Strategic Implications of the Indochina Conflict
1984; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 11; Issue: 3 Linguagem: Inglês
10.1080/00927678.1984.10553698
ISSN1940-1590
Autores Tópico(s)Asian Geopolitics and Ethnography
ResumoIn the past eight years one of the most observable trends in international affairs has been the hardening of the schism between the then five countries that made up the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)-Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand (Brunei joined in early 1984, thus becoming the sixth member)-on the one hand, and Vietnam on the other. There seems to be little doubt that from the very beginning the ASEAN states regarded as developments dangerous to themselves the victory of North Vietnam over the South in 1975 and the subsequent reunification of the country in 1976, taking place as they did in the context of the diminishing U.S. role and guarantees in the region. It is significant that within two days of the fall of Saigon, Singapore Premier Lee Kuan Yew visited Bangkok for consultations with his Thai counterpart, Kukrit Pramoj, about the new security situation and thereby started what turned out to be regularized process of visits and discussions which not only injected some vitality into the life and limbs of ASEAN for the first time, but also opened up new horizons of political and diplomatic cooperation for the organization, as witnessed at the February 1976 Bali summit and beyond. Clearly, the possibility of Vietnam's becoming, as termed by one veteran observer of regional affairs, a twentieth-century Prussia in Southeast Asia' was much feared.
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