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Droysen's Defense of Historiography: A Note

1977; Wiley; Volume: 16; Issue: 2 Linguagem: Inglês

10.2307/2504594

1468-2303

Thomas Bürger,

Philosophy, History, and Historiography

With Buckle's flat statement that all higher purposes of human thought history is still miserably deficient, and presents that confused and anarchical appearance natural to a subject of which laws are unknown, and even unsettled,1 age of methodological innocence had come to an end for historians. The indictment was derived from a relatively well-developed and systematic theory of science within whose framework historical accounts appeared as devoid of any serious significance. Its logical conclusion was demand to replace history by sociology. Traditional historians had little by way of a worked-out theory of history to put forward against positivists' charge. The closing of this gap and provision of a secure methodological foundation thus became central preoccupation of theorists of history in last part of nineteenth century. In Germany first effort was made by Johann Gustav Droysen, and in many ways it was exemplary.2 When Buckle judged history by reference to the higher purposes of human thought, he did so within framework of a positivistic theory of knowledge. This theory conceived of knowledge as valid cognitive information about external world, and of scientific knowledge as nomological knowledge. The position that only knowledge of laws is worth having was backed up, on one hand, by metaphysical tenet that essence of things lies in their laws, i.e., in immutable regularities of which they are instances, and on other hand, by a practical consideration: nomological knowledge was deemed most useful because it facilitates effective prediction and manipulation of things. Along with this, and in support of it, went a particular view of man and his history. Humans were seen entirely as part of natural order and as subject to its laws. They have a determined constitution, consisting of drives and capacities which they partly share with (other) animals, and which partly are specific to them alone. However, relative preponderance of specifically human capacities over others, which makes humans what they are, is largely a matter of degree, depending on relative conduciveness of circumstances. Men, striving to improve their lot (that is, to become more human), have realized that they must change circumstances-which affect their nature (especially their particularly human qualities), and that foremost means to that end is nomological knowledge. It is through (nomological) science, then, that humans can better their condition and therewith themselves. This betterment is quasi-automatic, since progress of human thought is inevita-