Portal de Periódicos da CAPES

Virtue Politics and Political Leadership: A Confucian Rejoinder to Hanfeizi

2012; Routledge; Volume: 22; Issue: 2 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1080/09552367.2012.692977

1469-2961

Sungmoon Kim,

Japanese History and Culture

Abstract In the Confucian tradition, the ideal government is called 'benevolent government' (ren zheng), central to which is the ruler's parental love toward his people who he deems as his children. Hanfeizi criticized this seemingly innocent political idea by pointing out that (1) not only is the state not a family but even within the family parental love is short of making the children orderly and (2) ren as love inevitably results in the ruin of the state because it confuses what is right/meritorious with what is not, thus disrupts the legal system. In this paper, I defend Confucian virtue politics against Hanfeizi's criticisms. I argue that by failing to grasp the complex nature of ren that encompasses both emotion (ren as love) and moral virtue (ren as filiality), Hanfeizi also failed to understand the actual process in which the ruler's parental love is extended to the people. Notes 1. Originally, tianxia (literally, 'all under Heaven') referred to the domain of the Zhou king's moral, political, and cultural authority. But throughout Chinese history, it was understood as the universal world in which morals and politics and politics and culture (wen 文) were massively fused. 2. Unless otherwise noted, all English translations of the Mencius in this paper are adopted from Lau, 1970 Lau, DC. (Trans.). (1970). Mencius. New York: Penguin Books [Google Scholar]. 3. Throughout the Analects, Confucius defines ren in many different ways, often in reference to the practice of rituals (li 禮). But, at one point (Analects 12:22), he says that ren is 'loving others (ai 愛)'. On the inseparability between ren and li in Confucius's thought, see Fingarette (1972 Fingarette, H. 1972. Confucius: The secular as sacred, New York: Harper. [Google Scholar]). 4. As such, Hanfeizi's Legalism is premised on a very simplistic understanding of human psychology and possesses no positive moral and political vision for a social order of the kind that the Confucian benevolent government aspires to achieve. I will come back to this problem later in this paper. 5. I emphasize the word 'eventually' because, to use social scientific language, by questioning the causal relation between the ruler's parental love (independent variable) and political order in the Confucian ideal of benevolent government (dependent variable), Hanfeizi dismisses the social context (intervening variables) that Confucians take seriously in actualizing the benevolent government. 6. In saying this, I assume that there is a coherent perspective of Confucian virtue politics to which all three ancient Confucian masters (Confucius, Mencius, and Xunzi) generally subscribed. I argue that this generic version of Confucian virtue politics can be found primarily in the political philosophy of Confucius who paid special attention to the virtue of filiality and understood the political in terms of the familial. This, however, does not mean that these paradigmatic Confucians upheld exactly the same kind of Confucian virtue politics. In fact, after the demise of Confucius, Mencius and Xunzi did develop qualitatively different versions of Confucian virtue politics. 7. In the Confucian political tradition, the notion of 'extension' was first introduced by Mencius as a method of virtue politics (dezhi 德治). In this paper, however, I argue that there is a generic Confucian virtue-political notion of extension and attribute it to Confucius, even though he never articulated it as Mencius did later, by politically reinterpreting his notion of zhengming 正名 (rectification of names) as a method of moral statecraft. Mencius's notion of extension will be treated as a special (i.e., moral sentimentalist) version of this generic Confucian idea of extension, focused on filial/familial affectionate sentiments. Therefore, my approach of (generic) Confucian notion of extension is qualitatively different from its most common understanding (focused on Mencius's notion of extension). Many contemporary philosophers who study ancient Confucian texts understand Confucian (particularly Mencian) notion of extension as a method of (universal) moral self-cultivation or a philosophical explication about the inseparability between the content of moral obligation and moral motivation. See Ivanhoe (2002 Ivanhoe, PJ. 2002. "Confucian self cultivation and Mengzi's notion of extension". In Essays on the moral philosophy of Mengzi, Edited by: Liu, X and Ivanhoe, PJ. 221–241. