Regulating Multiple Externalities: The Case of Nordic Fisheries
2016; University of Chicago Press; Volume: 31; Issue: 2 Linguagem: Inglês
10.1086/685286
ISSN2334-5985
AutoresStaffan Waldo, Frank Søndergaard Jensen, Max Nielsen, Hans Ellefsen, Jónas Hallgrimsson, Cecilia Hammarlund, Øystein Hermansen, John Roald Isaksen,
Tópico(s)Economic Policies and Impacts
ResumoOpen access is a well-known externality problem in fisheries causing excess capacity and overfishing. Due to global warming, externality problems from CO2 emissions have gained increased interest. With two externality problems, a first-best optimum can be achieved by using two regulatory instruments. However, solving the open-access externality problem also affects CO2 emissions. By using a bio-economic model covering Iceland, Norway, Denmark, Sweden, and the Faroe Islands, it is shown that regulations of the open-access externality problem have a large effect on both economic performance and CO2 emissions, while an additional CO2 regulation only has minor effects. The second-best solution achieved by only regulating open access reduces emissions by approximately 50% compared to current fisheries, with the exception of Iceland, which already has a well-developed fisheries management system.
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