The Role of "Ich Kann" in Husserl's Answer to Humean Skepticism
1986; Wiley; Volume: 46; Issue: 4 Linguagem: Inglês
10.2307/2107670
ISSN1933-1592
Autores Tópico(s)Psychoanalysis and Social Critique
ResumoHumean skepticism has been object of attentions of Analytic Philosophy over past eighty years, even where with advent of linguistic turn it has found itself demoted from status of Pied Piper to that of straw man. The diverse efforts to refute it undertaken over that period of time have yielded few conclusive results, although anything less than a book-length defence of this claim must be inadequate.I What may be argued more briefly is that Husserl's foundationalist approach to philosophy contains implicitly, when not explicitly, an answer to Humean skepticism, at least to extent that any answer is possible. This lesser claim holds in first instance with regard to Hume's general skeptical thesis of impotence and irrelevance of human reason in acquisition and justification of common beliefs about world. It holds furthermore, and by same token, with regard to three problems in epistemology of perception, each judged by Hume to be incapable of rational solution. In particular, Husserlian notion of ich kann may be shown to play a key role in resolution of most specifically Humean of three problems, one often characterized as problem of induction. Let us begin with a brief look at Humean skepticism. One of central topics of investigation in Hume's Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding is nature of empirical evidence. What is to be investigated is, in Hume's words, the nature of that evidence which assures us of any real
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