Portal de Periódicos da CAPES

Scientific Language and the Language of Religion

1961; Wiley; Volume: 1; Issue: 1 Linguagem: Inglês

10.2307/1385175

1468-5906

Paul L. Holmer, Harmon R. Holcomb,

Historical and Linguistic Studies

precise, and have truth as a property of sentences themselves. Easily taught, and easily grasped secondhand, this knowledge is neutral with respect to way in which (or how) it is held. It has no necessary implications for visions and faiths by which a man lives and discovers himself as a man. 2. General thesis concerning meaning and plurality of languages. There are many human needs in addition to cognitive, and there are many kinds of languages which express our ways of satisfying those needs. While there are scales of meaningfulness within a given language, there is no generic theory of meaning which can bridge all languages or order them in a scale of superiority. To learn a and to understand meanings appropriate to it, one m-iust learn its uses, its intents, and its satisfactions. 3. General thesis concerning relations between different kinds of languages. Since each kind of discourse has its own context, occasion, province, and function relative to a specific need, each kind has its own logic, incommensurable with others. Incommensurability and logical incompatibility are not same thing. So, despite cognitive drive to find implications and consequences everywhere, there are no inferential connections between languages of different orders. 4. Thesis concerning about religion. This is a species of cognitive and, as such, exemplifies characteristics mentioned in thesis No. 1, and is subject to limitations imposed by theses Nos. 2 and 3. 5. Thesis concerning of reThis content downloaded from 207.46.13.114 on Thu, 26 May 2016 06:30:26 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms SCIENTIFIC LANGUAGE AND THE LANGUAGE OF RELIGION 57 ligion. The of faith may have same objective, verifiable core as about religion, but assertions of faith are made in an evaluative, passionate mode and are understood only by faithful. Religious announces a radical commitment which gives a new order to one's passions, changes customary values, and overcomes distractions of world. It assumes as universal fact that men are in sin and despair and need forgiveness and rectitude of life. Every utterance, and understanding of it, is preceded by a radical passion which overcomes one's self and world. Religious is a mirror by which we discover ourselves and our controlling passion. It is also used to incite others to believe, and not simply to inform them. Hence of faith is never relative, hypothetical, tentative, and neither learning nor talent are pre-requisites to its use. It belongs to all faithful, whether simple or learned, for it speaks to us in our common humanity. Its roots are within ourselves, and phenomena which it expresses are those of a qualified human life, but it is not simply about our psyches and their condition. It is about everything which is. Through it we see world in a new light and bring a new order to whatever is case. 6. Thesis concerning internal tests of a language. The only criteria of truth are internal: non-believers do not know how to use or to understand it. But every speaker knows that there are ways of knowing what is meant and whether it is meant, all of which provide a way of scaling utterances as worthy or unworthy. Like of a lover, needs no explanation and no certification outside of immediate passion and its ability to overcome our guilt, despair, and distraction. 7. Thesis concerning limitations of language. Just as we are prone to forget that cognitive satisfactions are not sole determiners of our lives, so we are tempted to construe as true in sense appropriate to objective knowledge. But what is objectively uncertain cannot be made certain by faith. To treat of Bible as consisting of literal, propositional truths is bad religion and bad science, and to treat Scripture as inerrant, etc., is to make a category mistake. Drawing ethical and conclusions from scientific theories is matched in its silliness by attempts to use gaps in scientific explanations to further purposes. To each its own. The theory which is partly expressed by preceding seven theses should be seen in its family setting in Protestant theology, for when Holmer speaks of religious he evidently has in mind Protestant Christian language. Since destruction of natural theology in eighteenth century, Protestant theology has increasingly emphasized four things pertinent to our discussion: 1) an appeal to inner consciousness of man as place where God is found and truth is certified; 2) a description of consciousness as unique, sui generis, a priori, irreducible; 3) a separation of knowledge, with its self-authentication, from tests and implications of knowledge in other areas; 4) an account of revelation as nonpropositional, a matter of personal encounter rather than of assent to revealed truths. These four themes have been handled in many different ways in very different theologies, but through them runs common thread of isolation of knowledge from all other forms of knowledge. The resulting dichotomies have been deployed in a number of contexts reflected in such historic battle cries as the immediate feeling of absolute dependence, of fact vs. judgments of value, spirit vs. nature, the Christ of faith vs. Jesus of history, I-thou vs. I-it, Heilsgeschichte vs. Historie, in vs. belief that, mystery This content downloaded from 207.46.13.114 on Thu, 26 May 2016 06:30:26 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms 58 SCIENTIFIC LANGUAGE AND THE LANGUAGE OF RELIGION vs. prolbem, and so on. Critics to contrary notwithstanding, obscurantism has played no part in formation of these dichotomies: much in Christian tradition, and practically all phenomenology, supports them. Holmer's language of - vs. language about- is a version of this honorable tradition, and his version is a good one. In his talented hands, theory emerges sharply, with more awareness of what it will and will not allow, and shorn of pretentiousness which usually bedevils it. This placing of Holmer within a major Protestant tradition is, of course, not intended to detract from his personal contribution which is evident at point. Not least of his services is his recognition that once dichotomy is drawn, functions of do have their limits. Most versions set dichotomy and then go on to claim, quite illogically, that knowledge is a profound and ultimate form of knowledge of which other forms are distorted