Correspondence: Looking for Asia's Security Dilemma
2015; The MIT Press; Volume: 40; Issue: 2 Linguagem: Inglês
10.1162/isec_c_00220
ISSN1531-4804
AutoresRonan Tse-Min Fu, David James Gill, Eric Hundman, Adam P. Liff, G. John Ikenberry,
Tópico(s)International Relations and Foreign Policy
ResumoIn "Racing toward Tragedy? China's Rise, Military Competition in the Asia Pacific, and the Security Dilemma," Adam Liff and John Ikenberry claim that "a number of recent developments suggest that the region is ripe for, or may already be experiencing, severe security dilemma-driven dynamics, even arms races."1 They portray China's rise as the main cause of this dilemma and assert that states must adopt measures to reduce military competition in the region while they still can.I applaud Liff and Ikenberry for the policy relevance of their research, but their fundamental claim about the prevalence of severe military competition in the Asia Pacific region does not match the empirical reality. The real puzzle is why over the last thirty years Asian countries have shown a surprising lack of interest in boosting their military expenditures in response to China's massive increases, whether these expenditures are measured in absolute or proportional terms, and whether they are measured over the past generation or the last few years.Liff and Ikenberry ground their analysis in the empirical observation that Asia might already be engaged in severe military competition, but they never define what they mean by "military competition" (pp. 65–82). They imply that such competition exists when parties seek to enhance their military capabilities in response to an external threat (p. 65). More specifically, they state that "there is evidence of a security dilemma-driven spiral gradually unfolding between China and several states that is driving investments in military capabilities and that may worsen significantly in the years ahead" (p. 88).If Liff and Ikenberry's claim that the Asia Pacific is currently experiencing severe military competition were true, then major countries in the region should have significantly boosted their military spending over the past few decades.2 After all, China increased its military spending by 576 percent in real terms from 1992 to 2013. And as Liff and Ikenberry note, "the PLA [People's Liberation Army] increasingly poses at least a potential threat to China's neighbors and the United States" (p. 67). A generation of Asian leaders, however, has chosen not to respond with similar arms increases. Measured in constant $2011, from 1992 to 2013 Japan's increase was only 13 percent; South Korea's increase was 96 percent; and India's was 192 percent.3Measured as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP), the military expenditures of most Asia Pacific countries have steadily declined since the Cold War, despite the emergence of the PLA as a professional and capable fighting force.4 Few countries in the region have been willing to make massive investments in military power at the expense of other priorities.5 In addition, as a proportion of GDP, Asian military spending in 2013 was the lowest it had been since the end of the Cold War. On average, major Asian countries spent 3.32 and 2.83 percentage of their GDP on defense in 1988 and 1992, respectively. In 2013 the average proportion of GDP that major Asian countries devoted to defense was only 1.88 percent.6 In this sense, contrary to Liff and Ikenberry's claim, military competition in the Asia Pacific is becoming less rather than more intense.Perhaps one could argue that twenty-five years is too long an analytical time frame— that China's neighbors only recently decided its growth was a threat and have begun to respond. The most recent data do not support this claim either. Measured in inflation-adjusted constant terms, the military spending of key countries in the region declined in 2013: Japan —0.23 percent, India —0.74 percent, Taiwan —2.63 percent, and Australia −3.58 percent.7 This is not to suggest that Asian countries are indifferent to China's assertiveness. Asian countries, especially those with territorial (or other) claims, certainly care about China's policy in the South and East China Seas, but they have not responded by engaging in severe military competition, at least when measured in the standard manner.Perhaps one could argue that a broad regional perspective masks military competition between specific countries. For example, Japan, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Vietnam all have enduring disputes with China. Yet even these "most likely" rivals have been taking part in muted military competition or arms race.8 From 2003 to 2013, none has significantly increased its military budget, measured in constant 2011 dollars, despite a massive increase in Chinese military spending over the same period (see figure 1).Japan's 2015 military budget increased 0.8 percent in absolute terms, hardly qualifying as remilitarization, much less competition with China.9 Even though Prime Minister