Portal de Periódicos da CAPES

Veto Players and Central Bank Gold Sales

2008; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 13; Issue: 3 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1080/13563460802302586

1469-9923

Mark Duckenfield,

Local Government Finance and Decentralization

Click to increase image sizeClick to decrease image size Notes George Tsebelis, Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work (Princeton University Press, 2002); George Tsebelis, ‘Decision Making in Political Systems: Veto Players in Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, Multicameralism, and Multipartyism’, British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 25, No. 3 (1995), pp. 289–326. James A. Dearden & David Schap. ‘The First Word and the Last Word in the Budgetary Process: A Comparative Institutional Analysis of Proposal and Veto Authorities’, Public Choice, Vol. 81, Nos. 1–2 (1994), pp. 35–53; Kathleen Bawn, ‘Money and Majorities in the Federal Republic of Germany: Evidence for a Veto Players Model of Government Spending’, American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 43, No. 3 (1999), pp. 707–36; Herbert Obinger, ‘Veto Players, Political Parties, and Welfare-State Retrenchment in Austria’, International Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 32, No. 2 (2002), pp. 44–66; David Stasavage, Public Debt and the Birth of the Democratic State: France and Great Britain, 1688–1789 (Cambridge University Press, 2003); George Tsebelis, ‘Veto Players and Law Production in Parliamentary Democracies: An Empirical Analysis’, American Political Science Review, Vol. 93, No. 3 (1999), pp. 591–608; Witold J. Henisz & Bennet A. Zelner, ‘Interest Groups, Veto Points, and Electricity Infrastructure Deployment’, International Organization, Vol. 60, No. 1 (2006), pp. 263–86; Stephan Haggard & Mathew D. McCubbins (eds), Presidents, Parliaments, and Policy (Cambridge University Press, 2001). Tsebelis, Veto Players, p. 19. Tsebelis, ‘Decision Making in Political Systems’, pp. 304–5. Tsebelis, ‘Decision Making in Political Systems’, pp. 307–8. For a contrasting view arguing that central bankers can behave in a partisan fashion, see Susanne Lohmann, ‘Federalism and Central Bank Independence: The Politics of German Monetary Policy, 1957–92’, World Politics, Vol. 50, No. 3 (1998), pp. 401–46. Mark Hallerberg, ‘Veto Players and the Choice of Monetary Institutions’, International Organization, Vol. 56, No. 4 (2002), pp. 775–802. Torsten Persson & Guido Tabellini, The Economic Effects of Constitutions (The MIT Press, 2003), pp. 16–24. Torben Iversen & David Soskice, ‘Electoral Institutions and the Politics of Coalitions: Why Some Democracies Redistribute More than Others’, American Political Science Review, Vol. 100, No. 2 (2006), pp. 165–81. Philip Keefer & David Stasavage, ‘The Limits of Delegation: Veto Players, Central Bank Independence, and the Credibility of Monetary Policy’, American Political Science Review, Vol. 97, No. 3 (2003), pp. 407–23. Douglass North & Barry Weingast, ‘Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England’, Journal of Economic History, Vol. 49, No. 4 (1989), pp. 803–32. David Stasavage, ‘Credible Commitment in Early Modern Europe: North and Weingast Revisited’, Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Vol. 18, No. 1 (2002), pp. 155–86; Stasavage, Public Debt and the Birth of the Democratic State, chs. 5–6. Hallerberg, ‘Veto Players and the Choice of Monetary Institutions’. Lohmann, ‘Federalism and Central Bank Independence’. Steffen Ganghof, ‘Veto Points and Veto Players: A Skeptical View’, Working Paper, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies, 2002, pp. 6–7. Alexander L. George & Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences (Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, 2005), pp. 205–32. Gerd Strohmeier, ‘Consensus Politics in Germany Versus Adversary Politics in the United Kingdom? An Evaluation of the German and Westminster Model of Democracy on the Basis of the Veto Players Theory’, Debatte, Vol. 14, No. 3 (2006), pp. 229–45. Originally called the Washington Agreement on Gold (WAG), the agreement also came to be referred to as the Central Bank Agreement on Gold (CBGA) and later CBGA-1 once the Second Central Bank Gold Agreement (CBGA-2) was announced in 2004. For the sake of