Normativity without Cartesian privilege
2015; Wiley; Volume: 25; Issue: 1 Linguagem: Inglês
10.1111/phis.12059
ISSN1758-2237
Autores Tópico(s)Philosophy and Theoretical Science
ResumoPhilosophical IssuesVolume 25, Issue 1 p. 273-299 Original Article Normativity without Cartesian privilege Amia Srinivasan, Amia Srinivasan All Souls College, OxfordSearch for more papers by this author Amia Srinivasan, Amia Srinivasan All Souls College, OxfordSearch for more papers by this author First published: 12 October 2015 https://doi.org/10.1111/phis.12059Citations: 43Read the full textAboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onEmailFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditWechat References Alston, W. (1989). Epistemic Justification. 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