Portal de Periódicos da CAPES

Bedouin Communities in the Negev

2011; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 77; Issue: 2 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1080/01944363.2011.567890

1939-0130

Deborah F. Shmueli, Rassem Khamaisi,

Archaeology and Historical Studies

Abstract Problem: Conflict roils around recognition, planning, and appropriate municipal frameworks for Israel's 194,000 Negev Bedouin, especially the 45,000 Bedouin living in dispersed, unauthorized settlements, housed in tents and cinderblock shacks, lacking municipal water, sewage, or electricity, and accessible only by dirt tracks. Purpose: We examine both the universal (indigenous peoples) and unique (to the Bedouin) aspects of the land claims and planning challenges facing the Israeli Bedouin of the Negev. We seek to shift the focus of land disputes to planning paradigms that facilitate negotiated agreements, which may overcome the impasse between the Bedouin (struggling for land, municipal recognition, and equal economic opportunities) and the Israeli government that perceives the Bedouin as a growing demographic threat and a potential fifth column. We develop a model that builds on the convergence of spatial and socioeconomic forces, reflecting the interplay between Bedouin traditionalism and modernization in developing planning frameworks, and creating an arena of negotiation that balances the interests of the contending stakeholders. Methods: Our methodology is multifaceted: Over a three-year period we conducted in-depth interviews, workshops, and observations, and engaged in a review of the planning literature in indigenous societies, Negev Bedouin society, municipal reforms, societies undergoing modernization through urbanization, and relevant master and statutory plans. Results and conclusions: The universal phenomenon of the clash between traditional cultures and modernization has sharpened with the spread of urbanization into rural areas, presenting a challenge to centralized planning processes. The planning model presents a range of planning options that simplify complex conflicts of interests, needs and goals between the Bedouin and the national and local Israeli governments. Results suggest that diametrically opposite positions may be reconciled by identifying an arena of negotiations within which planning options can be developed through discourse, rather than imposing centrally developed plans that might trigger strong, if not volatile, opposition. Takeaway for practice: While this research deals with conflict over land between traditional and modern societies in Israel, the planning paradigms have international applicability. Forces for economic development and urbanization often compete with environmentalists or indigenous groups clinging to their land to maintain their ways of life. Culturally adaptive versions of collaborative planning are crucial to successful dispute resolution. Research support: None. Keywords: Negev Bedouinmunicipal structuresplanning paradigm modelland disputestraditionalism versus modernizationnegotiations Acknowledgments Many thanks to the Heads of Local Committees and village and town residents from whom we learned, and to Amram Kalagi for his wisdom and example. We are very grateful to Larry Susskind and to Saul B. Cohen for their insightful and astute input, and to the editors for their helpful comments. She specializes in environmental planning, public sector conflict management, community capacity building, and justice issues. Notes 1. CitationZaferatos (2004) demonstrates this conclusion in his examination of the Swinomish Indian Tribes' realization that they could not successfully achieve their community development goals in isolation from the surrounding political region, and shows how they formed cooperative agreements that advanced tribal interests and helped to achieve Washington State's growth management goals. CitationDale (1999) presents an anthropological perspective to the planning issues facing the Haida Gwaii in British Columbia and, as Merry comments, the robustness of this perspective shows just how much framing and context matter (as cited in CitationDale, 1999, see p. 933). 2. The Jordan Arab Legion, the Bedouin military force first organized by the British Glubb Pasha, was the backbone of the Hashemite Royal family, playing the key role in Jordan's invasion of Palestine in 1948 and in putting down the Palestinian attempt to overthrow the king in the "Black September" uprising of 1970. 3. According to the Land Ordinance (Mawat) of 1921, a Bedouin who cultivated revitalized and improved Mawat land was given a certificate of ownership for that land, which was then recategorized as Miri. Twenty-seven years later, the courts of the State of Israel ruled that any Bedouin who passed up the opportunity to register Mawat land in 1921 and did not receive a certificate of ownership was no longer eligible to do so (CitationBen-David, 1996; CitationKedar & Yiftachel, 2006; Meir & CitationMarx, 2005). 4. The demographic statistics about the Bedouin population are highly contested, and different statistics are used by different groups (even different government publications vary) to promote different agendas. This article will use the Statistical Abstract of Israel Number 61 (CitationCentral Bureau of Statistics, 2010). The data are from 2009, and we are using the end-of-year data. The total Arab population in the Negev was 193,700, with annual growth of 4.3% (Table 2.4, p. 92). Arabs living outside of localities (the diaspora or pzura) was 45.5 (Table 2.5, p. 95). CBS defines locality as a permanently inhabited place that meets the following criteria: a) it is usually inhabited by 40 or more adult residents (until the 1961 Census, this was 10 residents; until 1997, 20 permanent residents or more); b) it has self-administration; c) it is not officially included in another locality; d) the planning institutions approved its establishment (p. 29). Arabs living in Abu Basma Regional Council was 13.3 (Table 2.13, p. 127); Abu Basma includes 10 localities (not Abu Tlul) of which 6 have plans. The population of towns was Hura, 16,600; Ksefia, 16,800; Laqiya, 9,600; Rahat, 51,700 (includes a number of unrecognized villages within the territory of Rahat that other sources count as part of the unrecognized villages); Tel Sheva, 15,200; Segev, 7,300; Ararya B'Negev, 12,000; for a total of 129,200 (Table 2.15, pp. 130–132). The Arab population in Ber Sheva, Arad, Yeruham was 5,700; there were 36 unrecognized villages (Table 2.12, p. 124). 5. Until 1926, when the local authority of Beer Sheva was established (which later became the regional city), there were no municipal frameworks in the Negev. 6. The Syag border was expanded as the Rahat and Tel Sheva areas overlapped the line and Segev Shalom was located outside the boundary. 