Social Image and the 50-50 Norm: A Theoretical and Experimental Analysis of Audience Effects
2009; Wiley; Volume: 77; Issue: 5 Linguagem: Inglês
10.3982/ecta7384
ISSN1468-0262
AutoresJames Andreoni, B. Douglas Bernheim,
Tópico(s)Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
ResumoEconometricaVolume 77, Issue 5 p. 1607-1636 Social Image and the 50–50 Norm: A Theoretical and Experimental Analysis of Audience Effects James Andreoni, James Andreoni Dept. of Economics, University of California at San Diego, 9500 Gillman Drive, La Jolla, CA 92093, U.S.A. and NBER; [email protected]Search for more papers by this authorB. Douglas Bernheim, B. Douglas Bernheim Dept. of Economics, Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305-6072, U.S.A. and NBER; [email protected] We are indebted to the following people for helpful comments: Iris Bohnet, Colin Camerer, Navin Kartik, Antonio Rangel, three anonymous referees, and seminar participants at the California Institute of Technology, NYU, and Stanford University's SITE Workshop in Psychology and Economics. We acknowledge financial support from the National Science Foundation through grant numbers SES-0551296 (Andreoni) and SES-0452300 (Bernheim).Search for more papers by this author James Andreoni, James Andreoni Dept. of Economics, University of California at San Diego, 9500 Gillman Drive, La Jolla, CA 92093, U.S.A. and NBER; [email protected]Search for more papers by this authorB. Douglas Bernheim, B. Douglas Bernheim Dept. of Economics, Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305-6072, U.S.A. and NBER; [email protected] We are indebted to the following people for helpful comments: Iris Bohnet, Colin Camerer, Navin Kartik, Antonio Rangel, three anonymous referees, and seminar participants at the California Institute of Technology, NYU, and Stanford University's SITE Workshop in Psychology and Economics. We acknowledge financial support from the National Science Foundation through grant numbers SES-0551296 (Andreoni) and SES-0452300 (Bernheim).Search for more papers by this author First published: 06 October 2009 https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA7384Citations: 664 AboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onEmailFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditWechat Abstract A norm of 50–50 division appears to have considerable force in a wide range of economic environments, both in the real world and in the laboratory. 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