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Is the Privation Theory of Evil Dead

2016; University of Illinois Press; Volume: 44; Issue: 4 Linguagem: Inglês

2152-1123

Todd Calder,

Augustinian Studies and Theology

A fter centuries of neglect, there has been a revival of interest in the nature of evil by philosophers.' These philosophers seek to capture the concept of evil as it is used in contemporary moral and political contexts. The theories offered are secular and incom patible with the historically dominant priva tion theory developed by Saint Augustine. According to the privation theory, evil has no positive existence: evil consists in a lack of substance, being or goodness. This paper considers whether the privation theory ought to be revived along with philosophical inter est in the nature of evil, or whether it should be put to rest. There are two apparent reasons for contem porary philosophers to revive the privation theory of evil. First, some believe that only the privation theory of evil is compatible with theism, and thus, if one wants to be a theist, as many still do, they will need to adopt the privation theory of evil.2 The privation theory is thought to be singularly compatible with theism because it is believed to be necessary to help solve the problem of evil: the seem ingly incompatible coexistence of evil and an all-powerful, all-knowing, all-good creator. The privation theory is thought to help solve the problem of evil because if evil is a priva tion of substance, being or goodness, then God creates no evil, he merely allows it to exist as a lack of created being. A second reason to adopt the privation theory is for its ability to characterize evil. The term 'evil' is ambiguous. There is a broad sense of the term 'evil' which refers to anything wrong or bad. In this sense, white lies and minor pains are evil. There is also a narrower sense of the term that refers to only the most despicable sorts of acts, characters and events. Contemporary philosophers interested in the nature of evil are primarily concerned with evil in this narrower sense. The privation theory attempts to capture both the broad and narrow senses of evil, and thus, if correct, would be relevant to contemporary philosophers seeking to understand the nature of evil. Privation theorists believe they can offer convincing analyses of evils that, at first glance, appear to be positive rather than privative, such as pain, murder and malice.3 If privation theorists can offer plausible analyses of all forms of evil, and the privation theory is better able to deal with the problem of evil than non-privation theories, there will be considerable pressure on contemporary moral theorists to adopt, or develop, privation theories of evil.