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett. [Google Scholar]); Wong (2002 Wong, DB. 2002. "Reasons and analogical reasoning in Mengzi". In Essays on the moral philosophy of Mengzi, Edited by: Liu, X and Ivanhoe, PJ. 187–220. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett. [Google Scholar]). Questioning the plausibility of such ethical or philosophical interpretations is not my aim, however. My aim is rather to redirect our focus from ethics and philosophy to politics, particularly political leadership or statecraft. 8. As Robert Neville (2000 Neville, RC. 2000. Boston Confucianism: Portable tradition in the late-modern world, Albany, NY: State University of New York. [Google Scholar], pp. 96–100) claims, Confucian love is characteristically a familial love, which begins with parental love. 9. For the English translation of the texts of the Hanfeizi, I refer to two available English translations of it: Watson (1964 Watson, B. (Trans.). (1964). Han Fei Tzu: Basic writings. New York: Columbia University Press [Google Scholar]) and Liao (1939 Liao, WK. (Trans.). (1939 & 1959). The complete works of Han Fei Tzu: A classic of Chinese legalism (2 vols.). London: Arthur Probsthain [Google Scholar], 1959). I use the former only for chapters 7, 49 and 50 of the Hanfeizi. 10. Even though the term xiao 孝 is often translated as 'filial piety', 'filial obligation', or 'filial love', I follow Ames and Rosemont's translation ('filial responsibility') precisely for the reason they offer: 'In defining filial piety (xiao), for example, Confucius is not concerned about providing parents with food and shelter—we do as much for our domestic animals. The substance of filial piety lies in the 'face (se 色)' one brings to filial responsibility—the bounce in the step, the cheerful heart, the goodwill with which one conducts the otherwise rather ordinary business of caring for aging parents (Ames & Rosemont, 1998 Ames, RT and Rosemont, H. 1998. The Analects of Confucius: A philosophical translation, New York: Ballantine Books. [Crossref] , [Google Scholar], p. 52). Throughout this paper, all English translations from the Lunyu (Analects of Confucius) are adopted from Ames and Rosemont's. 11. For a philosophical illumination of Confucian virtue in terms of moral character or disposition, see Hutton, 2006 Hutton, EL. 2006. Character, situationism, and early Confucian thought. Philosophical Studies, 127: 37–58. [Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]; Ivanhoe, 2000 Ivanhoe, PJ. 2000. Confucian moral self cultivation, Indianapolis, IN: Hackett. [Google Scholar]; Van Norden, 2007 Van Norden, BW. 2007. Virtue ethics and consequentialism in early Chinese philosophy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. [Crossref] , [Google Scholar]. 12. As some Confucian virtue ethicists argue, all three giants of classical Confucianism (Confucius, Mencius, and Xunzi) claim that moral self-cultivation or moral behavior is always accompanied by profound joy. See Hutton, 2002 Hutton, EL. 2002. "Moral connoisseurship in Mengzi". In Essays on the moral philosophy of Mengzi, Edited by: Liu, X and Ivanhoe, PJ. 163–186. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett. [Google Scholar]; Ivanhoe, 2002 Ivanhoe, PJ. 2002. "Confucian self cultivation and Mengzi's notion of extension". In Essays on the moral philosophy of Mengzi, Edited by: Liu, X and Ivanhoe, PJ. 221–241. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett. [Google Scholar]; Van Norden, 2000 Van Norden, BW. 2000. "Mengzi and Xunzi: Two views of human agency". In Virtue, nature, and moral agency in the Xunzi, Edited by: Kline, TC and Ivanhoe, PJ. 103–134. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett. [Google Scholar]. This feeling of joy, however, is qualitatively different from the state of the soul in which the harmony between reason and passion has been achieved, which is the Aristotelian state of happiness. 13. Note that in the Analects Confucius uses the term junzi in both its original sense (the ruling class) and his own transvaluated meaning as the moral exemplar. In the current passage, Confucius's statement makes more sense with the junzi as the ruler. 