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Roman Forensic Procedure in the Cort Scene in the Poema de Mio Cid

1983; Liverpool University Press; Volume: 60; Issue: 2 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1080/1475382832000360095

1469-3550

Milija N. Pavlović, Roger M. Walker,

Organic Chemistry Synthesis Methods

Click to increase image sizeClick to decrease image sizeBSS Subject Index: CLASSICAL LANGUAGES, HISTORY, LITERATURE, CULTURE & INFLUENCELAW [IN HISTORY, LITERATURE, CULTURE & SOCIETY]POEMA DE MIO CID/CANTAR DE MIO CID Notes 1. Eduardo de Hinojosa, ‘El derecho en el Poema del Cid’, in Homenaje a Menéndez y Pelayo, I (Madrid: V. Suárez, 1899), 541–81; reprinted in Obras completas, I (Madrid: C.S.I.C., 1948), 181–215. Ramón Menéndez Pidal, Cantar de Mio Cid, 3rd edn (Madrid: Espasa-Calpe, 1956), III, 1165; En torno al Poema del Cid, 2nd edn (Barcelona: Edhasa, 1964), 53. 2. See, for example, William J. Entwistle, ‘My Cid—Legist’, BSS, VI (1929), 9–15; P. E. Russell, ‘Some Problems of Diplomatic in the Cantar de Mio Cid and Their Implications’, MLR, XLVII (1952), 340–49; Juan García González, ‘El matrimonio de las hijas del Cid’, Anuario de Historia del Derecho Español (hereafter AHDE), XXXI (1961), 531–68; Anthony Zahareas, ‘The Cid's Legal Action at the Court of Toledo’, RR, LV (1964), 161–72. 3. For the most vigorous exposition of this theory, see Colin Smith, Estudios cidianos (Madrid: Cupsa Editorial, 1977), 15–34 and 65–85. Support is offered in Steven D. Kirby, ‘Legal Doctrine and Procedure as Approaches to Medieval Hispanic Literature’, La Coránica, VIII (1979–80), 164–71. Much additional evidence, although presented with greater caution, is in David Hook, ‘On Certain Correspondences between the Poema de Mio Cid and Contemporary Legal Instruments’, Iberoromania, XI (1980), 31–53, and ‘The Legal Basis of the Cid's Agreement with Abbot Sancho’, Romania, CI (1980), 517–26; and María Eugenia Lacarra, El ‘Poema de Mio Cid’: realidad histórica e ideología (Madrid: José Porrúa Turanzas, 1970), 1–102. 4. The major critic who has disagreed at length with Hinojosa's views is Alfonso García Gallo, ‘El carácter germánico de la épica y del Derecho en la edad media española’, AHDE, XXV (1955), 583–679. 5. See, for example, E. N. van Kleffens, Hispanic Law until the End of the Middle Ages (Edinburgh: Edinburgh U.P., 1968), 52–57. 6. See van Kleffens, 35–37. 7. The Roman law in question here, of course, is pre-Justinianic, although there may have been some Byzantine influence on later Gothic codes owing to the increased contacts with the eastern Empire: Cartagena, for example, was occupied by Byzantine troops between 554 and 629. 8. See van Kleffens, 67–71. P. D. King, ‘King Chindasvind and the First Territorial Law-Code of the Visigothic Kingdom’, in Visigothic Spain, ed. E. James (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980), 131–58, argues that the Liber ludiciorum as we now have it was produced by King Recceswinth in 654, although he admits to the existence of an earlier code produced by Chindaswinth in 643–44, which is now lost. This does not, of course, affect our argument. 9. Under this system a locally-appointed judge would try a case by albedrío, that is to say, in a ‘common-sense’ manner, basing his judgement entirely on the merits of the case. His findings would then remain a fazaña, a binding precedent, as in English common law. 10. For example, Title X of the Council of Coyanza (1055) states: ‘Decrevimus ut ille, qui laboravit vineas, aut terras in contentione possitas, colligat fruges: et postea habeant iudicium super radicem; et si victus fuerit laborator, reddat fruges domino haereditatis’. In other words, the Council applies the Roman principle that the produce of the land belongs to the owner of the land, rather than the Germanic principle that the produce is owned by the one who sowed the land; see José Maldonado y Fernández del Torco, ‘Las relaciones entre el Derecho canónico y el Derecho secular en los concilios españoles del siglo XI’, AHDE, XIV (1942–43), 227–381. Alfonso García Gallo, ‘El Concilio de Coyanza’, AHDE, XX (1950), 275–633, argues that Title X of the original Council decree stoped at ‘radicem’ and that the last sentence is an addition of the late eleventh or early twelfth century, emanating from the chancery of Bishop Pelayo of Oviedo, inserted into the decree so as to conform to the legal practice of the time. If García Gallo is right, the above example may no longer be considered as evidence of the influence of Roman law through ecclesiastical councils, although it does show clearly that at least some civil practices were being romanized around 1100. 