Shinzö Abe wants to reestablish Japan as a first-tier nation, the five-year plan he put forth in 2013 might total increases of only $9 billion if it is fully implemented— and even those increases are in doubt given Japan's precarious economic situation. Furthermore, the Japanese people remain skeptical of their government's efforts to engage in a more activist foreign policy and the military's desire for greater influence.10 A poll taken by the Asahi Shimbun in April 2014 shows that 65 percent of respondents opposed Abe's efforts to promote closer security ties with the United States, believing these efforts will not benefit regional stability.11Meanwhile, in 2014 Vietnam and the Philippines spent a combined total of less than $4 billion on their militaries—roughly 4 percent of China's total budget. Although both countries are steadily modernizing their militaries, neither appears to be aiming to match China's military power.12 From 2003 to 2013, Vietnam's annual military expenditure increased 8 percent on average, and in 2013 it increased only 2.4 percent. These restrained increases are particularly important to note because Liff and Ikenberry claim that Vietnam boosted its military spending 70 percent in 2011 (p. 80). The source they cite, however, reports the huge increase in nominal terms and notes that the increase in military spending could easily "be negated by continuing double-digit inflation in Vietnam and the fall in the value of the local currency."13 Thus, rather than the 70 percent annual increases in defense spending that Liff and Ikenberry claim, the percentage change in Vietnamese military spending (as measured by SIPRI in constant $2011) was an increase of 11 percent in 2010; a contraction of 6 percent in 2011; and an increase of 16 percent in 2012.14 Moreover, although there is insufficient space to address all of Liff and Ikenberry's claims about Vietnam's military modernization, it should be noted, for example, that Vietnam's expansion of its total principal surface combatants from its current two destroyers to four destroyers by 2017 hardly represents a realistic intention to conduct a significant naval campaign of any type against a great power such as China.The pattern of Taiwan's military expenditure is even more revealing. Despite the threat to Taiwan's security posed by China's sovereignty claim and the accelerating enhancement of Chinese military capabilities, and despite the uncertainty of the availability of alliance partners, Taiwan reduced its defense effort nearly every year from 1990, where it stood at 5.3 percent of GDP and 19.1 percent of government spending, to 2013, where it stood at 2.2 percent of GDP and 11 percent of government spending. As the most-likely actor to engage in severe military competition with China, Taiwan has chosen a different path to deal with the rise of China.15 This suggests that other Asian countries' propensity to engage in military competition with China might be lower than Liff and Ikenberry predict.The most common explanation for East Asian states' muted military response to China's rise is the existence of a robust U.S. security guarantee that reassures allies and deters rivals.16 Given that the military expenditures of most Asia Pacific countries have gradually declined for the past quarter century despite "China's surging defense budget" (p. 67), and that the United States continues to "pivot" and increase its forward military deployment (p. 82), it might be that the region feels safer because of the U.S. military presence. If so, U.S.-China security competition would be a cause for concern, but not China-East Asian security competition. Yet Liff and Ikenberry miss this key argument—the bulk of their article focuses primarily on China-East Asian security dynamics (pp. 65–82). Either states are free riding on U.S. defense commitments and hence not spending what they might, or they have doubts about the U.S. military guarantee against all contingencies. Liff and Ikenberry cannot simultaneously argue that states are afraid of China and desperately arming themselves but also unafraid of China given the U.S. security guarantee (p. 88).Although the U.S. alliance system may mitigate national security concerns for some Asian countries, it is unlikely to reassure every one of them. After all, the U.S. security guarantee is not a blanket guarantee for all military contingencies. There is a simpler explanation for continued low military expenditures for both allies and non-allies in the region: few states fear for their survival; hence they are not arming as much as Liff and Ikenberry suggest.17 Although China's maritime claims are expansive, they are not new, nor are they increasing.18 And most important, China is unlikely to embark on territorial expansion.19 Direct military competition with China is thus unwarranted. The United States and China may be competing for regional hegemony, but few other states feel the necessity to choose sides. Given that the stakes are fairly low, it is not surprising that few states appear willing to make the costly domestic and economic trade-offs required for major sustained investments in their militaries.A systematic examination of the evidence reveals that countries in the Asia Pacific are making only modest increases in their military spending. Contrary to Liff and Ikenberry's assertion, East Asia is experiencing neither intensifying military competition nor an arms race. Furthermore, by most measures, China has already risen to regional dominance without causing major disruptions to regional stability. The real question, therefore, is why counterbalancing against China or an arms race has not occurred, despite three decades of extraordinary Chinese economic and military growth.