Artigo Revisado por pares

Israel's Wars of Attrition: Operational and Moral Dilemmas

2006; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 12; Issue: 4 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1080/13533310600890125

ISSN

1743-9086

Autores

Avi Kober,

Tópico(s)

Terrorism, Counterterrorism, and Political Violence

Resumo

Click to increase image sizeClick to decrease image size Notes 1. Avi Kober, ‘From Blitzkrieg to Attrition: Israel's Attrition Strategy and Staying Power’, Small Wars and Insurgencies, Vol. 16, No. 2 (June 2005), pp. 216–240. 2. See, for example, David Garnham, ‘War Proneness, War Weariness, and Regime Type: 1816–1980’, Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 23, No. 3 (1986), pp. 279–289. For a study suggesting that the West would not tolerate extensive casualties for relatively unimportant objectives, see Eric V. Larson, Casualties and Consensus: The Historical Role of Casualties in Domestic Support for US Military Operations, Santa Monica, CA, 1996. 3. Stuart A. Cohen, ‘Why Do They Quarrel? Civil–Military Tensions in LIC Situations’, in Efraim Inbar (ed.), Democracies and Small Wars, London, 2003, p. 24. 4. For this term, see Herman Kahn, On Escalation, Metaphors and Scenarios, New York, 1965, pp. 231, 290. 5. For IDF Chief of Operations General Meir Amit's estimation of the incompetence of the infantry units that were carrying out the reprisal raids up to 1953, see David Tal, Israel's Day-to-Day Security Conception: Its Origin and Development 1949–1956, Sede Boker, 1998, p. 85 (Hebrew). 6. Stuart A. Cohen, Masqueraders’ in the IDF, 1991–92: The Military Unit and the Public Debate, BESA Mideast and Security Policy Studies, No. 16 (April 1994). 7. Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince and the Discourses, New York, 1950, Book 3, Ch.9; Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, New York, 1988, pp. 657–664. See also, Dan Reiter and Allan C. Stam, Democracies at War, Princeton, NJ, 2002, pp. 10–48. 8. Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, James D. Morrow, Randolph M. Siverson and Alastair Smith, ‘An Institutional Explanation of the Democratic Peace’, American Political Science Review, Vol. 93, No. 4 (December 1999), p. 794; D. Scott Bennett and Allan C. Stam, ‘The Declining Advantages of Democracy: A Combined Model of War Outcomes and Duration’, Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 42, No. 3 (June 1998), pp. 344–366. 9. Richard K. Betts, ‘What Will It Take to Deter the United States?’ Parameters, Vol. 25, No. 4 (Winter 1995/96), p. 76. 10. Bennett and Stam, ‘The Declining Advantages of Democracy’; Reiter and Stam, Democracies at War, pp. 144–163; Andrew P.N. Erdmann, ‘The US Presumption of Quick, Costless Wars’, Orbis, Vol. 43, No. 3 (Summer 1999), pp. 363–381. 11. Bruce W. Jentleson and Rebecca L. Britton, ‘Still Pretty Prudent: Post-Cold War American Public Opinion on the Use of Military Force’, The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 42, No. 4 (August 1998), pp. 395–417; Bruce W. Jentleson, ‘Who, Why, What, and How: Debates Over Post-Cold War Military Intervention’, in Robert J. Lieber (ed.), Eagle Adrift: American Foreign Policy at the End of the Century, New York, 1997, pp. 39–70; John R. Oneal, Brad Lian and James H. Joyner, ‘Are the American People “Pretty Prudent”? Public Responses to U.S. Uses of Force, 1950–1980’, International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 40 (June 1996), pp. 261–280. 12. Steven R. David, ‘Why the Third World Still Matters’, International Security, Vol. 17, No. 3 (Winter 1992/93), pp. 142–144. 13. Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Randolph M. Siverson, ‘War and the Survival of Political Leaders: A Comparative Study of Regime Types and Political Accountability’, American Political Science Review, Vol. 89, No. 4 (December 1995), pp. 841–855. Sometimes, though, it is the lack of will on the part of Western politicians, misinterpreting societal resilience, which accounts for the low cost tolerance attributed to democratic societies, rather than any chronic perseverance problem. See, for example, Steven Kull and I.M. Destler, Misreading the Public: The Myth of New Isolationism, Washington, DC, 1999. 