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Taking Disaster Seriously: East Asian Military Involvement in International Disaster Relief Operations and the Implications for Force Projection

2013; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 9; Issue: 1 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1080/14799855.2013.760989

1555-2764

Jeffrey Engstrom,

Vietnamese History and Culture Studies

Abstract The participation of East Asian militaries (Japan, China, Taiwan, and South Korea) in international disaster relief is a relatively new phenomenon having many implications that will shape the global landscape of the 21st century. This article looks at the historical record of these operations and notes how they have evolved in size and scope over time. Empirical data are presented and analyzed to identify and compare demonstrated capacities for force projection. These demonstrated capacities are considered with current and future capabilities to contemplate the trajectory of the militaries' future participation in disaster relief and ability for force projection. Finally, the article concludes with a brief assessment of implications and policy considerations. For helpful comments and suggestions, the author thanks Cortez A. Cooper, Michael J. Lostumbo, Andrew Scobell, Bruce M. Sugden, and two anonymous reviewers. The author is thankful for generous financial support from the Tang Institute for US–China Relations through the Center for Asia–Pacific Policy at the RAND Corporation. Notes For helpful comments and suggestions, the author thanks Cortez A. Cooper, Michael J. Lostumbo, Andrew Scobell, Bruce M. Sugden, and two anonymous reviewers. The author is thankful for generous financial support from the Tang Institute for US–China Relations through the Center for Asia–Pacific Policy at the RAND Corporation. 1. For the purposes of this article, force projection is defined as the ability of a military to send military equipment and personnel from their respective country (or another region) to engage in overseas military operations across the full spectrum of combat and noncombat missions. 2. East Asia consists of China, Japan, Mongolia, North Korea, South Korea, and Taiwan. Until this point, East Asian militaries did not participate in international disaster relief. Instead, civilian government or nongovernment provided the only East Asian responses to international disasters, and these were standard approaches to providing aid, if at all. Of the six countries listed, the militaries of North Korea and Mongolia remain inactive in international disaster relief participation. 3. These numbers were achieved by summing the total instances in which a particular military was dispatched for disaster response. Situations in which a country sends multiple teams without continuous presence to a particular country are not counted separately. 4. The Chinese People's Liberation Army has directly participated in antipiracy SLOC operations in the Gulf of Aden as well as NEO operations in Libya. Japan's SDF have participated in SLOC operations in the Gulf of Aden and have lent humanitarian support to US-led coalition forces in Iraq. The SDF also engaged in a small NEO in 2004, evacuating ten Japanese journalists on C-130s from Iraq. South Korea's military has participated in SLOC operations in the Gulf of Aden as well as US-led coalitions in Iraq and Afghanistan. China's National Defense in 2010 (Beijing: Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, 2011). “Chinese Citizens Continue to Evacuate from Libya,” Xinhua, March 5, 2011. Defense of Japan 2010 (Tokyo: Ministry of Defense, 2010), p. 349; Defense of Japan 2006 (Tokyo: Japan Defense Agency, 2006), pp. 189, 527; Defense White Paper 2006 (Seoul: Ministry of National Defense, 2007), pp. 120–121. Defense White Paper 2010 (Seoul: Ministry of National Defense, 2010), pp. 111–112. 