—Ronan Tse-min FuLos Angeles, CaliforniaIn "Racing toward Tragedy? China's Rise, Military Competition in the Asia Pacific, and the Security Dilemma," Adam Liff and John Ikenberry argue that a security dilemma-driven spiral is developing in the region that is leading to increased tension and military competition, particularly between China and the United States.1 Liff and Ikenberry deserve praise for providing a useful elaboration of security dilemma theory and for offering an informative empirical survey of Asia Pacific states' security policies. Nevertheless, their argument would be more convincing if they had addressed two problems, which I discuss below.The first problem is that Liff and Ikenberry sometimes rely on ambiguous evidence to support their argument that a security dilemma-driven spiral is unfolding between China and the United States. They accept that China's "true intentions are unknowable" (p. 91), and they note that the security dilemma is not the only cause of military competition taking place in the Asia Pacific, pointing to other possible sources such as "concrete conflicts of interest," "domestic politics," or the pursuit of "international prestige" (p. 60). Yet Liff and Ikenberry conclude that security dilemma dynamics are a major driver of China's actions in many instances.To support this claim, they cite rises in military spending, quantitative and qualitative enhancements in China's military capabilities, and "leadership rhetoric and political statements" (ibid.). Liff and Ikenberry also adopt a four-question test to determine whether security dilemmas exist in the Asia Pacific. They do not persuasively show, however, why theirs is the best interpretation of the data that they have assembled. Further detail would help to clarify their key assumptions—namely, how they select evidence, how they distinguish between greedy and security-seeking states and how they separate and assess other drivers of state behavior.2Much of the evidence cited by Liff and Ikenberry remains ambiguous. An alternative explanation of China's behavior could reasonably attribute it to revisionist ambitions. Rises in military spending and efforts to enhance strategic capabilities might reflect greed more than insecurity, whether regional or global in ambition.3 Walter Russell Mead, for instance, has cogently argued that China is a revisionist power.4 Ikenberry has previously noted that China desires "greater regional influence" and, "where possible, regional domination."5 Liff and Andrew Erickson have asserted that China holds "irredentist" concerns and has increased military spending in part to "improve capabilities to address outstanding territorial and maritime claims."6 The rhetoric and political statements of China's leadership are also open to a variety of interpretations. The examples selected by Liff and Ikenberry may not accurately reflect the leadership's motives. Indeed, the authors recognize elsewhere the existence of Chinese political figures' revisionist rhetoric and the ambiguity of Beijing's statements concerning great power relations.7Revisionist interpretations of China's military buildup and foreign policy behavior enjoy two clear advantages over those emphasizing the security dilemma. First, they do not assume persistent misunderstanding among experienced policymakers or ignorance of the security dilemma in Beijing or Washington.8 Second, as detailed below, they enjoy stronger support from the historical record, which provides limited evidence for major competition between status quo powers driven by fears of potential insecurity.9 None of this is to suggest that security dilemma theory is irrelevant to the study of strategic competition. Several theorists have argued persuasively that states in competitive environments that are unable to balance deterrence and reassurance appropriately can risk unnecessary escalation.10 Such arguments, however, often explain military competition with reference to a mix of insecurity and revisionist aims rather than as being directly attributable to uncertainty about strategic intentions or the "type-1 strategic setting" that Liff and Ikenberry suggest exists in parts of the Asia Pacific (pp. 63–64, 82, 86). Uncertainty in anarchy matters, but the crucial issue is the extent to which it explains China's