Portal de Periódicos da CAPES

EU–Russian Energy Relations after the 2004/2007 EU Enlargement: An EU Perspective

2010; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 18; Issue: 3 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1080/14782804.2010.507918

1478-2804

Marek Neuman,

European and International Law Studies

Abstract While voices for a more unified EU approach towards Russia to guarantee the Union's energy security grow stronger, the internal dichotomy between the energy interests of the old and the new (Central and Eastern European) member states hampers the possibility of joint action. Although an analytical thick distinction between old and new EU members often represents extensive simplification, in terms of energy policy, it is made possible by the discrepancies in their respective energy sectors, particularly over three categories. First, their energy mixes are diverse. Second, the degree to which national grids are interconnected differs greatly. Third, these two camps hold opposing perceptions of Russia as a reliable energy partner. With these differences in mind, this article proposes four possible scenarios that could develop within the European Union in terms of energy policy; the establishment of a common European Energy Policy with an external dimension; the lack of such a policy, effectively maintaining the current status quo situation; the EU expanding its energy community; and the EU becoming a nuclear energy powerhouse. Each of these potential developments is assessed for its implications on EU–Russian energy relations. Keywords: European UnionEastern enlargementCentral and Eastern European countriesRussiaenergyEuropean energy policyexpanded energy communitynuclear energy Notes 1 Valuable comments have been received at the 'Between Scylla and Charybdis: Energy Security and Climate Change Challenges in the European Union' conference held on 18–19 September 2009 in Loughborough. Earlier versions of this paper have been presented at the 'Enlargement—Five Years After: The State of European Integration and New Challenges for the Discipline' conference held on 8–9 May 2009 in Budapest and at the Fourth Pan-European Conference on EU Politics, which was held in September 2008 at the University of Latvia in Riga. 2 Prozorov, S. (Citation2006) Understanding conflict between Russia and the EU: the limits of integration, O. Richmond (Ed.) Rethinking Peace and Conflict Studies (Hampshire and New York: Palgrave Macmillan), p. 8. 3 CitationFeklyunina, V. (June Citation2008) The 'Great Diversification Game': Russia's vision of the European Union's energy projects in the shared neighbourhood, Journal of Contemporary European Research, 4(2), p. 137. 4 CitationJoint Statement on EU Enlargement and EU-Russia Relations (Europa.eu, 27 April 2004), p. 1. 5 That this was a real concern was confirmed in the negotiation process of a new PCA that is to replace the original, long-outdated treaty. The launching of these negotiations has been halted by first Poland and then Lithuania, who exercised their right of veto. Both countries ultimately withdrew their dissent in time for the PCA negotiations to be launched at the EU-Russia summit at Khanti Mansiisk, Russia, in June 2008. Nevertheless, they have subsequently been halted again as a reaction to Russia's military campaign in Georgia in August 2008, before being resumed in the end of 2008. This once again illustrates the complexity of EU-Russian relations, especially after the last round of EU enlargement. 6 For a more detailed account of these practical problems, whose discussion would surpass the framework of this paper, please refer to Light, M. (Citation2006) Russian Political Engagement with the European Union, in Putin's Russia and the Enlarged Europe, R. Allison, M. Light & S. White (Eds.) (London: Chatham House), pp. 49–67. 7 Prozorov, Understanding conflict between Russia and the EU: the limits of integration, p. 48. 8 CitationSolana, J. The External Energy Policy of the European Union, Annual Conference of the French Institute of International Relations (Brussels: Council of the European Union, 1 Feb 2008), p. 2. 9 'CitationBuzek Calls for EU 'Energy Community', in EurActiv (11 Dec 2009): 2. 10 The term 'EU–Russian energy relations' describes the bilateral (Brussels–Moscow) relationship with regard to energy matters in the broad sense. Thus, it includes official discussion and negotiation fora, such as the Energy Dialogue, but also semi-official talks between and statements by individual leaders. 