clarity, I refer to the first agreement as the WAG and the second agreement as CBGA-2. European Central Bank, ‘Joint Statement on Gold’, press release of the European Central Bank, 26 September 1999. European Central Bank, ‘Joint Statement on Gold’, press release of the European Central Bank, 8 March 2004. House of Commons, Hansard, Vol. 418, 23 February 2004, column 115W; HM Treasury, ‘United Kingdom Gold Policy’, press release 23 April 2004. I am indebted to Andrew Bailey for this point. Bundesratsbeschluss über die Festsetzung der Goldparität des Frankens, 9 May 1971. Bundesverfassung (old Federal Constitution), Article 39, Section 6. Author interview with Dr Ernst Baltensperger, member of the Expert Group on Constitutional Reforms of the Currency Laws, Berne, 11 May 1998. Swiss National Bank and Federal Finance Ministry, Bericht der Arbeitgruppe: ‘Anlagepolitik und Gewinnausschüttung der Schweizerischen Nationalbank’ (SNB and Federal Finance Ministry, 1996), section 6.7.2. Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, Article IV, Section 2b. Swiss Federal Finance Ministry, Bericht der Expertengruppe ‘Reform der Währungsordnung’ (Swiss Federal Finance Ministry, 1997). Author interview with Peter Klauser, Head of Legal and Administrative Affairs, Swiss National Bank, Zurich, 13 May 1998. Adrian Vatter, ‘The Transformation of Access and Veto Points in Swiss Federalism’, Regional and Federal Studies, Vol. 15, No. 1 (2005), p. 3. Author interview with Peter Klauser, Head of Legal and Administrative Affairs, Swiss National Bank, Zurich, 13 May 1998. Author interview with M. Kraft, Swiss Federal Ministry of Finance, Solidarity Foundation Project, Berne, 11 May 1998. Author interview with Klaus Stöhlker, Stöhlker Communications, Zurich (Zollikon), 12 May 1998. Nationalrat, Amtliches Bulletin der Bundesversammlung: Reform der Bundesverfassung (Nationalrat, 28 April 1998), p. 255; Ständerat, Amtliches Bulletin der Bundesversammlung: Reform der Bundesverfassung (Ständerat, 4 March 1998), p. 91. Nationalrat, Amtliches Bulletin der Bundesversammlung, p. 497; Ständerat, Amtliches Bulletin der Bundesversammlung, p. 229. Yannis Papadopoulis, ‘How Does Direct Democracy Matter? The Impact of Referendum Votes on Politics and Policy-Making’, West European Politics, Vol. 24, No. 2 (2001), pp. 35–57. I am indebted to Andrew Walter for these examples. Even so women did not gain the right to vote in all cantons – it was not until 1990 that women received suffrage in the conservative canton of Appenzell Innerroden. Schweizerische Bundeskanzlei, ‘Bundesbeschluss über eine neue Bundesverfassung,’ Volksabstimmung vom 18 April 1999 (Swiss Federal Executive, 2006). Swiss National Bank, 92nd Annual Report 1999 (Swiss National Bank, 2000), p. 44. Nationalrat, Amtliches Bulletin: Wintersession 1999, 11th Sitzung (nationalrat, 22 December 1999); Ständerat, Amtliches Bulletin: Wintersession 1999, 10th Sitzung (Ständerat, 22 December 1999). Swiss National Bank, ‘National Bank takes up gold sales’, press release of the Swiss National Bank, 2000. Mark Duckenfield, ‘The Partisan Politics of Gold: Switzerland and the Sale of Gold’, West European Politics, Vol. 29, No. 1 (2006), pp. 113–33. Author interview with Peter Klauser, Head of Legal and Administrative Affairs, Swiss National Bank, Zurich, 13 May 1998. Swiss National Bank, 97th Annual Report 2004 (Swiss National Bank, 2005), p. 73. Swiss National Bank, ‘Warum die Nationalbank die KOSA-Initiative ablehnt’, KOSA-Initiative: Faktenblatt 1 (Swiss National Bank, 2006), p. 2. Swiss Federal Finance Ministry, ‘Verteilung des überschüssigen Goldvermögens der Nationalbank’, press release of the Swiss Federal Finance Ministry, 2005; Swiss National Bank, 98th Annual Report 2005 (Swiss National Bank, 2006), p. 67. Swiss National Bank, ‘SNB to distribute proceeds from the sale of gold as of May 2005’, press release of the Swiss National Bank, 25 February 2005. Andreas Busch, ‘Central Bank Independence and the Westminster Model’, West European Politics, Vol. 17, No. 1 (1994), pp. 53–72. Gordon Brown, ‘The New Monetary Policy Framework’, letter to the Governor of the Bank of England (HM Treasury, 6 May 1997), item 7. Bank of England, Bank of England Annual Report 2001 (Bank of England, 2001), p. 63. HM Treasury, ‘Review of the sale of part of the UK gold reserves’, HM Treasury, October 2002, p. 