behavior. Ambiguous evidence makes it difficult to reach firm conclusions concerning the importance of the security dilemma as a driver of military competition in the region.The second problem with Liff and Ikenberry's argument concerns their assumption that "history teaches us to be wary of security dilemma-induced military competition and war" (p. 91). They could be clearer as to which events from the past are suitably instructive. Often-cited examples from security dilemma scholarship include the Anglo-German naval buildup before World War I, the outbreak of World War I, and the Cold War. Yet all three cases are contentious. Some political scientists have drawn on historical research to argue that the security dilemma plays a more limited role than revisionist aims and domestic politics in explaining the origins of World War I and the root cause of the Cold War.11 Scholars of international relations, however, have not fully engaged with the historiography concerning the security dilemma's role in the Anglo-German naval arms buildup.12Conventional accounts based on security dilemma theory of the Anglo-German rivalry cast Britain and Germany as status quo states seeking security. These accounts suggest that Germany perceived Britain's huge navy as a threat because it increased the risk of coastal raids, trade interdiction, and economic isolation. To counter this perceived threat, Germany started building its own powerful navy for defensive purposes. Britain in turn saw Germany's navy as an offensive force. Uncertainty about intentions thus drove escalatory balancing on each side. Yet the Anglo-German naval buildup is far from a clear-cut case of the security dilemma in operation.Some international relations scholars, though continuing to note the importance of insecurity, recognize that Germany did intend to challenge the status quo.13 Indeed, Liff and Ikenberry claim that a perceived threat was not the primary explanation for Germany's naval buildup, but suggest that its actions could have generated insecurity in others (p. 64, n. 27).14 Few scholars have engaged with the historical literature concerning British naval policy, however, which remains vital for claims concerning an action-reaction cycle. Many historians believe that fear of Germany is an inadequate explanation of British naval policy before World War I.15 Revisionist scholars suggest that imperial interests and domestic-political concerns, especially financial constraints and interservice rivalries, were major drivers of many of the British Admiralty's strategic decisions.16The historical record does not provide clear lessons about insecurity creating or exacerbating military competition. Historians also offer limited support for the argument that security dilemmas drive serious rivalries between status quo powers. Given the tremendous stakes that would be involved in a U.S.-China conflict, scholars should consider the lessons of the past carefully. Those who use historical examples to highlight the importance of the security dilemma in explaining strategic rivalry would benefit from engaging with the historiography to better support their claims.Liff and Ikenberry provide a series of policy recommendations for U.S.-China relations based on their research. Their suggestions could be helpful if a U.S.-China security dilemma exists, but ineffective or counterproductive if other explanations for China's foreign policy behavior prove more valid. Establishing and strengthening diplomatic mechanisms for bargaining presents limited risks to either side, though it would do little to stop a revisionist power driven by greedy tendencies. In contrast, increasing the transparency of military capabilities, strategic objectives, and decisionmaking could prove damaging to U.S. security. Neither the available evidence nor the historical record instills sufficient confidence in policy recommendations based on the assumption that the security dilemma is the major driver of military competition between China and the United States. When making such important decisions, scholars and policymakers should not race to conclusions. Further debate is essential to clarify the causes of strategic rivalry.—David James GillNottingham, United KingdomAdam Liff and John Ikenberry argue that the security dilemma is an important driver of military competition in the Asia Pacific, one with the potential to worsen and lead to a dangerous arms race in the region.1 In so doing, they provide a useful overview of many military developments in the region and highlight the enormous importance of identifying security dilemma dynamics. Liff and Ikenberry's conceptualization of the security dilemma and their empirical tests for it, however, are flawed in ways that undermine many of their claims.Liff and Ikenberry characterize the security dilemma as a situation in which two states are driven to pursue costly, potentially destabilizing competitive policies "because of insecurity and uncertainty about the other's true intentions" (p. 54). By under-emphasizing