11 Stone Sweet, A. & Sandholtz, W. (Citation1998) Integration, supranational governance, and the institutionalization of the European Polity, W. Sandholtz and A. Stone Sweet (Eds.) European Integration and Supranational Governance (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press), p. 9. 12 Stone Sweet, A. & Sandholtz, W. (Citation1998) Integration, supranational governance, and the institutionalization of the European Polity, W. Sandholtz and A. Stone Sweet (Eds.) European Integration and Supranational Governance, (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press: 9-11. 13 For a detailed discussion of the telecommunications policy example, please refer to Sandholtz, W. (Citation1998) The Emergence of a Supranational Telecommunications Regime, W. Sandholtz & A. Stone Sweet (Eds.) European Integration and Supranational Governance, (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press). 14 CitationGeopolitics of EU Energy Supply, in EurActiv (18 July 2005), p. 1. 15 This interdependency is said to further deepen as Russian gas will constitute sixty percent of EU's gas imports by 2030. Found in Ibid. 16 Mankoff, J. (Citation2009, February) Eurasian Energy Security, Council Special Report No. 43 (New York: Council on Foreign Relations,): 4. The original quote can be found in the Energeticheskaya strategiya Rossii na period do 2020 goda. 17 Russia's determination to penetrate into other parts of the energy chain has once again been demonstrated by the Kremlin-connected oil company Surgut Neftegaz acquiring Austrian OMV's 21.2% stake in Hungary's MOL Oil and Gas Company in April 2009, spreading its influence in the Central and South-East European markets. Found in CitationSocor, Vladimir, 'Major Russian Oil Company Secretly Buys Into Hungary's MOL', Eurasia Daily Monitor, 3 Apr 2009, p. 1–2. 18 'An Energy Policy for Europe', in Communication from the Commission to the European Council and the European Parliament (Brussels: Commission of the European Communities, 10 Jan 2007): 3-23. This has been followed by an energy and climate package proposing concrete measures to achieve these targets. 19 Schmidt-Felzmann, A., (Citation2008) All for One? EU Member States and the Union's Common Policy towards the Russian Federation, Journal of Contemporary European Studies, 16(2), p. 172. 20 100% of Slovakia's gas is imported from Russia, with Bulgaria and the Baltic states following closely with a 96% and 78% dependency on Russian gas, respectively. Found in 'Russia, in Country Analysis Briefs (Energy Information Administration, May 2008): 9. Data for the Czech Republic and Hungary show a similar trend: 84% and 62% gas dependency on Russia, respectively. Found in Cohen, A. (Citation2007) Europe's Strategic Dependence on Russian Energy, Backgrounder, no. 2083, p. 3. Moreover, seven EU member states (Bulgaria, Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, and Slovakia) are receiving 100% of their gas imports from Russia, resulting in complete import dependence on one supplier. Found in Feklyunina, "The 'Great Diversification Game': Russia's Vision of the European Union's Energy Projects in the Shared Neighbourhood," p. 132. With regard to oil, too, the situation does not differ substantially, as for instance 100% of oil imports to Slovakia stem from Russia, with the number for Hungary standing at 98%. Found in CitationBalmaceda, Margarita M., EU Energy Policy and Future European Energy Markets: Consequences for the Central and East European States, in Arbeitspapiere Nr. 42 (Mannheim: Mannheimer Zentrum für Europäische Sozialforschung, 2002): 6-7. 21 There are some recent proposals to connect the grids of individual Eastern European countries, such as the Hungarian 'New European Transmission System' initiative, but it remains to be seen how successful these will be. Found in Mankoff, 'Eurasian Energy Security', p. 29. 22 CitationBoon von Ochssée, T. & van der Linde, C. Two sides of the same coin?: Energy security thinking in the US Versus Europe (University of Groningen) p. 16. 23 Several bilateral activities involving German, French, or Italian companies (and governments) come to mind. 24 In Lithuania's case, the matter involved the privatization of a refinery, sold to Polish PKN Orlen, thus preventing a Russian takeover. In the Czech Republic, the drop is believed to be a reaction to the Czech Republic signing a bilateral treaty with the United States allowing the latter to place parts of an anti-missile defense system on Czech soil; an act vehemently opposed by Moscow. For more detailed information on these two examples, please refer to CitationSocor, Vladimir, Russian Oil Pipeline Shutoff to Lithuania: Wider Ramifications, in Eurasia Daily Monitor (6 June 2007) and CitationRussia Suspected of 'Pipeline Politics' Over Czech Oil Cuts, in EurActiv (1 Aug 2008). 