7. During this period, the sedentarization of the Bedouin in officially recognized municipalities, as well as in illegal settlements, was monitored by a paramilitary "green" patrol established by Ariel Sharon in 1976. The patrol had the mandate to pull down illegal Bedouin tents, control herd sizes and grazing areas, destroy crops that lacked governmental permission, impose fines, and evict inhabitants (CitationKoeller, 2006). 8. A conflict assessment published at the end of 2006 (a year and a half after recognition) reflects the frustration of Um Batin residents over the slow pace of implementation (CitationConsensus Building Institute, 2006). 9. These committees submitted their recommendations and suggestions to the government; reports analyzing the committees' findings have been published (for instance, CitationDor-On, 2009; Negev Coexistence Forum for Civil Equality, 2009), but to date no agreement has been reached. 10. On December 23, 2007 the Minister nominated the members of the committee who included representatives of the Ministries of Interior, Finance and Agriculture, an NGO, an expert on land issues and the majors of two of the Bedouin Negev towns (Laqiya and Rahat); no committee member was appointed from the unrecognized villages. 11. Key points include: •Recognize parts of the villages according to threshold of number of inhabitants and mix/join them as possible among existing localities.•Allow some of the residents of the unrecognized villages who request to move their village to other fixed locations in the North of the Negev to do so, and enable them to choose the type of settlement which they would like to develop.•Define existing buildings located within the boundaries of authorized local plans as gray buildings, on the condition that the buildings not contradict plan implementation or development infrastructures. This definition would legalize these building and enable them to be connected to infrastructure and services prior to obtaining the building permits, which is a lengthy process.•Produce a "quick implementation legal instrument" which would enable the recommendations of the Committee to be speedily implemented.•Establish a special planning committee, alongside the South District planning committee, to resettle the dispersed Bedouin villages.•Recognize partially and conditionally some of the Bedouin land claims on the basis of existing usage (catchment, like squatters), and pay compensation for some of the disputed claimed lands.•Decisive enforcement of the law and the rules regarding housing demolition for buildings built illegally during the period in which Goldberg recommendations await government authorization. 12. Public reaction was mixed (CitationDor-On, 2009). CitationSoffer (2009) reflects the fears that its implementation from a strategic point of view will result in Israel's loss over control of the northern Negev, others see this as a potential step toward solution (CitationAltman & Arbel, 2010; CitationZandberg, 2009). 13. In 2010, over 700 illegal Bedouin structures were demolished and 9,000 dunam of land were ploughed under for lack of permits, three times the demolition rate of each of the previous two years (CitationKhoury & Yagna, 2010; CitationYagna, 2010). In addition, a group of Jewish Negev residents petitioned the Supreme Court for an injunction against the regional council head of Abu Basma for failure to demolish illegal buildings, although such buildings are part of the plans for Bedouin villages currently awaiting a lengthy planning approval process (File 2219/10 to the Supreme Court). The Supreme Court is awaiting comprehensive recommendations from the judicial advisor for the government before proceeding. The necessity of aligning development planning by synchronizing and coordinating its three dimensions (planning and zoning; land ownership and registration or catchment; and implementation, including the commitment of state resources) was pointed out in 2006 (CitationConsensus Building Institute, 2006). 14. All building and development require licensing by the Local Planning and Building Commission. Permits are issued if they conform to approved local outline or detailed schemes (akin to statutory master and site plans), which must be congruent with district and national outline schemes. 15. Local government officials are initially appointed by central government, and subsequently elected by local residents. The process of municipalization in Israel enjoys the support of central government, which over the past two decades has encouraged decentralization of governance (CitationBen Elie, 2004; CitationEfrati et al., 2004; CitationKhamaisi, 1990; CitationNachmias, 2006; CitationRazin, 2003). This has not been fully applied, however, to the Negev Bedouin communities. 16. Master Plan for Bedouin Settlement (Khamaisi), 1990; CitationYahodkin, 2004; National Outline Plan 35, 2005; Beer Sheva District Outline Plan, 4/14/23, 2010). 17. This would increase Rahat's population by 3,500 (projected to grow to 7,300 by 2030) and extend the town's land area from about 22,000 to 30,000 dunam. Similarly, Al-Mas'adiya, Ujan, and Al'Meikan, with estimated populations of 4,100 (projected to 8,500 in 2030) can be annexed to Laqiya. 18. A northwestern regional council would be oriented toward Beer Sheva and the Bnai Shimon Regional Council, the northeastern one toward Arad, the south central toward Dimona, and southwestern council toward Yeruham. The councils would reflect the present clustering of villages along major tribal lines: the Azazme in the south, the Tiaaha in the east and northeast, the Adhulam in the far east, and the Tarabin in the west. In drawing the boundaries for new regional councils, not only would tribal affiliation be important but so also would the distribution of landless residents. Such a geographical expansion highlights the fact that the Syag's original boundaries have long been erased. 19. In emerging countries such as China and Brazil, land taking, displacement of agriculture, and uprooting of indigenous societies have become sources of bitter conflict. Even in an authoritarian Communist state such as China, where large state and private corporations backed by corrupt local governments have expropriated farm land to make room for industrialization, urbanization, and hydro-electric dams, the process is fraught with widespread protests, unrest, and violence. In Brazil's Amazon, logging, mining, hydro-power developments, and opening up of lands for large-scale agriculture has been accompanied by the building of large urban centers almost overnight. There the clash between indigenous societies such as the Guarani-Tupi, supported by environmentalists, and economic interests promoted by the state are cause for deep unrest.