the role of misperception, however, this characterization diverges in important ways from those of the models they cite in their article.Robert Jervis defines the security dilemma as a situation in which "many of the means by which a state tries to increase its security decrease the security of others."2 Such attempts can be self-defeating for such a state when others' reactions reduce its security, even if all actors avoid misperceptions and behave rationally. Charles Glaser, for instance, expanded scholars' understanding of the security dilemma by elaborating the rational logics through which its dynamics can develop even if misperceptions do not occur.3 Perceptions, however, can also be critical drivers of the security dilemma. Jervis brings them into play through his discussion of a state's subjective security demands: "Decision makers act in terms of the vulnerability they feel, which can differ from the actual situation."4 For Jervis, perceptions play such a central role in the security dilemma that even though the defense turned out to have an "overwhelming advantage" over the offense in World War I, alliance patterns, defense budgets, mass opinion, and attitudes toward preemption were all better explained by the widely shared, erroneous perception that the offense had the advantage.5 Glaser, too, notes that "the effects of structure are mediated through states' perceptions, whether accurate or not."6 Perceptions play an even stronger role in newer models of the security dilemma, which high-light its nature as a socialization process in which two states form impressions of each other; perceptions influence whether this process leads to stability or to the construction of adversarial dynamics.7Although Liff and Ikenberry do note that their theoretical model describes situations that can lead "one side to interpret the other's defensive measures as offensive" (p. 58), they downplay the possibility of misperception. Instead, they focus on uncertainty as the source of this kind of misinterpretation, arguing that "mistrust and uncertainty about intentions lead one side to interpret the other's defensive measures as offensive" (ibid.). This kind of misinterpretation can result, however, from either uncertainty or misperception. Liff and Ikenberry's model does not clearly distinguish between the two, which undermines their analysis because different drivers of the security dilemma demand divergent policy responses. It is possible, for instance, for an actor to have the knowledge and skill needed to ascertain its opponent's intentions but still perceive them incorrectly; conversely, an actor can perceive an opponent's action correctly, but nonetheless remain uncertain about what that action conveys about the opponent's intentions. This is a core insight of the security dilemma—it is not always possible to clearly signal intentions. Misperceptions can either generate this problem or exacerbate the effects of uncertainty.In addition, perceptions are critical to security dilemma theory because they govern a security-seeking actor's assessment of its security requirements. For instance, perceptions will determine whether or not a state thinks it needs more territory to be secure. Accordingly, both Jervis and Glaser note that security-seeking states can desire territorial expansion.8 Liff and Ikenberry, though, equate "security-seeking" states with "status quo" states (p. 60), and argue that security dilemmas can exist only between "status quo, defensive-oriented states" (p. 63). In their model, no security dilemma can be present if "one or more states seek changes to the status quo in a fundamentally zero-sum manner" (p. 64). They identify "territorial disputes" (pp. 69, 79), "material and territorial interests" (pp. 82, 86), and "interest-based disputes" (p. 86) as examples of the kind of zero-sum conflicts in which their model of the security dilemma does not apply (p. 64).Equating security-seeking states with status quo states is problematic as well, because doing so can make sense only when states (1) never perceive a need for more territory to ensure their security and (2) never disagree over the status quo. For Liff and Ikenberry, it seems, security-seeking states can never desire territory claimed by another state or disagree with others about the nature of the status quo, which is inconsistent with the models of the security dilemma they cite. It also does not accord with the reality of ongoing disputes about the status quo in the Asia Pacific.9More important, conflating status quo inclinations and security-seeking intentions renders Liff and Ikenberry's model unable to distinguish between security dilemma-driven and adversarial dynamics. For example, Liff and Ikenberry argue that because military competition between Vietnam and China is "driven primarily by perceived revisionist behavior" (p. 86), it is not driven by the security dilemma. At the same time, they argue that Australia is "responding to a perceived … threat from China" (p. 69), but that this competition