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A Historical Reevaluation of America's Role in the Kuril Islands Dispute

1998; University of British Columbia; Volume: 71; Issue: 4 Linguagem: Inglês

10.2307/2761081

1715-3379

Bruce A. Elleman, Michael R. Nichols, Matthew J. Ouimet,

Japanese History and Culture

A S RECENTLY as December 1995, Japanese Minister of State Masaki Nakayama announced that, from a legal standpoint, Russia and Japan are still in a state of war.' A formal peace treaty ending World War II has continued to elude Moscow and Tokyo, even though both sides have expressed confidence that a treaty terminating Russo-Japanese hostilities will be signed before the turn of the century. One of the primary factors impeding progress on the peace talks has been the territorial dispute over which islands actually constitute the Kuril Island chain. As background to the Kuril Islands dispute, this article will first examine the early history of the Kurils, when Japan initially gained legal possession over them, and then the World War II negotiations. These negotiations led to the Soviet annexation of the entire Kuril Island chain as well as the Habomai Islands and Shikotan Island, formerly considered an indivisible part of the island of Hokkaido. The article will then consider the SovietAmerican exchanges between Stalin and Truman over the exact wording of the United States' General Order No. 1. Finally, it will discuss the pitfalls such as the so-called Threat Incident surrounding the Kuril negotiations between Moscow and Tokyo during the 1950s, negotiations that have yet to be completed. Based on declassified U.S. government documents from the W. Averell Harriman collection at the Library of Congress and the John Foster Dulles collection at Princeton University, this article will conclude that the United States never condoned the permanent cession of all of the Kuril Islands to the Soviet Union. Rather, Washington's policy from the Yalta Conference onward merely agreed that Moscow could negotiate directly with Tokyo to arrive at a mutually acceptable solution. In an attempt to assist Japan in these negotiations, John Foster Dulles even suggested in 1956 that Japan linkAmerica's planned return of Okinawa to the Soviet return of the disputed Kuril Islands. According to the American viewpoint, in the absence of a Russo-