Assessing potential Russian irredentism and separatism in Kazakhstan’s northern oblasts
2015; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 56; Issue: 5 Linguagem: Inglês
10.1080/15387216.2015.1103660
ISSN1938-2863
Autores Tópico(s)European Politics and Security
ResumoAbstractThe presence of co-ethnic peoples within a borderland constitutes the core of most cases of irredentism, or the subjective perception that specific international borders fail to appropriately delimit national territory. Russian President Vladimir Putin publically rationalized his recent annexation of Crimea and cross-border interventions in Georgia and Eastern Ukraine through the alleged persecution of Russians in neighboring states (specifically Russkiy Mir). While much attention has been focused on the cases of outright invasion, it is important to evaluate other borderlands as sites of potential Russian actions. Central Asia's north-central steppe possesses a long history of shifting borders and demographics, which has given rise to varied claims to "rightful ownership." This paper critically assesses potential irredentism and separatism in Kazakhstan's northern oblasts.Keywords: KazakhstanirredentismnationalismRussiaseparatismbordersregionalism Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.Notes1. The question posed by Anna Sazonova, a student of the People's Friendship University of Russia, at the "town-hall"-style meeting of the 10th Seliger-2014 Youth Forum of Russia: "There are concerns over growing nationalist sentiments in Kazakhstan's south. And the incumbent President Nursultan Nazarbayev seems to be the only deferring factor. Should we expect a Ukraine-like scenario if the president steps down? Has Russia got a strategy to deal with this possible scenario? And what are the prospects of Eurasian integration (and joining of the two countries together)?" (TengriNews Citation2014a).2. Putin suggested that Ukraine "was an artificial creation sewn together from territory of Poland, the Czech Republic, Romania, and especially Russia" (UNIAN Citation2008).3. Saideman and Ayres (Citation2000) offer a cogent review of perspectives and hypotheses on irredentism; these include the debates on the nature of the group, characteristics of the group's kin, contagion processes, ethnic security dilemmas, and the end of empire.4. Examples include the Estonian removal of the Soldier Statue in Narva (see Kaiser Citation2012), overtures of NATO membership with Ukraine, the EU and NATO's incorporation of the Baltic States (encircling Kaliningrad), and expansion of a missile defense system into the Baltics (see Diener and Hagen Citation2011, 577).5. Modernist approaches to nationalism suggest the process is initiated through the formation of fixed territorial entities (bordered states) and centralized bureaucratic authorities within them. These authorities disseminate an ideal of "nationhood" through education and other public services, militaries, iconography, and printed material. The Soviet Union created these institutions within a framework of ethnically named Republics in Central Asia (see Hirsch Citation2005; Kaiser Citation1994).6. The 17 March 1991 referendum on the future of the Soviet Union posed the question: "Do you consider necessary the preservation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as a renewed federation of equal sovereign republics in which the rights and freedom of an individual of any nationality will be fully guaranteed?" In Kazakhstan, the wording of the referendum was changed by substituting "equal sovereign states" for "equal sovereign republics" but still elicited a 95% affirmation of preservation. On 16 December 1991, Kazakhstan was the last of the Republics to declare independence.7. An exception to this would be Belarus' President Lukashenka's efforts to eschew Belarusian identity (Ioffe Citation2003).8. This title was previously conferred upon Tsar Ivan the Great, who increased the size of the Russian empire in the fifteenth century. It should also be noted that not all Russian citizens support the annexation. Zevelev (Citation2014) states, "Almost all public intellectuals who can be considered neo-imperialists … have voiced strong support for the Kremlin's actions with regard to events in Crimea in the spring of 2014. Ethnic nationalists are divided on the issue … At the same time, some intellectuals from these groups … find that the Kremlin's new policy disguised in the imperialist agenda actually aims to build a nation-state where political and ethnic borders would coincide."9. In 1992, President Boris Yeltsin's advisor Sergei Karaganov argued that Russia's intervention in countries within the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) is justified when the human rights of Russian compatriots are at stake. This "Karaganov doctrine" is strategically vague as to what constitutes "compatriots" and when their human rights are at stake.10. An historical perspective on the intellectual foundations