14. This stipulation, however, is less relevant (but not irrelevant) to Xunzi's political theory of Confucian virtue politics. Unlike Mencius, and arguably Confucius, who did not offer a coherent account of human nature, Xunzi begins political theory on the assumption that human nature is bad (xing e 性惡) and this raises a fundamental question how people, who are naturally bad, can be inspired by the ruler's moral virtue and motivated to be virtuous. This 'Xunzi problem' is still an unresolved question among contemporary students of Chinese philosophy but it is generally agreed that it is Xunzi's conviction that once people's wicked nature has been reformed by the ritual institutions established by the sage-kings, they will be further transformed to truly delight in the Confucian Dao and moral virtue. On the contemporary attempts to explicate the Xunzi problem from the perspective of his xing e thesis, see Wong (2000 Wong, DB. 2000. "Moral agency and motivation in the Xunzi". In Virtue, nature, and moral agency in the Xunzi, Edited by: Kline, TC and Ivanhoe, PJ. 135–154. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett. [Google Scholar]) and Hutton (2000 Hutton, EL. (2000). Does Xunzi have a consistent theory of human nature? In T.C. Kline and P.J. Ivanhoe (Eds.), Virtue, nature, and moral agency in the Xunzi (pp. 220–236). Indianapolis, IN: Hackett [Google Scholar]). In my view, if the Xunzi problem is bypassed, this generic idea of Confucian virtue politics can be highly compatible with Xunzi's political theory which concentrates on the rule by ritual (lizhi 禮治). 15. Xunzi calls the political order attained by the Confucian statecraft of zhengming the state of 'great equality' (zhi ping 至平): '[W]hen a humane man occupies the highest position, farmers labor with all their energy to exhaust the potential of their fields, merchants scrutinize with keen eyes to get the utmost from their goods, the various artisans use their skills to the fullest in making utensils and wares, and the officials, from the knights and grand officers up to the feudal lords, all execute fully the functions of their offices with humanity, generosity, wisdom, and ability. This may be called 'Great Equality' (zhi ping). So though one may have as his emolument the whole world, he need not consider it excessive, and though one be only a gatekeeper, receptionist, guard, or nightwatchman, he need never think his salary too meager. Anciently it was said: Unequal (zhan 斬) yet equivalent (qi 齊) , bent (wang 枉) yet obedient (shun 順), not the same (bu tong 不同) yet uniform (yi 一). This refers to the constant relationships of mankind (ren lun 人倫)' (Xunzi 4:12, translation slightly modified by the author). All English translations of the Xunzi are adopted from Knoblock (1988 Knoblock, J. 1988, 1990, 1994. Xunzi: A translation and study of complete works, Vol. 3, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. [Crossref] , [Google Scholar], 1990, 1994). 16. Hanfeizi's exclusive focus on ren as love and his overall misunderstanding of the actual operation of Confucian virtue politics is partially attributable to a particular version of Confucianism, namely, Mencian-Confucianism, that was prevalent in his time, which frequently presents ren in terms of moral sentiments such as pity or compassion. Mencius criticized Mohists, who advocated the principle of inclusive care (jian ai 兼愛), for inventing the 'two roots thesis', according to which ren is rooted in both filiality and universal love/compassion (see Mencius 3A5), thus violating the well-established 'one root thesis' originally submitted by Youzi. However, by presenting ren occasionally in terms of compassion (that is, by calling compassion the 'sprout' of ren), Mencius himself seems to have significantly modified the original Confucian idea of ren, which was closely related to the practice of rituals (li), thus inviting the Mohist and (as we see in this paper) Hanfeizi's challenges. On this Mencian predicament, see Liu (2004 Liu, Q. 2004. Is Mencius' doctrine of 'extending affection' tenable?. Asian Philosophy, 14: 79–90. [Taylor & Francis Online], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]) and Nivison (1996 Nivison, D. 1996. The ways of Confucianism: Investigations in Chinese philosophy, Chicago, IL: Open Court. [Google Scholar]). 17. This is not to say that Hanfeizi does not revere sage-kings Yao and Shun. However, Hanfeizi argues that the essence of their sagacity consists in their rule by law: 'The Dao of the intelligent sovereign is true to the law, and his law is true to the mind. Therefore, when standing close by it, he acts on the law; when going away from it, he thinks of it in the mind. Thus, Yao made no covenant as binding as glue and varnish with his age, but his Dao prevailed. Shun left no territory sufficient to set a gimlet on with subsequent ages, but his virtue (de 德) to the myriad subsequent ages, is called 'an enlightened sovereign' (Hanfeizi 25, p. 265, translation slightly modified by the author). Compare this with Mencius's description of Shun, which is focused on his immaculate moral (filial) virtue (see Mencius 5A1-4). 