5. See, for example, Yasuhiro Izumikawa, “Explaining Japanese Antimilitarism: Normative and Realist Constraints on Japan's Security Policy,” International Security Vol. 35, No. 2 (2010), pp. 123–160. Robert S. Ross, “China's Naval Nationalism, Sources, Prospects, and the U.S. Response,” International Security Vol. 34, No. 2 (2009), pp. 46–81. Amitav Acharya, “Can Asia Lead? Power Ambitions and Global Governance in the Twenty-First Century,” International Affairs Vol. 87, No. 4 (2011), pp. 851–869. 6. See, for example, Sharon Wiharta et al., The Effectiveness of Foreign Military Assets in Natural Disaster Response (Stockholm: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2008); Barry R. Posen, “Military Responses to Refugee Disasters,” International Security Vol. 21, No. 1 (1996), pp. 72–111; Thomas G. Weiss and Kurt M. Campbell, “Military Humanitarianism,” Survival Vol. 32, No. 5 (1991), pp. 451–465. 7. See, for example, Christopher W. Hughes, “Japan's Remilitarization,” The Adelphi Papers Vol. 48, No. 403 (2008); Walter C. Ladwig III, “India and Military Power Projection: Will the Land of Gandhi Become a Conventional Great Power?” Asian Survey Vol. 50, No. 6 (2010), pp. 1162–1183. 8. UNISDR Terminology on Disaster Risk (Geneva: United Nations, 2009), p. 24. Text in brackets is added. 9. This article specifically does not look at relief aid provided under the auspices of the UN Peacekeeping Operations (UNPKO). UNPKO generally do not present a test of force projection for militaries providing personnel as the United Nations regularly provides transportation and sustainment for these forces. 10. This is an admittedly low threshold for determining whether force projection has occurred or not. However, any definition that seeks to prescribe a certain amount of military individuals necessary for such an event would quickly run into the problem of how to determine when a critical mass of individuals has been achieved. As this definition is not exclusionary in this regard, it does not potentially undercount occurrences of force projection. Of course, it follows that if only one or a handful of military personnel are involved in an international disaster relief operation, force projection occurring is at an extremely low level. 11. For example, providing satellite imagery to the disaster-affected country's government. Similarly disaster aid organized by a military but brought to the affected area on a chartered civilian flight and distributed by civilian personnel is also not the focus of this article, though it is often noted. 12. For example, an in-country military attaché that may oversee aspects or participate directly in an aid delivery operation is not considered, as this individual was not specifically sent from the responding country for this task. 13. Susan Chira, “Japan Quake Aid is Slow to Arrive,” New York Times, December 14, 1988. 14. Japan, however, sent naval minesweepers to the Persian Gulf to support US-led combat operations against Iraqi forces during the Gulf War. Courtney Purrington, “Tokyo's Policy Responses during the Gulf War and the Impact of the ‘Iraqi Shock’ on Japan,” Pacific Affairs Vol. 65, No. 2 (1992), pp. 161–181. 15. Stephanie DeMoss, The Bangladesh Cyclone of 1991 (Washington, DC: US Agency for International Development, PN-ADG-744, 2005). 16. “Government Calls for SDF Disaster Relief Teams,” Report from Japan, July 31, 1991. 17. Ryu Yamazaki, “Review of the Guidelines for Japan–US Defense Cooperation: A Japanese Perspective,” The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis Vol. 9, No. 2 (1997), pp. 27–44. 18. Office of Disaster Assistance, OFDA Annual Report FY 1999 (Washington, DC: US Agency for International Development, n.d.), p. 68. 19. “Japan's Military Planes Head for Honduras on Relief Mission,” Xinhua, November 13, 1998. 20. The latter two, which essentially allow Japan to contribute a supporting role for US-led coalition wars, are based on time-limited laws that have to be approved and regularly reapproved by the Diet. Defense of Japan 2009 (Tokyo: Ministry of Defense, 2009), p. 280. 