25 Natorski, M. & Herranz Surrallés, A. (Citation2008) Securitizing Moves To Nowhere? The Framing of the European Union's Energy Policy, Journal of Contemporary European Research 4(2) pp. 75–80. 26 CitationVondra, A. Solidarity As a Cornerstone of the EU Energy Policy, Vilnius Energy Security Conference 2007 (Vilnius: 11 Oct 2007), p. 1. 27 CitationLandsbergis, V. Why we must learn to say no to Russia, Europe's World (Summer 2008) p. 1. 28 Geden, O., Marcelis, C. & Maurer, A. (Citation2006) Perspectives for the European Union's external energy policy: discourse, ideas and interests in Germany, the UK, Poland and France (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik), p. 16. 29 Putin, Vladimir V. (Citation2006, February 28,) Energy Egotism is a Road to Nowhere, The Wall Street Journal: A16. 30 Barnes, P.M. (Citation2008, June) Security of Energy Supply in the New Europe: a role for the European Atomic Energy Community in the European Union's Neighbourhood Policy?, Journal of Contemporary European Research 4(2), pp. 107–09. 31 For a detailed overview of the activities of both the EC and the EP with regard to the EU's energy policy, please refer to Natorski & Herranz Surrallés, Securitizing Moves To Nowhere? The Framing of the European Union's Energy Policy. 32 CitationOettinger defends European vision on Energy, in EurActiv (15 Jan 2010): 1–2. 33 This has also been the case in the Czech Republic, for which energy security constituted one of the 'three Es' of its Presidency of the European Council in the first half of 2009. Nevertheless, due to several factors (domestic and external), the Czech Republic, and consequently the European Council never followed through on the ideas proposed (e.g. a more concerted approach towards Russia). 34 For a detailed analysis of Russia's efforts to change its public image abroad and at home, please refer to Feklyunina, V. (2008, June) Battle for perceptions: projecting Russia in the West, Europe-Asia Studies 60(4). 35 Such a policy would be acceptable to Russian companies despite the fact that they prefer to deal with their buyers on a bilateral rather than multilateral basis, due to their bargaining power being greater vis-à-vis individual countries than vis-à-vis the Union as a whole. 36 The idea of a solidarity pact is one that is often brought up in the discourse on a European energy policy. A solidarity clause, such as the one mentioned in the Lisbon Treaty that entered into force on December 1, 2009, would, however, not cure the internal EU dichotomy between the old and new member states. Rather, it would soften the impact of potential disruptions to (particularly) the new members, without, however, addressing the underlying causes for the dichotomy (i.e. disproportionate dependency on Russian energy resources, low and inefficient grid interconnectedness among the new member states and among the new and old members). Nevertheless, the rhetoric surrounding the solidarity pact is yet to be put into practice. 37 Mankoff, Eurasian Energy Security, p. 38. 38 Geden, Marcelis & Maurer, Perspectives for the European Union's External Energy Policy: Discourse, Ideas and Interests in Germany, the UK, Poland and France, p. 24. 39 Geden, Marcelis & Maurer, Perspectives for the European Union's External Energy Policy: Discourse, Ideas and Interests in Germany, the UK, Poland and France, p. 24 40 For a more detailed discussion of the current stage of a European Energy Policy, please refer to the above-stated chapter entitled 'Energy Policy in the European Union and in the Russian Federation', which puts forward a detailed analysis of energy divisions between the EU and Russia, also paying attention to internal difficulties and the subsequent dichotomies within the European Union. 41 An example of such a quest is Poland's gas monopoly's deal for liquefied natural gas from Qatar. For more information, please refer to 'CitationQuatar Gas Signs LNG Deal with PGNiG', in Oil & Gas Eurasia (15 Apr 2009), p. 1. 42 Citationvan Aartsen, Jozias, Why Energy Must Be the Core of EU Security Thinking, in Europe's World (Spring 2008), p. 1. 43 Why Energy Must Be the Core of EU Security Thinking, in Europe's World (Spring 2008), p. 1 44 Why Energy Must Be the Core of EU Security Thinking, in Europe's World (Spring 2008), p. 1: 1–2. 