35. House of Commons, ‘Sale of Part of the UK Gold Reserves’, Seventh Report of the Select Committee on Public Accounts, House of Commons, 2001, question 100. National Audit Office, ‘The Sale of Part of the UK Gold Reserves', Report by the Comptroller and Auditor General, HC 86, Session 2000–1 (National Accounting Office, 2001), p. 8. House of Commons, ‘Sale of Part of the UK Gold Reserves’. Ibid., question 9. HM Treasury, ‘Review of the sale of part of the UK gold reserves’, pp. 5–6, 9. House of Commons, ‘Sale of Part of the UK Gold Reserves’, questions 104–7. Ibid., question 125. HM Treasury, A Stronger Global Economy – The UK and the IMF 2004–05 (HM Treasury, 2005), p. 49. Germany did reduce its gold holdings by 35 tonnes between 1999–2004 in order to mint coins commemorating the deutschmark and UNESCO cultural heritage sites. These sales were not considered a major sale or reduction in the Bundesbank's holdings. Fritz Scharpf, ‘The Joint-Decision Trap: Lessons from German Federalism and European Integration’, Public Administration, Vol. 66, No. 3 (1988), 239–78; Peter Katzenstein, Policy and Politics in West Germany: The Growth of a Semisovereign State (Temple University Press, 1987). William Chandler, Gary Cox & Mathew McCubbins, ‘Agenda Control in the German Bundestag, 1980–2002’, German Politics, Vol. 15, No. 1 (2006), pp. 27–48. Lohmann, ‘Federalism and Central Bank Independence’, pp. 404–5. Any attempt to change the relationship of the Bundesbank with the European Central Bank or erode its independence would require a constitutional change. However, the political parties have argued that mandating a revaluation or sale of gold reserves or providing for a different system of managing foreign exchange reserves could be accomplished without compromising the Bundesbank's independence in its relationship with the German government and the European Central Bank. Bundesbank officials disagree and believe that such a change would undermine their constitutionally enshrined independence within the framework of the European Central Bank. Resolution of any resulting dispute would presumably involve the German Constitutional Court in Karlsruhe as an additional veto player. In this regard, I do not discuss efforts at constitutional change. Katzenstein, Policy and Politics in West Germany, p. 17. Scharpf, ‘The Joint-Decision Trap’, pp. 242–3; Manfred Schmidt, ‘The Impact of Political Parties, Constitutional Structures and Veto Players on Public Policy’, in Hans Keman (ed.), Comparative Democratic Politics: A Guide to Contemporary Theory and Research (Sage, 2002), pp. 166–84. Statement of Helmut Kohl, Theodore Waigel, Wolfgang Gerhardt, Wolfgang Schäuble, Otto Solms & Michael Glos, ‘Revaluation of the Bundesbank's reserve holdings’, Press and Information Office, Bonn 28 May 1997. Mark Duckenfield, Business and the Euro (Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), pp. 59–68. Author interview with Carl-Ludwig Thiele, FDP Member of the Bundestag Finance Committee, Berlin, 8 September 2003. Frankfürter Allgemeine Zeitung, 5 September 2002, p. 21. Author interview with Benedikt Fehr, Frankfürter Allgemeine Zeitung correspondent, Frankfurt, 10 September 2003. Deutsche Bundesbank, Monthly Report January 2003 (Deutsche Bundesbank, 2003), p. 26. Author interview with Joachim Poß, SPD Member of the Bundestag Finance Committee, Berlin, 8 September 2003. Author interview with Uwe Müller, Head of Foreign Exchange Trading and Investments, International Markets Division, German Bundesbank, Frankfurt, 9 September 2003. Author interview with Volker Rohmann, Head of Foreign Reserve Investment, German Bundesbank, Frankfurt, 9 September 2003. Financial Times Deutschland, 25 March 2004. Letter from Hans Welteke [son of Ernst Welteke] to Der Tagesspiegel, 11 April 2004. Axel Weber, speech at his official inauguration as Bundesbank President, Deutsche Bundesbank, 2004, pp. 3, 7–8 Wirtschaftswoche, 27 July 2004. Deutsche Bundesbank, ‘Decisions of the Executive Board of the Deutsche Bundesbank’, Press release, 20 December 2004, items 2 and 3; Financial Times Deutschland, 6 October 2006; Stuttgarter Zeitung, 6 October 2006, p. 14 The Independent, 5 April 2005, p. 38; Financial Times Deutschland, 8 February 2005. Deutsche Bundesbank, Annual Report 2004 (Deutsche Bundesbank, 2005), pp. 92, 103. Der Spiegel, 13 November 2005.