21. “Norota Orders MSDF to Ship Prefab Shelters to Turkey,” Japan Economic Newswire, September 17, 1999. “Japan Extends Fresh Aid to Quake-Hit Turkey,” Japan Economic Newswire, September 20, 1999. 22. “Japanese Navy Warship Leaves Southern China Port,” Xinhua, June 27, 2008. 23. Defense of Japan 2005 (Tokyo: Japan Defense Agency, 2005), p. 64. 24. The MSDF helicopters were stationed aboard two MSDF destroyers also participating in disaster relief efforts. 25. Defense of Japan 2006, p. 305. 26. Defense of Japan 2006, p. 308. 27. Defense White Paper 2011 (Tokyo: Ministry of Defense, 2011), p. 363. “Japan Military Chopper Unit Heads to Flood-Hit Pakistan,” Statesman, August 21, 2010. “Japan's Two More Helicopters Reach Karachi Port,” Pakistan Press International, September 18, 2010. 28. The SDF chartered a Volga-Dnepr An-124 large cargo aircraft to deliver the helicopter. “Disaster Relief in Pakistan,” Ministry of Defense, n.d. Available at http://www.mod.go.jp/js/Activity/Gallery/pakistan_kinkyuenjo_g01.htm 29. Defense White Paper 2011, pp. 362–363. 30. Defense White Paper 2010 (Seoul: Ministry of National Defense, 2010), p. 8. 31. Defense White Paper 2008 (Seoul: Ministry of National Defense, 2008), p. 46. 32. Lee Myung-bak, Global Korea: The National Security Strategy of the Republic of Korea (Seoul: Cheong Wa Dae [Office of the President], 2009), p. 12. 33. “Prime Minister Leaves for Anti-Disaster Conference in Jakarta,” Antara – The Indonesian National News Agency, January 5, 2005. 34. “South Korean Air Force to Deliver Philippine Landslide Relief,” BBC Monitoring Asia–Pacific – Political, February 27, 2006. “Seoul to Provide $2 Mil. in Aid to Indonesia,” Korea Times, May 31, 2006. 35. The ROKAF airlifted 41 civilian rescue workers as well as 26.6 tons of aid to China following the earthquake. “Foreign Teams Arrive in China Quake Zone: Xinhua,” Agence France Presse, May 16, 2008. Defense White Paper 2008, p. 122. 36. “S. Korea to Send 102-Strong Rescue Team to Japan,” Asia Pulse, March 14, 2011. “S. Korea Sends 102 More Rescue Workers to Quake-Ravaged Japan,” Xinhua, March 14, 2011. 37. Directly quoting a World Bank–Colombia University study, one report states that Taiwan “may be the place on Earth most vulnerable to natural hazards.” Mark A. Stokes and Tiffany Ma, Taiwan, the People's Liberation Army, and the Struggle with Nature (Arlington VA: The Project 2049 Institute, 2011), p. 3. 38. Andrew Nien-Dzu Yang, “The Republic of China's Defense Strategy and Policy,” Defense Security Brief Vol. 1, No. 1 (2011), p. 4. Text in parentheses is added. 39. “Taiwan to Keep Low Profile in Asian Tsunami Relief – President,” BBC Monitoring Asia–Pacific – Political, January 19, 2005. 40. “ROC Humanitarian Mission Stuck in Abu Dhabi En Route to Macedonia,” Central News Agency – Taiwan, April 13, 1999. “Taiwan's Humanitarian Delegation in Skopje to Return,” Central News Agency – Taiwan, April 21, 1999. 41. Nearly two months after Macedonia's diplomatic recognition of Taiwan, China vetoed a UN resolution extending the mandate of a 1,000-member peacekeeping force in the country. Macedonia switched its recognition back to Beijing in 2001. Alexander Casella, “Macedonia: Taiwan's Lost Gambit,” Asia Times, July 11, 2001. “Taiwan Criticises China UN Veto,” BBC News, February 26, 1999. Available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/285835.stm 42. “Government, Local NGOs Continue with Tsunami Aid,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Taiwan, January 21, 2005. Available at http://www.taiwantoday.tw/ct.asp?xItem-21105&C+Node=451; “Taiwan to Keep Low Profile in Asian Tsunami Relief – President.” 43. In response to the 2006 earthquake in Indonesia, the ROCAF flew ten C-130 sorties with relief aid, its largest response to date. For the Philippines mudslides, only one sortie of relief aid was flown. “Taiwan Military Aircraft Deliver Relief Goods to Indonesia,” BBC Monitoring Asia–Pacific – Political, June 8, 2006. “Disaster Relief Operations Said Straining Philippine Military Resources,” BBC Monitoring Asia–Pacific – Political, October 13, 2009. “Malampaya Gas Royalty to Finance P10-B Rehab Fund,” Manila Standard, October 13, 2009. 