18. Though in the social and political theory literature, civility (and civil society) is conceptually differentiated from civic virtue (and community), in this paper I understand the term broadly as civic virtue in the social middle ground, namely civil society that stands between the family and the state. 19. It should be noted here that while calling filiality the root (ben 本) of ren, Mencius, as a moral sentimentalist, is simultaneously convinced that the 'sprout' (duan 端) of ren is love, more accurately, commiseration or compassion (Mencius 2A6). Put differently, according to Mencius's reasoning, what gives rise to the virtue of ren is filiality (in the sense that ren is not possible without first being filial to one's parents and other family members) but the most common and compelling evidence that ex post facto demonstrates the (metaphysical) innateness of the virtue of ren in human nature (xing 性) is the moral sentiment of commiseration or compassion that every human being is capable of in a particular situation—for instance, where one finds herself seeing a child about to fall into a well. 20. This apparently Mencian claim may seem not applicable with equal force to Xunzi who upholds the xing e thesis. But Xunzi presents his xing e thesis as an account for the putative cause of disorder (or a quasi-Hobbesian state of nature), not in any strong psychological terms. That is, unlike Hobbes, Xunzi does not say that men retain their original nature in the civil state. Rather, he, though without clearly explicating the process of moral self-transformation, stipulates that in the civil state men are fundamentally changed; now delighting the Confucian Dao, thus cherishing the virtue and moral sentiment of ren. 21. Qingping Liu (2003 Liu, Q. 2003. Filiality versus sociality and individuality: On Confucianism as 'consangunitism'. Philosophy East and West, 53: 234–250. [Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]) asserts that filiality in Confucianism is nothing more than consanguinity, which has no moral constraint, thus in my view fails to note why filiality is understood as virtue. 22. For an excellent study of Rousseau's complex of understanding of pity, see Boyd (2004 Boyd, R. 2004. Pity's pathologies portrayed: Rousseau and the limits of democratic compassion. Political Theory, 32: 519–546. [Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]). 23. The English translation here is adopted from Bloom (2009 Bloom, I. (Trans.). (2009). Mencius. New York: Columbia University Press [Google Scholar]). 24. Mencius 7A45 (slightly modified from Bloom's translation of Mencius). 25. In this regard, Pierre Manent's following statement is highly relevant to Hanfeizi's criticism of Confucianism: '[B]ecause physical pity is rooted in the senses, we communicate immediately with the other, without the mediation of complex ideas. Physical compassion offers us the easiest, most direct, and most general sentiment of those like ourselves … [However] politics is the great mediation or the mediation of mediations [which] prevents any experience from claiming absolute validity [and that] requires any experience coexist and to communicate with the other experiences (Manent, 2006 Manent, P. 2006. A world beyond politics? A defense of the nation-state, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. [Google Scholar], pp. 189, 201–202). 26. Hanfeizi 7, p. 30: 'The enlightened ruler controls his ministers by means of two handles alone. The two handles are punishment and favor. What do I mean by punishment and favor? To inflict mutilation and death on men is called punishment; to bestow honor and reward is called favor. Those who act as ministers fear the penalties and hope to profit by the rewards. Hence, if the ruler wields his punishments and favors, the ministers will fear his sternness and flock to receive his benefits.' 27. The purpose of this section is to evaluate Hanfeizi's alternative to Confucian benevolent government, not to thoroughly examine his Legalist political philosophy. For a comprehensive discussion of Hanfeizi's political philosophy, see Harris (2009 Harris, EL. (2009). Morality in politics: Panacea or poison? (Doctoral dissertation, University of Utah) [Google Scholar]); Wang and Chang (1986 Wang, H-P and Chang, LS. 1986. The philosophical foundations of Han Fei's political theory, Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press. [Crossref] , [Google Scholar]). 