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Molotov: Stalin's Cold Warrior

2015; The MIT Press; Volume: 17; Issue: 3 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1162/jcws_r_00578

1531-3298

Alfred J. Rieber,

Historical Geopolitical and Social Dynamics

Geoffrey Roberts has undertaken the formidable task of refuting the interpretation of Vyacheslav Molotov as an inveterate Cold Warrior and replacing it with a more subtle picture. Most of the book is devoted to a review of Molotov's diplomatic career under Iosif Stalin's heavy hand. This is familiar ground. Roberts passes quickly over Molotov's life and activities before 1939 while reminding us that Molotov was a faithful supporter of Stalin in all major domestic policy decisions from collectivization to the purges and mass terror. Molotov's service as head of the Communist International is not touched upon. Nor is much space allotted to Molotov's relations with Communist parties after World War II. Roberts attributes the decision in 1939 to replace Maksim Litvinov with Molotov as foreign commissar to Stalin's displeasure over the pace of negotiations with Britain and France on a treaty of alliance. Roberts mentions the differences between Litvinov's concept of a postwar settlement based on spheres of influence and Molotov's more open system, but he does not explore the implications. Litvinov's plans for postwar Europe were based on the assumption that there would not be any revolutionary transformations. Molotov took a different view.The centerpiece of Roberts's revisionist view is a thorough and well-documented account of Molotov's support for the reunification of Germany and the establishment of an all-European collective security system. Roberts stresses how Molotov employed his well-known diplomatic skills—his attention to detail, his tactical flexibility, his persistence, and, what may come as a surprise to some readers, his sharp wit—in pursuance of this “daring policy initiative” (p. 149). Roberts further argues that this was not primarily intended to split Western Europe from the United States or to encourage neutralism in France or prevent the integration of West Germany into a Western bloc, desirable as these ends might have been. Rather, Molotov was committed to resolving the German problem and thus nipping the Cold War in the bud. Roberts accepts at face value Molotov's stated purpose of achieving through negotiations with the United States and Great Britain a united, “peaceful and democratic” Germany within a security system that would guarantee peace and security for Europe. To be sure, Roberts acknowledges that Molotov remained committed to a Marxist-Leninist worldview and that he envisaged the ultimate triumph of Communism. How did Molotov square the idea of a “peaceful and democratic Germany” (adjectives that had been used before in the Declaration of Liberated Territories at Yalta) with the idea of the ultimate triumph of Communism? Unfortunately, even the abundance of archival material that Roberts has unearthed over the years does not yield any direct answer to this question. One of the most interesting insights in the book is the extent to which Molotov was embedded in the culture of the Foreign Commissariat (Ministry). He often assigned the drafting and reworking of proposals to his subordinates—notably, Vladimir Semenov, Mikhail Gribanov, Georgii Pushkin, Andrei Gromyko, and Andrei Vyshinskii. This working team was held together by professional ties that survived most of the political storms raging around them. When the tide turned against Molotov, they abandoned him and kept their posts. Continuing along these lines, one would have liked to find out more about Molotov's links with the diplomats in the field. We now have considerable documentation on their reporting. Although Molotov's public pronouncements emphasized the desirability and feasibility of negotiated settlements over Germany and other questions with the West, the tone of the diplomatic reporting carried a different message. This was reflected in part by the analyses of Nikolai Novikov, to which Roberts gives appropriate importance.The problem of differentiating Molotov's views on foreign policy after Stalin's death from those of other members of the Communist Party's ruling organs is complicated. Roberts insists that Molotov was from 1953 to 1955 “a partisan of peace” (ch. 5). Molotov was instrumental in negotiating the Austrian State Treaty despite subsequent attempts by Nikita Khrushchev to deny this. Molotov's attitude toward Yugoslavia is particularly instructive given his ideological predispositions. Even though Molotov accepted the necessity of reestablishing state-to-state relations with the government in Belgrade, he opposed the readmission of Yugoslavia into the socialist camp. The real break with Khrushchev came over the German question. Molotov was willing to take the risk involved in creating a united Germany within a European collective security system. Did he envisage the “Finlandization” of Germany? Or was he counting on a gradual internal social transformation of Germany that could not be opposed from the outside under the terms of a European security system guaranteeing non-interference in domestic affairs. We will probably never know. In any case, Roberts demonstrates convincingly that Khrushchev was not prepared to take the risk of sacrificing the “socialist achievements” of East Germany in exchange for the possibility of a neutral Germany. The conflict with the West came over which should take precedence: all-German elections or a European security pact. Molotov did his best to meet the Western demands for elections so long as a united Germany remained neutral and the “democratic and social reforms and freedoms” of East Germany would be preserved. Presumably, that neutrality could have been maintained within a European security system. Khrushchev and other Communist Party leaders were having none of it.Roberts provides a clear, detailed summary of the growing conflict between Molotov and Khrushchev. Policy and personal issues were mixed. The abortive coup by Georgii Malenkov, Molotov, and Lazar Kaganovich against Khrushchev in May 1957 remains, however, obscure. Molotov later attributed it to the lack of unity and a program. Still, one wonders how such experienced conspirators and protégés of Stalin could have let power slip through their hands so easily.Roberts's command of the sources is excellent, and his attempts to reexamine fixed positions are stimulating. He points the way to future research and debates on questions that continue to fascinate and challenge.