44. “Talk of the Day, News Digest of Local Media, Secret Aid Mission,” Central News Agency – Taiwan, January 21, 2010. 45. This team, however, focused its efforts on recovering the bodies of Chinese peacekeepers who died in the quake while supporting ongoing UNPKO. The team then left the country shortly thereafter. Beijing later dispatched a second team that focused on the provision of medical treatment as well as sending chartered flights with aid. Daniel Erikson, “The Politics of Disaster Relief: China, Taiwan and the Haitian Earthquake,” China Brief Vol. 10, No. 3 (2010), pp. 7–10. “Chinese Medical Team in Haiti Back Home,” Xinhua, February 11, 2010. 46. Because Haiti's damaged airport infrastructure was already overwhelmed with international relief flights, the ROCAF C-130 landed instead at the San Isidro Air Base in the neighboring Dominican Republic. After the relief aid was placed onto trucks, the ROCAF C-130 and its crew made the return flight to Songshan Air Base near Taipei, Taiwan. “WHO Envoy Thanks Taiwan for Medical Aid to Haiti,” BBC Monitoring Asia–Pacific – Political, January 26, 2010. “Military Transport Plane Carries Supplies to Haiti,” United Daily News, January 26, 2010. “Taiwan Army Plane Returns After Delivering Relief Supplies to Haiti,” BBC Monitoring Asia–Pacific – Political, January 31, 2010. 47. Conditions included in this agreement that were publically released stated that the flight could not transport any “diplomatic personnel, overseas expatriates, or other goods” back to Taiwan. “Military Transport Plane Carries Supplies to Haiti.” 48. The “New Historic Missions,” first promulgated by President Hu Jintao in 2004 and later codified into law in 2007, is shorthand for the “Historic Missions of the Armed Forces in the New Period of the New Century.” Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China 2011 (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2011), pp. 16–17. 49. China's National Defense in 2010. 50. China's National Defense in 2010. For an in-depth look at the evolution of PLA thought on MOOTW, see Andrew Scobell, “Discourse in 3-D: The PLA's Evolving Doctrine, Circa 2009,” in Roy Kamphausen, David Lai, and Andrew Scobell, eds., The PLA at Home and Abroad: Assessing the Operational Capabilities of China's Military (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2010), pp. 99–133. 51. Heidi Holz and Kenneth Allen, “Military Exchanges with Chinese Characteristics: The People's Liberation Army Experience with Military Relations,” in Roy Kamphausen, David Lai, and Andrew Scobell, eds., The PLA at Home and Abroad: Assessing the Operational Capabilities of China's Military (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2010), p. 459. 52. China's National Defense in 2010. Quotes can be found at http://english.gov.cn/official/2011–03/31/content_1835499_6.htm 53. In this instance, 14 aid flights were sent to Afghanistan aboard chartered China United Airlines Boeing 737 aircraft, a civilian airline owned by the PLA. Although the PLA no doubt had an active role in organizing and funding these flights, there is no sign of any PLA military personnel involvement in Afghanistan proper. Until recently, chartered civilian flights constituted China's only method of aid delivery and had been involved on numerous occasions. Notably, a China Southern Airlines Boeing 747 delivered 100 tons of humanitarian aid to Little Rock Air Force Base in the wake of Hurricane Katrina. Air China Cargo has played a significant role in distributing humanitarian aid in numerous instances in response to earthquakes in Pakistan (2006 and 2010) and Mexico (2009), Typhoon Marakot in Taiwan (2009), and an earthquake in Chile (2010). Zhao Huanxin, “Quake Experts May Aid Afghanistan,” China Daily, March 29, 2002. “China's Party Daily Highlights Beijing's Recent Aid to Afghanistan,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, May 