Portal de Periódicos da CAPES

Shu Guang Zhang. Beijing’s Economic Statecraft during the Cold War, 1949–1991 .

2016; Oxford University Press; Volume: 121; Issue: 1 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1093/ahr/121.1.222

1937-5239

Austin Jersild,

Chinese history and philosophy

In contrast to studies that focus on U.S.-Chinese normalization after 1978, Shu Guang Zhang describes the global international and economic history of the People’s Republic of China since 1949. China’s version of “economic statecraft,” or “a government’s ability, intent, policy and preparedness to use economic instruments in pursuit of foreign policy goals,” was profoundly shaped by the Sino-Soviet relationship and China’s experience in the socialist world (2). The trade embargo led by the U.S. left China vulnerable and dependent on Moscow and the socialist bloc. China quickly learned a series of difficult lessons, and became determined to pursue economically beneficial relationships while limiting the political intrusions of a stronger power. Zhang describes the determination of China to benefit from exchange with the most advanced countries of the socialist world, such as the German Democratic Republic, with Western European countries willing to subvert the embargo, and with Japan. The failed Sino-Soviet relationship continued to shape China’s international relationships in the 1960s, as the Chinese reached out to newly independent and decolonizing states throughout the Third World. Frustrated with their former dependence on Moscow, China cultivated relations with numerous areas of the globe, and in “multiple dimensions” (57). Especially in the case of the Third World, the Chinese were determined to foster economic relations that would enhance the independence of the recipient countries. The memory of the Sino-Soviet relationship was everywhere: Chinese advisors were to earn salaries commensurate with those of local professionals and be respectful of local norms and traditions, and Chinese aid was to facilitate long-term indigenous development, lead to “self-reliance,” address the needs of the recipient economy, and come with “no privileges attached,” as Chinese officials emphasized to the Guineans and their president, Ahmed Sékou Touré (118). These notions and ideas were both a product of China’s experience in the socialist bloc and of its sympathy for the decolonizing countries that met at the Bandung Conference in 1955 and eventually formed the Nonaligned Movement. Zhang similarly explores China’s relationship to socialist allies such as North Korea, North Vietnam, and Outer Mongolia, and the more unusual case of Albania. In spite of China’s determination to distinguish itself from the history of the Soviet Union’s “great power chauvinism,” the Chinese managed to antagonize almost all of their trading partners.