14. Edward N. Luttwak, ‘A Post-Heroic Military Policy’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 75, No. 4 (July/August 1996), pp. 33–44. 15. Marshal (Ferdinand) Foch, The Principles of War, London, 1918, pp. 297–298. 16. See Mao Tse-tung, Selected Works, London, 1954; Vo Nguyen Giap, People's War, People's Army, Hanoi, 1961; Che Guevara, On Guerrilla Warfare, New York, 1961; R. Debray, Strategy for Revolution, London, 1970; T.E. Lawrence, ‘Guerrilla’, Encyclopaedia Britannica, www.britannica.com/original/print?content_id = 1365. 17. See Charles E. Callwell, Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice, Wakefield, 1976; Robert Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency, New York, 1966; Roger Trinquier, Modern Warfare: A French View on Counterinsurgency, New York, 1967. 18. The most persuasive works on compellence are Thomas Schelling, Arms and Influence, New Haven, CT, 1966, pp. 1–18; Alexander George and William Simons (eds.), The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy, Boulder, CO, 1994. 19. On deterrence-by-punishment as opposed to deterrence-by-denial, see Glenn Snyder, Deterrence and Defence, Princeton, NJ, 1961. 20. Mordechai Bar-On, The Gates of Gaza: Israel's Defence and Foreign Policy 1955–1957, Tel Aviv, 1992, pp. 93–94 (Hebrew); Avi Kober, Battlefield Decision: Battlefield Decision in the Arab–Israeli Wars, 1948–1982, Tel Aviv, 1995, pp. 162–166 (Hebrew). For a detailed analysis of the logic of the Israeli traditional offensive approach, see Ariel Levite, Offence and Defence in Israeli Military Doctrine, Jerusalem, 1989. 21. See, for example, Simon Naveh, ‘The Cult of Offensive, Pre-emption and Future Challenges for Israeli Operational Thought’, in Efraim Karsh (ed.), Peace in the Middle East: The Challenge for Israel, London, 1994, pp. 168–187. 22. Stuart A. Cohen and Efraim Inbar, ‘Varieties of Counter-Insurgency Activities: Israel's Military Operations Against the Palestinians, 1948–1990’, Small Wars and Insurgencies, Vol. 2, No. 1 (April 1991), pp. 44–45. On Ben-Gurion's awareness of the international constraints on the reprisal raids policy and his scepticism regarding the effectiveness of the raids in the early 1950s, see Tal, Israel's Day-to-Day Security Conception, pp. 69–70. 23. Tal, Israel's Day-to-Day Security Conception, pp. 71–72. 24. Bar-On, The Gates of Gaza, pp. 94–97. 25. Bar-On, The Gates of Gaza, pp. 111–112; Zeev Schiff and Eitan Haber (eds.), Israel, Army and Defence: A Dictionary, Tel Aviv, 1976, pp. 323–324 (Hebrew). 26. Ami Gluska, Eshkol, Give the Order!, Tel Aviv, 2004, p. 77. 27. Ami Gluska, Eshkol, Give the Order!, Tel Aviv, 2004, pp. 125–148. 28. Carmit Gai, Bar-Lev: A Biography, Tel Aviv, 1998, pp. 171–200 (Hebrew). 29. Edward Luttwak and Dan Horowitz, The Israeli Army, London, 1975, p. 318; Ariel Sharon with David Chanoff, Warrior: An Autobiography, New York, 2001, pp. 219–220. 30. Yaacov Bar-Siman-Tov, ‘IAF Effectiveness During the War of Attrition’, Ma'arachot, No. 283 (July 1979), pp. 45–50. 31. Schiff and Haber (eds.), Israel, Army and Defence, pp. 74–5. 32. Schiff and Haber (eds.), Israel, Army and Defence, p. 342. 33. Abba Eban, An Autobiography, Tel Aviv, 1977, pp. 458–459; Ezer Weizman, On Eagles’ Wings, Tel Aviv, 1975, p. 313 (Hebrew); Yitzhak Rabin, Pinkas Sherut, Tel Aviv, 1979, pp. 252–261. 34. Moshe Dayan, Story of My Life, Jerusalem, 1976, pp. 704–706 (Hebrew). 35. According to President Assad, as long as Syria had the option of conducting a war of attrition, Israel had not yet won the war. See Patrick Seale, Asad of Syria: The Struggle for the Middle East, Berkeley, 1995, p. 240. 36. Marvin Kalb and Bernard Kalb, Kissinger, Jerusalem, 1975, p. 290 (Hebrew). 37. Benny Morris, Righteous Victims: A History of the Zionist-Arab Conflict, 1881–2001, Tel Aviv, 2003, pp. 343–364 (Hebrew). 