29, 2002. Arlo Taylor, “Little Rock Welcomes China Hurricane Aid,” Air Force Print News, September 9, 2005. “Three B747-400 Cargo Charter Flights Took Off from Two Places,” Air China Cargo Co. Ltd., n.d. Available at http://www.airchinacargo.com/en/index.php?section=0-0149-0151-0164-0236&id=1287583235 54. The PLA continued to hold on to this and a few other assets long after being ordered to divest its business holdings in 1998. Kim Nødskov, The Long March to Power: The New Historic Mission of the People's Liberation Army (Copenhagen: Royal Danish Defence College Publishing House, 2009), p. 58. Huanxin, “Quake Experts May Aid Afghanistan.” “China's Party Daily Highlights Beijing's Recent Aid to Afghanistan.” 55. China's National Defense in 2010. 56. The first voyage, named “Harmonious Mission 2010,” visited Tanzania, Kenya, Djibouti, Seychelles, and Bangladesh. The second, “Harmonious Mission 2011,” visited Cuba, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, and Costa Rica. “Chinese Navy Hospital Ship Concludes 88-Day Overseas Humanitarian Mission,” Xinhua, November 26, 2010. “‘Peace Ark’ Hospital Ship to Write New Chapter of Harmony,” China Military Online, September 20, 2011. 57. The CISAR team wore its military fatigues in Port-au-Prince, and the 2010 White Paper released two months later in March acknowledged their military status. “Overview of Major Events of New China's Military Diplomacy,” Ministry of National Defense, February 28, 2011. Available at http://eng.mod.gov.cn/DefenseNews/2011-02/28/content_4227436.htm 58. This number encompasses all known international disaster relief operations carried out by the CISAR team. 59. “Major International Rescue Operations Carried Out by CISAR,” Xinhua, March 14, 2011. 60. So far, CISAR teams have taken chartered flights in every known instance when deployed abroad for disaster relief operations. 61. “Second Chinese Contingent Arrives in Pakistan's Thatta for Disaster Relief,” Xinhua, September 14, 2010. 62. “Chinese, Laotian Medical Teams Arrive to Give Health Care Services,” The New Light of Myanmar, May 20, 2008. Xiang Shiping, “Experience of the China Medical Team with Emergency Medical Relief in Burma after Cyclone Nargis,” paper presented at the 39th Congress on Military Medicine, November 2011. 63. “Chinese PLA Medical Rescue Team Arrives in Pakistan,” PLA Daily, October 21, 2011. 64. “Chinese, Laotian Medical Teams Arrive to Give Health Care Services.” 65. “China Sends Disaster Relief Material to Snow-Hit Mongolia,” Xinhua, February 1, 2010. 66. “China Sends Disaster Relief Material to Snow-Hit Mongolia.” 67. While the total amount sent via Il-76 was not stated, the previous Mongolia operation averaged 30 tons per flight. “China Sends Emergency Aid to Pakistan,” Xinhua, August 4, 2010. “International Disaster Relief Operations Obligation of China's Armed Forces,” Xinhua, March 31, 2011. “China Pledges Its Biggest-Ever Aid to Pakistan,” Xinhua, September 23, 2010. 68. “Second Chinese Contingent Arrives in Pakistan's Thatta for Disaster Relief.” 69. “PLA Air Force Airlifts Disaster Relief Materials to Pakistan,” PLA Daily, September 23, 2011. “China Sends Humanitarian Aid to Flood-Hit Pakistan,” Xinhua, September 22, 2011. “Programme Summary of CCTV-7 Channel Military News 1130 gmt 21 Oct 11,” BBC Monitoring Asia–Pacific – Political, October 24, 2011. 70. “Programme Summary of CCTV-7 Channel Military News 1130 gmt 21 Oct 11.” 71. The Effectiveness of Foreign Military Assets in Natural Disaster Response, p. 34. 72. Although the total weight of the 500 prefabricated homes is unknown, this is an estimate that each house is 700 square feet and each square foot of material weighs 35 pounds. 73. There is only a small window of time in which search and rescue teams are effective at retrieving victims alive. 74. “Second Chinese Contingent Arrives in Pakistan's Thatta for Disaster Relief.” 75. The Effectiveness of Foreign Military Assets in Natural Disaster Response, p. 34. 