From Foe to Friend? army integration after war in Burundi, Rwanda and the Congo
2015; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 23; Issue: 1 Linguagem: Inglês
10.1080/13533312.2015.1103187
ISSN1743-906X
Autores Tópico(s)Military History and Strategy
ResumoABSTRACTThis article examines the integration processes of rebel and government forces in three African armies after war with the aim of enhancing the understanding of which conditions and which actors drive these processes forward. In addition, the objective is to evaluate how successful these different processes have been and what effects they have had on the peacebuilding processes. The author adopts a comparative case study approach of Burundi, Rwanda and the Congo, and examines their respective integration processes. An altered version of Galtung's structural theory of integration is applied to identify different means, methods and results. The author finds that professionalization, socialization, welfare-provision and political education are all used to various extent to promote conditions for integration. The author argues that while a functional army capable of conducting major military operations is a sign of successful integration, it does not necessarily have a positive effect on the peacebuilding process if the relationship between the government and the army is undemocratic. AcknowledgementsThe author would like to thank Roy Licklider, Ron Krebs, Nicolas Lemay-Hebert and Josefine Kühnel Larsen for comments on earlier drafts as well as the three anonymous reviewers.About the authorNina Wilén is a FNRS post-doctoral fellow at Université Libre de Bruxelles. She also teaches at Sciences Po, Paris. She has carried out extensive research on the Great Lakes Region in Africa, with a particular interest in the military institutions. Her articles have appeared in journals such as: Journal of East African Studies, Third World Quarterly, International Peacekeeping, African Security and Defence and Security Analysis. Her book, Justifying Interventions in Africa: (De) Stabilizing Sovereignty (Palgrave Macmillan), which analyses the paradox of stabilizing sovereignty through interventions will come out in paperback in 2016.Notes1. See R.R. Krebs and R. Licklider, ‘Does Military Integration Make Renewed Civil War Less Likely? Theory and Evidence’, unpublished ms, University of Minnesota and Rutgers University, 2014.2. See, for example, A. Bryden and V. Scherrer, Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration and Security Sector Reform, Geneva: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), LIT, 2012; M. Sedra (ed.), The Future of Security Sector Reform, Waterloo: The Centre for International Governance Innovation, 2010; R. Egnell and P. Haldén, ‘Laudable, Ahistorical and Overambitious: Security Sector Reform Meets Stateformation Theory’, Conflict, Security and Development, Vol.9, No.1, 2009, pp.27–54.3. R. Licklider (ed.), New Armies from Old: Merging Competing Military Forces after Civil Wars, Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2014; M. Eriksson Baaz and J. Verweijen, ‘The Volatility of a Half-Cooked Bouillabaisse: Rebel–Military Integration and Conflict Dynamics in the Eastern DRC’, African Affairs, Vol.112, No.449, 2013, pp.563–82; M. Jowell, ‘Cohesion through Socialization: Liberation, Tradition and Modernity in the Forging of the Rwanda Defence Force (RDF)’, Journal of Eastern African Studies, Vol.8, No.2, 2014, pp.278–93; C. Samii, ‘Perils or Promise of Ethnic Integration? Evidence from a Hard Case in Burundi’, American Political Science Review, Vol.107, No.3, 2013, pp.558–73.4. P. Jackson, ‘Security Sector Reform and State Building', Third World Quarterly, Vol.32, No.10, 2011, pp.1803–22; Sedra (see n.2 above); R.R. Krebs, ‘A School for the Nation? How Military Service Does Not Build Nation States and How It Might’, International Security, Vol.28, No.4, 2004, pp.85–124; S.