38. Aryeh Shalev, The Intifada: Causes and Effects, Jerusalem, 1991, pp. 99–122. 39. Morris, Righteous Victims, pp. 552–553. 40. Aluf Ben, ‘In Israel, Too Much to Leave to the Generals’, Washington Post, 18 August 2002. 41. Alex Fishman, ‘Extinguishing the Fire and Gaining Time’, Yediot Aharonot Weekend Supplement, 21 January 2005. 42. An aerostat is a tethered or moored balloon, often shaped like an airship and usually filled with helium. Aerostats, in contrast to airships and balloons (aircraft) that are free flying, are tied to the ground. 43. As Gandhi put it, no other people would respond to ‘soul force’ as quickly as the British. Judith M. Brown, Gandhi's Rise to Power, Cambridge, 1972, p. 247. And indeed, in India, following the massacre in Amritsar, the criticism among liberal circles in Britain tied the hands of the military when confronted with unarmed civilians. As a result of this criticism, the British doctrine of maximum force was supplanted by one of minimum force. 44. Edward L. Katzenbach, ‘Time, Space and Will: The Politico-Military Strategy of Mao Tse-Tung’, in T.N. Greene (ed.), The Guerrilla and How to Fight Him, New York, 1962, p. 18. 45. Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, New York, 1977, p. 151. 46. Paul Ramsey, The Just War: Force and Political Responsibility, Savage, 1983, p. 469; James Turner Johnson, Just War Tradition and the Restraint of War: A Moral and History Inquiry, Princeton, 1981, p. 198; James Turner Johnson, Can Modern War Be Just? New Haven, 1984, p. 145. 47. George Schwarzenberger, Power Politics: A Study of World Society, London, 1964, p. 191; Abraham D. Sofaer, ‘Response to Terrorism: Targeted killing is a necessary option’, San francisco Chronicle, 26 march 2004. http://www.sfgate.com/cgi–bin/article.cgi?file = /chronicle/archive/2004/03/26/EDGK65QPC41.DTL, David Kretzmer, ‘Targeted Killing of Suspected Terrorists: Extra–Judicial Executions or legitimate means of defence?’, the European Journal of International Law, Vol. 16, No. 2, (2005), pp. 171–212. Daniel Statman, ‘Targeted Killing’, Theoretical Inquiries in Law, Vol. 5, No. 1 (January 2004), pp. 179–198. 48. Kretzmer, ‘Targeted Killing of Suspected Terrorists’, p. 187. 49. Thomas A. Keaney and Eliot A. Cohen, Revolution in Warfare? Air Power in the Persian Gulf, Annapolis, MD, 1995, p. 225. 50. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, Princeton, NJ, 1984, p. 209. For the difference between the British and American school and Clausewitz's interpretation of the principle, see Michael I. Handel, Masters of War, London, 2000, p. 406, note 9. 51. Alan Geyer and Barbara G. Green, Lines in the Sand: Justice and the Gulf War, Louisville, KY, 1992, p. 338. 52. Edward N. Luttwak, ‘Where Are the Great Powers?’ Foreign Affairs, Vol. 73, No. 4 (July/August 1994), pp. 23–28; ‘Toward Post-Heroic Warfare’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 74, No. 3 (May/June 1995), pp. 109–122. 53. Edward N. Luttwak, ‘A Post-Heroic Military Policy’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 75, No. 4 (July/August 1996), pp. 33–44. 54. Non-lethal and less-lethal weapons describe a variety of technologies—electromagnetic, acoustic, biotechnical, chemical, mechanical, optical, etc.—that can be used in the framework of both HICs and LICs, by both civil and military agencies. Concept for Non-lethal Capabilities in Army Operations, Department of the US Army, Fort Monroe, VA, 1 December 1996. 55. According to one source, US bombs claimed 1,000–1,300 civilian lives. Carl Cornetta, ‘Operation Enduring Freedom: Why a Higher Rate of Civilian Bombing Casualties’, Project on Defence Alternatives (PDA), Briefing Report, No. 11, 24 January 2002, www.comw.org/pda/0201oef.html. Another source quotes Professor Marc W. Herold of the University of New Hampshire as estimating that US bombs claimed the lives of 3,000 to 3,400 Afghan civilians, ‘Afghanistan Two Years After the Bombing: Osama's Not Caught; The Taliban Are Back and Fighting Intensifies’, Democracy Now!, 7 October 2003, www.democracynow.org/article.pl?sid = 03/10/07/1536205&mode = thread&tid = 47. For an explanation for the higher casualty rates see Cornetta, ‘Operation Enduring Freedom’. 