'Despite Differences'. 73 C.R. Ryan, 'The King's Speech', Foreign Policy, Middle East Channel, 17 June 2011, http://mideast.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/06/17/the_kings_speech (accessed 17 July 2011). 74 Author interview with reform activist, Washington, DC, June 2010. 75 L. Andoni, 'Jordanians Demand Change', Al-Jazeera, 21 February 2011, http://english.aljazeera.net/indepth/opinion/2011/02/2011220105658153939.html (accessed 30 July 2011). 76 NCHR: Government Negligence of Real Reform is Greatest Danger to National Unity, Security, Ammon News, 4 February 2011, http://en.ammonnews.net/article.aspx?articleNO=11507 77 A.T. Homoud, 'Reform Gets a Heavyweight', JO Magazine, 3 July 2011. 78 Al-Rantawi, 'Coalition Presses for Electoral Reform in Jordan'; National Democratic Institute, 'In Jordan, Coalition Unites for Electoral Reform', 3 March 2010, http://www.ndi.org/print/16087 (accessed 30 July 2011). 79 M. Muasher, A Decade of Struggling Reform Efforts in Jordan: The Resilience of the Rentier System (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2011), p. 4. 80 M. Muasher, A Decade of Struggling Reform Efforts in Jordan: The Resilience of the Rentier System (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2011), p. 23. 81 The two largest parts of the regime's ruling political elite might therefore also be seen to include more specifically an old guard largely East Jordanian elite rooted in the bureaucracy, security services and armed forces, and a newer elite (that arose with King Abdullah's accession to the throne) of more business-oriented technocratic elites, including both East Jordanians and Palestinians. In his analysis, Bustani notes that the latter group tends to be seen as 'neoliberal' but that both groups actually tend to subscribe to this ideology. See Bustani, 'The Alternative Opposition in Jordan'.
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