-G. Simonsen, ‘Building “National” Armies – Building Nations: Determinants of Success for Postintervention Integration Efforts', Armed Forces and Society, Vol.33, No.4, 2007, pp.571–590.5. Here, post-war refers to the end of significant hostilities involving recognizable military forces that is underscored by a legitimate legal process such as a signed peace agreement that is accepted by all major parties. It could be argued that the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is still the scene of minor conflicts, which is why the use of post-war rather than post-conflict has been preferred.6. In the Congo, the author stayed with a European Defence Attaché and attended among others, informal meetings with Congolese military officers as well as conducting nine individual interviews with international military and political officers. In Burundi, the author spent time as an observing participant with a Belgian small contingent deployed to educate Burundian officers in Management at the Higher Officer's Institution (ISCAM), and conducted 24 interviews with mainly Burundian military officers, but also Belgian military officers and international political actors. In Rwanda, the author conducted two focus groups with former FDLR rebels, and one focus group with former Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) rebels turned soldiers as well as two individual interviews with former FDLR rebels. The focus on ex-rebels in Rwanda was due to the fact that the author was unable to come into contact with military officers who were willing to be interviewed at the time.7. A. George and A. Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Science, Cambridge, MA: MIT, 2005, p.67.8. H. Hintjens, ‘Postgenocide Identity Politics in Rwanda’, Ethnicities, Vol. 8, No.1, 2008, pp.1–41.9. 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Nkurunziza, ‘Evaluation indépendante externe: Projets du fond de consolidation de la paix au Burundi’, UN Peacebuilding Fund, Mar. 2010 (at: www.unpbf.org/wp-content/uploads/Burundi_2009.pdf).99. Belgian Defense, ‘Engagements de la défense au Burundi: Le Programme de Partenariat Militaire (PPM), les grandes lignes’, internal document, accessed 12 Nov. 2013.100. International Crisis Group, ‘Security Sector Reform in the Congo’, Africa Report, No.104, 13 Feb. 2006, p.16.101. N. Wilén, ‘No More Tintin in the Congo: A Transformative Analysis of Belgian Defence Policies in Central Africa’, Final Report, Royal Military Academy, Brussels, 2013, p.42.102. Galtung (see n.49 above), pp.378–80.103. Huntington (see n.52 above), p.12. This has however not always proven to be the case in integrated armies, as we will see later in this part.104. M. Kamrava, ‘Military Professionalization and Civil–Military Relations in the Middle East’, Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 115, No.1, pp.67–92, at p.68.105. Shils and Janowitz (see n.62 above), p.281.106. Jowell (see n.3 above), p.286.107. See Beswick (n.12 above); Wilén (see n.17 above).108. D. Beswick and M. Jowell, ‘Contributor Profile: Rwanda’, IPI, Providing for Peacekeeping Project, Version 17, Mar. 2014 (at: www.providingforpeacekeeping.org/2015/03/30/peacekeeping-contributor-profile-rwanda/).109. Jowell (see n.3 above), p.287.110. Kühnel Larsen (see n.69 above).111. Wilén et al. (see n.19 above).112. Author's interviews with military officers, Bujumbura, Burundi, Mar. 2013.113. Ibid.114. Wilén (see n.28 above).115. Eriksson Baaz and Verweijen (see n.3 above).116. Stearns (see n.42 above).117. Okapi Radio, ‘L'envoi des FARDC en Centrafrique: Une décision de prestige, selon l'Asadho', 23 Dec. 2013 (at: http://radiookapi.net/actualite/2013/12/23/rdc-reactions-lenvoi-des-soldats-fardc-en-centrafrique/).118. S. Melmot, ‘Candide in Congo: The Expected Failure of the Security Sector Reform’, Institut Français de Relations Internationales, Apr. 2009, p.10.119. Eriksson Baaz and Verweijen (see n.3 above).120. Wilén (see n.101 above).121. See, for example, Z. Barany, ‘Armies and Revolutions’, Journal of Democracy, Vol.24, No.2, 2013, pp.62–76, at pp.66–7.122. Galtung (see n.49 above), p.377.123. See, for example, Shils and Janowitz's seminal article (n.62 above) on how German military units continued fighting even after it was clear that they were defeated, which is explained mainly by the inter-personal relationships the primary groups.124. Beswick (see n.12 and n.17 above).125. Beswick and Jowell (see n.108 above).126. Siebold (see n.56 above), p.463.127. B.E. Bruton and P.D. 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