56. Kober, ‘From Blitzkrieg to Attrition’, pp. 219–220. 57. Kober, ‘From Blitzkrieg to Attrition’, p. 216. 58. See, for example, Chief of Staff Rabin's words before the members of the General Staff in the midst of ‘the battle on the water’ with the Syrians in the mid-1960s, Gluska, Eshkol, p. 100. 59. Bar-On, The Gates of Gaza, p. 249. 60. On the Qibya operation and its aftermath, see Shabtai Teveth, ‘Has the Operation Order Been Forged?’, Ha'aretz, 2 September 1994; Shabtai Tevet, ‘Who Changed the GHQ's Order?’, Ha'aretz, 9 September 1994; Shabtai Tevet, ‘Old Versions, New Versions’, Ha'aretz, 16 September 1994; Yossi Melman, ‘Qibya's Agreed Lie’, Ha'aretz, 18 April 1997; Morris, Righteous Victims, p. 264; Benny Morris, Israel's Border wars 1949–1956: Arab infiltration, Israeli retaliation and the countdown to the suez war (Tel–AVIV: Am oved, 1996), pp. 211–212, 278; Dayan, Story of My Life, p. 115; Martin Van Creveld, The Sword and the Olive (New York: public affairs, 1998), pp. 133–134; Shimon Golan, Hot Border, Cold War, Tel Aviv, 2000, pp. 292–297. 61. Schiff and Haber (eds.), Israel, Army and Defence, p. 74. 62. See www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page = story_5-5-2004_pg4_11. 63. Address to members of the European Parliament, Jerusalem, 27 October 2003, www.kokhaviv.publications.com/2003/israel/10/0310281320.html. 64. Amos Yadlin and Asa Kasher, ‘The Ethics of Fighting Terror’, Journal of National Defence Studies, Nos. 2–3 (September 2003), pp. 5–12 (Hebrew). 65. Mordechai Gur, Chief of the General Staff, 1974–1978, Tel Aviv, 1998, p. 404 (Hebrew). 66. Interview with Chief of Staff Barak, Ha'aretz, 30 July 1993. See also Press conference with the Northern Command's Chief of Staff, Brigadier R., Ha'aretz, 29 July 1993; Chief of Staff Mofaz in an interview to the Israel Radio, Channel 2, 6 October 1999. 67. See www.palestinefacts.org/pf_1991to_now_jenin_2002.php. 68. James Taranto, The Wall Street Journal, 10 April 2002, www.opinion.journal.com/best/; Arieh O'Sullivan, ‘Soldiers’ Deaths Won't Affect Defensive Shield’, The Jerusalem Post, 10 April 2002. 69. See www.btselem.org/English/Publications/Full_Text/Illusions_of_Restraint. 70. Avi Kober, ‘Targeted Killing and the War on Terror: The Israeli Experience during the Second Intifada’. Unpublished manuscript. 71. Chief of the IAF General Shkedi in an interview to the Israeli Radio, Channel 2, 29 June 2005; Chief of the IAF General Shkedi at Tel Aviv University, quoted in Chanan Greenberg, ‘Chief of IAF: Wounding of Innocent Civilians Lower than the Statistics’, Ynet, 7 March, 2006, www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-3224821,00.html. See also Amir Rapaport, ‘Decision of Existential Significance’, Ma'ariv Weekend Supplement, 1 July 2005. 72. Chief of the Authority for Weapon Research and Development (AWRD) in the Israeli Defence Ministry, Major-General Yitzhak Ben-Israel, in an interview with Ha'aretz, 17 December 2001. 73. www.technologyreview.com/articles/05/03/wo/wo_hoffman031505.asp?p = 1. 74. Bar-On, The Gates of Gaza, p. 144. 75. www.israel-mfa.gov.il/MFAHeb/Diplomatic + updates/Events/Rafiah + 19-May-2004.htm. 76. Morris, Righteous Victims, pp. 546–552. 77. Interview to Ha'aretz, 17 March 1989. 78. Gideon Alon, ‘Mofaz: IDF Jurist Approves Killings’, Ha'aretz, 11 January 2001. 79. Amos Harel and Avi Isacharoff, The Seventh War, Tel Aviv, 2004, pp. 210–211. For the concept escalation dominance, see Kahn, On Escalation, p. 290. Additional informationNotes on contributorsAvi KoberAvi Kober is a Senior Lecturer in Political Studies at Bar Ilan University and a Senior Research Associate at the BESA Centre. The author wishes to thank Efraim Inbar for his helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper.

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