45 Such close cooperation is conditional on the signatory states having to adopt the Union's acquis in the field of energy (such as liberalizing the domestic electricity market). For more information, please refer to Barnes, Security of Energy Supply in the New Europe: A Role for the European Atomic Energy Community in the European Union's Neighbourhood Policy?, p. 124. 46 For more details, please refer to CitationEU in Quest to Secure Middle East Gas Supplies, in EurActiv (6 May 2008). 47 For more information on the potential and difficulties of the Nabucco project, please refer to Mankoff, 'Eurasian Energy Security', pp. 19–26. 48 For the chapter on energy security contained in the CitationEastern Partnership proposal, please refer to 'Eastern Partnership', in Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council (Brussels: Commission of the European Communities, 3 Dec 2008), pp. 7–8. 49 Russia seems to have a better developed strategy, as it tries to buy up gas from Caspian Sea producers (such as Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan), which it then wants to re-sell to its European partners. The Nabucco project, too, is being rivaled by the Russian proposed, planned, and financed South Stream. Here, the Russian strategy seems to already be bearing fruit, as witnessed by the two signing ceremonies that were recently held in Turkey within the space of several weeks (both witnessed about Turkey's support for both the Nabucco and South Stream pipeline). Similarly, Russian energy giants are penetrating into the North African markets. This is a very forward-thinking strategy, especially considering that the output of Russian domestic fields is slowly declining, which is set to accelerate in the decades to come. For statistical information on the outputs of individual oil and gas fields, please refer to Citation'Russia', pp. 1–11. 50 The Union's appeal in these countries is a strong point for consideration, as many of these countries still face authoritarian regimes and lack basic democratic and liberal market principles. These limitations for now also stand in the way of their closer cooperation with the EU. 51 CitationGoldirova, R. (Citation2008) Time Is Ripe For EU-Wide Nuclear Safety Rules, Brussels Says, EU Observer, 25 May, p. 2. 52 Goldirova, R. (2008) Barroso Attempts to Woo Germany on Nuclear Energy, EU Observer, 7 July, p. 1. 53 Piebalgs, who was in charge of energy at the European Commission, shares Barroso's view. For more information, please refer to Goldirova, Time is ripe for EU-Wide Nuclear Safety Rules, Brussels says, p. 1. 54 Although the '20–20–20' EC proposal for a European energy policy fell short of calling for a unified European Nuclear Energy Policy, it nevertheless stressed the importance of nuclear energy within the individual states' energy mixes and called for more consultation on the future of nuclear energy in the EU. For more details, please refer to 'CitationAn Energy Policy for Europe', pp. 17–18. 55 The newly formed governing coalition of the CDU/CSU and the FDP has made such a decision more likely. Indeed, the party most opposed to reconsidering the decision to phase out German nuclear reactors, the Bündnis 90/Die Grünen (the German Green Party), is not directly involved in the decision-making process. However, whether such a decision will truly be taken, remains to be seen. 56 Special Eurobarometer Citation297: Attitudes towards radioactive waste (Brussels: European Commission, June 2008), p. 5. 57 A similar survey conducted in 2005 showed the respective figures to be 37% in favour and 55% opposing nuclear energy. For further details, please refer to Ibid. 5–6. 58 Quote found in CitationMyslobodsky, M. The origin of radiophobias, Perspectives in Biology and Medicine 44, no. 4 (Autumn 2001), p. 550. 59 However, some CEECs (those inclined towards Russia) have demonstrated that they are not opposed to Russian involvement in their national nuclear energy fields, as long as this results in the diversification of energy resources. Therefore, the Bulgarian government signed a deal with Russia's Atomstroyexport JSC for the construction of the new Belene reactor. For more information of this rather surprising development, please refer to Barnes, Security of Energy Supply in the New Europe: A Role for the European Atomic Energy Community in the European Union's Neighbourhood Policy?, p. 123. 60 Please see scenario one above. 61 'Oettinger Defends European Vision on Energy', p. 1–2.