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Affective and Non-Affective Desire

1984; Wiley; Volume: 45; Issue: 2 Linguagem: Inglês

10.2307/2107429

1933-1592

Melinda Vadas,

Philosophical Ethics and Theory

Is it possible to act without desire? It certainly seems possible to act without desiring to perform the action one does perform; e.g., if I find that I must expel a favorite student for cheating, I may do so, but only reluctantly, for the duty is an onerous one. However, in such a case we may say that, though I did not desire to expel the student, I did desire to act rightly, and so did not act without desire after all. In order to illustrate the possibility of action without desire, that is, action that does not stem from any desire the agent has, let us imagine the following scene, and let us consider the events described with, so far as is possible, an unprejudiced and theory-free eye. I am standing on a boat dock, next to a deep lake, and I am engaged in a heated philosophical discussion with a colleague, Professor A. As our voices become louder and louder (we are arguing the question of free will and moral responsibility), and as I become more and more agitated at Professor A's stupidity, a flash in the water catches my eye. Turning my head only slightly, I see a cat floundering in the water beneath me. Let us now suppose, as is in fact the case, that I care nothing for cats. Though I recognize that they too are sentient beings, it would not be accurate to say that I like cats. Let us also suppose that at the very moment I see the cat, I am consumed by a strong desire to strangle Professor A, whose position on moral responsibility would befit that of the losing side at Nuremberg. Nevertheless, despite my intense fixation on the despicable Professor A, I bend down slightly in order to toss a rope, coiled at my feet and tied to the dock, to the struggling cat, so that it may climb ashore. I do this without missing a beat in the argument and without flagging one whit in my desire to strangle Professor A. Just as I am launching into colorful invective concerning my colleague's powers of intellect, the cat's apparent owner (the scruffy animal has now clambered to safety) approaches me with thanks for saving her pet. The animal's owner, only somewhat more coherent than Professor A, gushes on aimlessly concerning the wonderfulness of