Investment in Education and the Time Inconsistency of Redistributive Tax Policy
1996; Wiley; Volume: 63; Issue: 250 Linguagem: Inglês
10.22004/ag.econ.273254
ISSN1468-0335
AutoresRobin Boadway, Nicolas Marceau, Maurice Marchand,
Tópico(s)Financial Literacy, Pension, Retirement Analysis
ResumoTime inconsistency of tax policy is shown to arise in a setting where households differ in their ability to accumulate wealth and where the government has redistributional objectives. It is assumed that wealth accumulation takes the form of human capital acquired through education. The government is precluded from redistributing to a first-best optimum by a self-selection constraint. The second-best is shown to be time-inconsistent. In the time-consistent optimum, households underinvest in education. An argument can be made for public intervention in the provision of education.
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