76. Once mastered, instances in which a foreign military participates in aid distribution may still be limited as a result of such sensitivities. 77. Before this point, all PLA involvement in disaster relief aid distribution was accomplished using chartered aircraft and does not meet this article's stricter definition of requiring actual military personnel to be sent abroad to either provide, deliver, or distribute aid. In comparison, it took Japan seven years, from 1998 to 2005, to make such a leap. South Korea and Taiwan are now both at the seven-year mark of aid delivery, though both have yet to engage in aid distribution. 78. “Chinese PLA Helicopter Rescue Team Returns Home from Pakistan,” PLA Daily, October 13, 2010. 79. “PLA Medical Rescue Team to Pakistan Returns Home,” PLA Daily, October 18, 2010. “Chinese PLA Helicopter Rescue Team Returns Home from Pakistan.” 80. “Pakistani, US Officials Mark End of US Military Flood Mission,” US Central Command, December 2, 2010. 81. “China to Send Military Helicopters to Pakistan for Flood Relief,” Xinhua, September 19, 2010. 82. Defense White Paper 2011, pp. 365–366. 83. International Institute of Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2012 (London: Routledge, 2011), p. 196. James Hardy, “Japan Lays Keel for 22DDH Helicopter Carrier,” Jane's Navy International, February 9, 2012. 84. The Dokdo is alternately referred to as an “LPX” (landing platform experimental) or an “LPD” (landing platform dock), though neither term, especially the latter, seems to correctly describe the ship. A more accurate classifier would be “LHD” (landing helicopter dock) as the Dokdo has both a well deck for landing craft and a large flat top for helicopters. International Institute of Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2012, p. 253. “LP-X Dokdo (Landing Platform Experimental) Amphibious Ship,” GlobalSecurity.org, July 11, 2011. Available at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/rok/lp-x.htm 85. Islamabad has seemed increasingly eager to rely on Beijing for security provision. In the aftermath of challenges to sovereignty from drone strikes and the raid that killed Osama bin Laden, as well as accusations of linkages between Pakistani intelligence and insurgent groups fighting US and coalition forces in Afghanistan, the Pakistani defense minister even offered its port in Gwadar as a location for a PLA naval base. Beijing declined. Griff Witte, “Pakistan Courts China as US Ties Sour,” Washington Post, June 23, 2011. 86. According to one report, three Yuzhao-class LPDs have been launched, but only one is known to have reached initial operational capacity. Ted Parsons, “China Launches Third Type 071 LPD,” Jane's Navy International, September 28, 2011. The People's Liberation Army Navy: A Modern Navy with Chinese Characteristics (Suitland, MD: Office of Naval Intelligence, August 2009), p. 45. 87. “China's First Aircraft Carrier Starts Sea Trials,” BBC News Asia–Pacific, August 10, 2011. Available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-14470882 88. Minnie Chan, “Military Rivals Seize Chance to Co-Operate,” South China Morning Post, May 20, 2011. “‘Peace Ark’ Hospital Ship to Visit Latin America,” PLA Daily, September 16, 2011. 89. In 2012, China's heavy and medium cargo aircraft were capable of approximately 2.76.MTM/D, whereas (in decreasing order) Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea's fleets are at 1.29, 0.68, and 0.41 MTM/D, respectively. An explanation of how to derive MTM/D is found in Airlift Mobility Planning Factors (Scott AFB, IL: AMC Regional Plans Branch, Air Force Pamphlet 10-1403, 2003), p. 4; International Institute of Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2012. 90. Charles R. Smith, Angels from the Sea: Relief Operations in Bangladesh, 1991 (Washington, DC: History and Museums Division Headquarters, US Marine Corps, 1995), p. 6. 91. See Todd S. Sechser, “Goliath's Curse: Coercive Threats and Asymmetric Power,” International Organization Vol. 64, No. 4 (2010), pp. 643–645.