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Freedom of Will and Freedom of Action

2013; Philosophy Documentation Center; Linguagem: Inglês

10.5840/apapa2013150

2330-6114

Rogers Albritton,

Seventeenth-Century Political and Philosophical Thought

Descartes held the will is perfectly free, free in its nature it cannot be constrained.2 everyone just go down deep into himself, he is reported to have said to Frans Burman, find out whether or not he a perfect and absolute will, and whether he can conceive of anything which surpasses him in of the will. I am sure everyone will find it is as I say.3 Not everyone so found, and one might think: wonder! We aren't gods. How could our wills not have their limits, like our digestions? Don't we quite often--or occasionally, at a minimum-have no of will, in some matter or other? And mustn't it be like that? Whatever the will is, or was, mustn't it, under whatever name or names, be good for something? And in our case, mustn't it be something in the world the will is good for? But if so, its can't be perfect and unconditional. What in the world, might reasonably be called a freedom, could be so absolute? If the will in the world were some faculty, say, of never mind what, wouldn't it be possible somehow to restrict its exercise? How could be impossible? No doubt we're free as birds. We know it, God knows how, or as good as know it. Or better than know it, as perhaps we better than know twice two is four. But how free are birds? Let no bird preen itself on its freedom. There are cages. There are tamers of birds. There's a lesson in birds, namely a certain modesty about our famous is very much in order, in the order of nature to which we so palpably belong. One might think something like that. Nevertheless, I am inclined to agree with Descartes. And of course I have some company. Foreigners, mostly, but there it is. Not much company, however, as far as I know. Most philosophers seem to think it quite easy to rob the will of some freedom. Thus Elizabeth Anscombe, in an essay called Soft Determinism, appears to suppose a man who can't walk because he is chained up lost some of will. He has no 'freedom of will' to she says, or, again; no freedom of the will in respect of walking.4 Everyone will allow, she says, that 'A can walk, i.e. of the will in respect of walking' would be gainsaid by A's being chained up.5 And again, External constraint is generally agreed to be incompatible with freedom,6 by which she seems to mean: incompatible with perfect of will, because incompatible with of will to do, or of the will in respect of doing, whatever the constraint prevents.