is driven by the security dilemma. They distinguish between the two by arguing that the threat to Australia is "uncertain" (ibid.), whereas the threat to Vietnam is "specific" (p. 86) and rooted in "material and territorial interests" (p. 82). Identifying security dilemma dynamics, however, requires determining if states have security-seeking motives, which Liff and Ikenberry's assessment of threats' certainty or specificity does not do. Further, if the presence of a "direct conflict of interest" rules out the applicability of Liff and Ikenberry's security dilemma model (p. 64), as they claim, then it should not be possible to apply this model to any of the many states they examine that, in their own words, "may … have long-standing interest-based disputes with China" (p. 86).Whereas the potential for security dilemma dynamics centers on actors' intrinsic motives, the nature and severity of such dynamics depends especially on two "offense-defense variables": whether the offense is distinguishable from the defense, and whether the offense dominates over the defense. Liff and Ikenberry themselves note that "the distinguishability of offensive and defensive forces and the defense having the advantage is stabilizing" (p. 59), and they initially set out to test for distinguishability and a defensive advantage in the Asia Pacific. Their proposed empirical test for determining the presence of a security dilemma in the region includes four questions, two of which concern offense-defense variables. The first asks, "What is the offense-defense balance in the Asia Pacific?" (p. 64); the second asks, "Are allegedly defensive measures/weapons distinguishable from offensive ones?" (ibid.). Liff and Ikenberry never answer these questions in their empirical analyses, however.As Jervis noted, "If the defense has the advantage, and if the status-quo powers have reasonable subjective security requirements, they can probably avoid an arms race. Although an increase in one side's arms and security will still decrease the other's security, the former's increase will be larger than the latter's decrease…. Thus a stable equilibrium can be reached."10 Therefore, because Liff and Ikenberry do not assess the offense-defense balance, they cannot answer Glaser's question about security dilemma dynamics: "Why does not this action-reaction process simply leave the state's security unchanged, since the adversary's reaction could just offset the state's action?"11 Further, because they do not examine the distinguishability of offensive and defensive forces, readers are left even more uncertain as to the severity of any security dilemma dynamics. As Glaser puts it, "Offense-defense differentiation has the potential virtually to eliminate the security dilemma."12 In some cases, an action-reaction spiral can actually increase security,13 but because Liff and Ikenberry do not investigate the very offense-defense variables they highlight as critically important, they provide little basis on which to judge whether existing dynamics are more likely to increase or decrease security for states in the Asia Pacific.Liff and Ikenberry propose two other questions as part of their test for the presence of a security dilemma in the Asia Pacific. First, are "clashing interests" driving military competition, "with one or both sides being greedy" (p. 65)? Second, does each state have "a good understanding of the other's motives," especially as indicated by "relative levels of military transparency" (ibid.)? Liff and Ikenberry investigate these questions, but not in ways that support their claims. For instance, they endeavor to identify the presence of Glaser's greedy states by looking for concrete conflicts of interest. But Glaser defines "greed" in this context on the basis of intrinsic interests, as "motives beyond security";14 a greedy state is thus one that is not intrinsically security-seeking. Having interests that clash with those of another state does not necessarily mean a state has motives beyond security, nor does a lack of "concrete" clashes of interest mean a state is fundamentally security-seeking. Liff and Ikenberry's focus on concrete conflicts of interest at the expense of evaluating the intrinsic motives critical to security dilemma theory therefore further weakens their analysis.Liff and Ikenberry go on to highlight the critical role of transparency in understanding states' motives. Their investigation of transparency is flawed in two ways, however. First, although they correctly note that transparency can increase a state's understanding of another's motives (allowing a determination of whether a state is seeking security), they do not acknowledge that in terms of security dilemma theory, transparency exposes motives only to the degree that the offense and the defense are distinguishable. If they are not, a state's motives are likely to remain unclear even in cases of high transparency.15 Transparency is therefore a poor proxy measure for others'
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