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THE REJECTION OF EPISTEMIC CONSEQUENTIALISM

2013; Wiley; Volume: 23; Issue: 1 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1111/phis.12019

ISSN

1758-2237

Autores

Selim Berker,

Tópico(s)

Political Philosophy and Ethics

Resumo

Philosophical IssuesVolume 23, Issue 1 p. 363-387 Original Article THE REJECTION OF EPISTEMIC CONSEQUENTIALISM Selim Berker, Selim Berker Harvard UniversitySearch for more papers by this author Selim Berker, Selim Berker Harvard UniversitySearch for more papers by this author First published: 25 October 2013 https://doi.org/10.1111/phis.12019Citations: 63Read the full textAboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onEmailFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditWechat References Alston, William P. 1985. "Concepts of Epistemic Justification." The Monist 68: 57–89. 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