Accuracy, Risk, and the Principle of Indifference
2014; Wiley; Volume: 92; Issue: 1 Linguagem: Inglês
10.1111/phpr.12097
ISSN1933-1592
Autores Tópico(s)Philosophy and Theoretical Science
ResumoPhilosophy and Phenomenological ResearchVolume 92, Issue 1 p. 35-59 Original Article Accuracy, Risk, and the Principle of Indifference Richard Pettigrew, Richard Pettigrew University of BristolSearch for more papers by this author Richard Pettigrew, Richard Pettigrew University of BristolSearch for more papers by this author First published: 24 March 2014 https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.12097Citations: 36Read the full textAboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onEmailFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditWechat References Armendt, B. (1993). Dutch Books, Additivity, and Utility Theory. Philosophical Topics, 21(1): 1–20. Bertrand, J. (1889). Calcul de probabilités. Gauthier-Villars, Paris. Buchak, L. (2013). Risk and Rationality. Oxford University Press. Christensen, D. (1996). Dutch-Book Arguments Depragmatized: Epistemic Consistency for Partial Believers. The Journal of Philosophy, 93(9): 450–479. Easwaran, K. (2013). Expected Accuracy Supports Conditionalization—and Conglomerability and Reflection. Philosophy of Science, 80(1): 119–142. Easwaran, K. (ms). Dr. Truthlove, or, How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love Bayesian Probability. http://dl.dropboxusercontent.com/u/10561191/Unpublished/Truthlove.pdf. Goldman, A. (2002). The Unity of the Epistemic Virtues. In Pathways to Knowledge: Private and Public. Oxford University Press, New York. Hájek, A. (2008). Arguments For—Or Against—Probabilism? The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 59(4): 793–819. Hájek, A. (ms). Staying Regular. http://hplms.berkeley.edu/HajekStayingRegular.pdf. Ismael, J. (2008). Raid! Dissolving the Big, Bad Bug. Noûs, 42(2): 292–307. James, W. (1905). The Will to Believe. In The Will to Believe, and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy. Longmans Green, New York. Jaynes, E. T. (1957). Information Theory and Statistical Mechanics. The Physical Review, 106(4): 620–630. Joyce, J. M. (1998). A Nonpragmatic Vindication of Probabilism. Philosophy of Science, 65(4): 575–603. Joyce, J. M. (2009). Accuracy and Coherence: Prospects for an Alethic Epistemology of Partial Belief. In F Huber. and C Schmidt-Petri., editors, Degrees of Belief. Springer. Kemeny, J. G. (1955). Fair Bets and Inductive Probabilities. Journal of Symbolic Logic, 20(3): 263–273. Lewis, D. (1980). A Subjectivist's Guide to Objective Chance. In R. C Jeffrey., editor, Studies in Inductive Logic and Probability, volume II. University of California Press, Berkeley. Paris, J. B. and Vencovská, A. (1990). A Note on the Inevitability of Maximum Entropy. International Journal of Approximate Reasoning, 4: 181–273. Pettigrew, R. (2013). A New Epistemic Utility Argument for the Principal Principle. Episteme, 10(1): 19–35. Predd, J., Seiringer, R., Lieb, E. H., Osherson, D., Poor, V., and Kulkarni, S. (2009). Probabilistic Coherence and Proper Scoring Rules. IEEE Transactions of Information Theory, 55(10): 4786–4792. Rawls, J. (1975). A Theory of Justice (revised edition). Oxford University Press, New York. Savage, L. J. (1951). The Theory of Statistical Decision. Journal of the American Statistical Association, 46(253): 55–67. Skyrms, B. (1984). Pragmatics and Empiricism. Yale University Press, New Haven. van Fraassen, B. C. (1989). Laws and Symmetry. Oxford University Press, Oxford. Vineberg, S. (2001). The Notion of Consistency for Partial Belief. Philosophical Studies, 102: 281–296. White, R. (2009). Evidential Symmetry and Mushy Credence. Oxford Studies in Epistemology, 3: 161–186. Williamson, J. (2007). Motivating Objective Bayesianism: From Empirical Constraints to Objective Probabilities. In W. L Harper. and G. R WheelerR., editors, Probability and Inference: Essays in Honor of Henry E. Kyburg Jr., 155–183. College Publications, London. Citing Literature Volume92, Issue1January 2016Pages 35-59 ReferencesRelatedInformation
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