of this policy is well articulated by Maria Snegovaya, a doctoral student at Columbia University (Snegovaya Citation2015).11. Links across the Russian/Kazakhstani border include shared electrical grids, industrial infrastructure, 200 roads, and 16 rail-lines (some of which weave in and out of the other state's territory en route to their terminal stations – e.g. Uralsk through the Orenburskaya Region to Aktubinsk, Semipalatinsk through the Altaiski Region to Oskemen, Orsk to Nikeltau along the South Ural railway crosses into Kazakhstan nine times, while the Transiberian Railway between Kurgan and Omsk routes through 100 miles of Kazakhstan's territory.12. Some organizations in which Kazakhstan and Russia share membership include the Commonwealth of Independent States, the Customs Union, the Collective Security Treaty Organization, the Euro Atlantic Partnership Council, and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.13. Thirty-six percent of Kazakhstan's imports come from Russia and 9% of its exports go to Russia. China may be surpassing Russia as Kazakhstan's chief economic partner, receiving 20% of its exports and providing18% of Kazakhstan's imports (MIT Citation2015), but this strict economic measure does not reflect the broad-ranging human, military, and other linkages between Russian and Kazakhstan that far outpace those between Kazakhstan and China (Laruelle and Peyrouse Citation2013, 9–42).14. In a rather ironic twist, Dugin advocates reverse irredentism in the return of Russia's western-most territory Kaliningrad to Germany (Dugin Citation1997, 228).15. Between 1991 and 2011, 60.8 percent of returnees were from Uzbekistan with 12.7 percent from China and 10.5 percent from Mongolia, 7.5 percent from Turkmenistan, 5.2 percent from Russia and small percentages from Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkey, and Iran (Mendikulova Citation2012, 20).16. By contrast, both Estonia and Latvia enacted far harsher nationalization projects than did Kazakhstan, despite the presence of large numbers of ethnic Russians (Brubaker Citation2011; Kudaibergenova Citation2012, 40–51). The 1993 Constitution offered guarantees of ethnic equality, thereby implicitly setting a goal of civic nation formation (Konstitutsiya Citation1993). An early 1990s literature/media campaign promoting multiculturalism included a revision of the 1995 Constitution – Article 1, which declares "Kazakhstani patriotism" to be one of the guiding principles of the Republic (Konstitutsiya Citation1995).17. "Internationalism" as applied in Soviet policy may also refer to a uniting of proletarian workers across international borders in the struggle against capitalism.18. Following the model of Russian culture as a basis for a "friendship of nations" in the Soviet era, Kazakh ethnonationalism was cultivated in presidential speeches during the 1990s. "The culture of the Kazakhs must be seriously assimilated by the representatives of the other ethnoi, just as the Kazakhs, in their own time, earnestly studied Russian culture" (Nazarbaev, V potoke istorii Nazarbayev Citation1999, 124). Nazarbayev also suggested that the Republic "bears the responsibility of the Kazakh nation," and the "rebirth and development of a specific culture, of traditions, of the language, and the reinforcing of national pride of the Kazakh nation and the other nationalities living in Kazakhstan constitutes one of the main missions of the statehood of the Republic of Kazakhstan" (Nazarbayev Citation1990).19. The Asia Barometer Survey of 2005 cites 87% of Kazakhstan's citizens professing to be "very proud" or "proud" of their citizenship (Asia Barometer Citation2005). A Kazakhstan Institute of Social and Economic Information and Forecasting survey in 2009 revealed a hierarchy of identity in which 53% preferred a civic identity, 26% ethnic identity, and only 10% preferred a religious identity (see Spehr and Kassenova Citation2012, 142). Also in 2009, a Centre for Social and Political Research (Citation2009) report characterizes interethnic relations in Kazakhstan to be "quiet and friendly." Akylbayeva, Malgaraeva, and Umirzakova's Citation2011 research purports 57% of respondents regard "interethnic tolerance" to be well formed within the state, with 18% contending this is not the case and 25% having no clear opinion.20. Opponents of the Doctrine Draft's promotion of Russian and English claim that these languages are "Stronger and will destroy Kazakh" (Shakhanov Citation2009).Additional informationFundingThis work was was supported by the Fulbright Commission under the Regional Research Fellowship and the University of Kansas' College of Arts and Sciences' New Faculty General Research Fund. This article was written while the author was a Title VIII Short-Term Scholar at the Kennan Institute of the Woodrow Wilson Center for International Scholars in Washington DC and Senior Fellow at the Davis Center of Harvard University.
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