28. King Wen (文王) founded the Zhou 周 dynasty (1122–256 BCE) by defeating Zhou 紂, the last emperor of the Shang 商 dynasty (1766–1122 BCE), who is arguably the most notorious tyrant in Chinese history alongside Jie 桀, the last emperor of the Xia 夏 dynasty (2205–1766 BCE). 29. Despite his provocative interpretation of Hanfeizi as a constitutionalist thinker, Henrique Schneider (2011 Schneider, H. 2011. Legalism: Chinese-style constitutionalism?. Journal of Chinese Philosophy, 38: 46–63. [Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar], p. 50), too, agrees that 'the well-being or the interest of the governed is not a major concern for the legalists, and it not part of their motivation for governing the state'. Schneider's statement, however, makes me wonder what makes Hanfeizi a constitutionalist thinker. For a completely opposite viewpoint (that sees Hanfeizi as a totalitarian thinker), see Fu (1996 Fu, Z. 1996. China's legalists: The earliest totalitarians and their art of ruling, Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe Publishers. [Google Scholar]). 30. Joseph Chan's following remark is highly suggestive in this regard: 'Once past the level of material sufficiency, Mencius and Xunzi do not object to economic inequalities that arise from personal factors such as merit and contribution, which are largely based on the possession of abilities (moral character and intelligence)' (Chan, 2008 Chan, J. 2008. "Is there a Confucian perspective on social justice?". In Western political thought in dialogue with Asia, Edited by: Shogimen, T and Nederman, CJ. 261–277. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books. [Google Scholar], p. 275). It should be emphasized though that the Confucian focus is not so much on the morally justifiable extent of economic inequalities (after meeting the threshold of sufficiency) but on how to create a condition in which people's economic provisions are sufficient. 31. For a very insightful study of politics from the perspective of (sociopolitical) victims, see Shklar (1990 Shklar, JN. 1990. The faces of injustice, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. [Google Scholar]). 32. Xunzi says that 'if one only reproves and does not instruct, then punishments will be numerous but evil will not be overcome. If one instructs but does not reprove, then dissolute people will not be chastened. If one reproves but does not reward, then applying harsh discipline to the people will not exhort them to good' (Xunzi 10:10). Xunzi's position, however, is clearly distinguished from Hanfeizi's. While Xunzi presents the use of reward and punishment as part of Confucian moral statecraft, Hanfeizi recommends it for the sake of the convenience in controlling the people (especially the ministers). 33. For instance, Hanfeizi says, 'The sage in governing the state pursues the policy of making the people inevitably do him good but never relies on their doing him good with love. For to rely on the people's doing him good with love is dangerous, but to rely on their inevitability to do him good is safe. To be sure, ruler and minister having no blood kinship … Knowing this well, the intelligent sovereign simply establishes the system of advantages and disadvantages and thereby shows the world what is right and what is wrong'. Thus, in Hanfeizi 36:146, Hanfeizi concludes that 'the relationship of ruler and minister is not as intimate as the bond of father and son; It is an outcome of mutual calculations' (Hanfeizi 14, p. 121; also see Hanfeizi 27, p. 272). 34. Recently, David Elstein has submitted that there is textual ground to reinterpret Hanfeizi as a political theorist of non-domination. I strongly disagree. Elstein (2011 Elstein, D. 2011. Han Feizi's thought and republicanism. Dao, 10: 167–185. [Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar], p. 171) writes, 'Han Feizi argued for concentrating power in the hands of the ruler because he thought that was the best way to reduce the likelihood that others would be able to dominate the state and the people'. But this is exactly what a despot does in order to monopolize power. Philip Pettit, on whose work Elstein draws extensively, integrates the citizens' right to contest the political authority in civil society into his notion of non-domination but even in Elstein's most charitable interpretation, Hanfeizi allows the people no political liberty or public freedom, nor does he cherish the value of civil society, a sphere independent of the arbitrary intervention from the state. For Hanfeizi, people must be docile subjects, not republican (i.e., self-governing) citizens.