11. An excellent brief description of the Emperor Justinian's legislative work, which gave Roman law its final—and still influential—form, is contained in the introduction to Thomas Collett Sandars, The Institutes of Justinian, 7th edn (London, New York and Toronto: Longman's, 1948), xxxi–xxxiv. 12. See J. A. C. Thomas, Textbook of Roman Law (Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Co., 1976), 8, and van Kleffens, 175. 13. For example, St Raymond de Peñafort taught law at Bologna between 1218 and 1221 ; Pere de Cardona, who became a cardinal in 1181, taught civil law in Southern France, probably at Montpellier; Vincentius Hispanus, the future bishop of Saragossa, (and/or Idanha) taught both canon and Roman law at Bologna in the late twelfth or early thirteenth century. For further details and other examples, see van Kleffens, 176–78, and Gaines Post, Studies in Medieval Legal Thought: Public Law and the State, 1100–1322 (Princeton: Princeton U .P., 1964), 67–69 and 484–85. 14. See Post, 68–69, n. 33. 15. Alfonso X el Sabio in his Estoria de España (basing himself on el Toledano, VII.34) describes how Alfonso VIII imported ‘maestros de todas las sçiençias’, presumably including lawyers, to staff the University of Palencia which he had founded; see Primera crónica general de España, ed. Ramón Menéndez Pidal, 2nd edn (Madrid: Gredos, 1955), II, 686. See also E. S. Procter, Curia and Cortes in León and Castile, 1072–1295 (Cambridge: C.U.P., 1980), 67–69, 91–93. 16. It is interesting to note that under the Visigoths, even after the abrogation of all Roman law, the latter was still recommended for the purposes of study; see van Kleffens, 66–67 and 76–77. 17. See El elemento germánico en el derecho español (Madrid: Imprenta Clásica Española, 1915), passim. 18. See, for example, Alfonso Otero Varela, ‘Las arras en el Derecho español medieval’, AHDE, XXV (1955), 189–210; Rafael Gibert, ‘Los Fueros de Sepúlveda: estudio histórico-jurídico’, in Los Fueros de Sepúlveda, ed. Pascual Marín Pérez (Segovia: Diputación Provincial, 1953), 335–569; Manuel González Herrero, Fuero latino de Sepúlveda (Segovia: Diputación Provincial, 1958). 19. See Russell, ‘Some Problems’; Bernardo Gicovate, ‘La fecha de composición del Poema de Mio Cid’, Hisp (USA), XXXIX (1956), 419–22; A. Ubieto Arteta, ‘Observaciones al Cantar to Mio Cid’, Arbor, XXXVII (1957), 145–70; José Fradejas Lebrero, Estudios épicos: el Cid (Ceuta: Instituto Nacional de Enseñanza Media, 1962); Jules Horrent, ‘Tradition poétique du Cantar de Mio Cid au XIIe siècle’, CCMe, VII (1964), 451–77; D. G. Pattison, ‘The Date of the Cantar de Mio Cid: a Linguistic Approach’, MLR, LXII (1967), 443–50; Smith, Estudios cidianos, 15–34 and 37–62 (revisions of articles published in 1971 and 1973) ; A. Ubieto Arteta, El ‘Cantar de Mio Cid’ y algunos problemas históricos (Valencia: Anubar, 1973); Roger M. Walker, ‘A Possible Source for the Afrenta de Corpes Episode in the Poema de Mio Cid’, MLR, LXXII (1977), 335–47. For a cautious discussion of the various arguments in favour of the 1200–07 dating, see Derek W. Lomax, ‘The Date of the Poema de Mio Cid’, in ‘Mio Cid’ Studies, ed. A. D. Deyermond (London: Tamesis, 1977), 73–81. 20. See Smith, 82 and 156. Professor Smith informs us that his latest research convinces him that the poet could not have obtained his legal training in Spain. 21. ‘El derecho en el PMC’, 202. 22. We owe this information to Professor J. A. C. Thomas. 23. See van Kleffens, 135. 24. See Francis de Zulueta, The Institutes of Gaius (Oxford: Clarendon Press), II, 250–55. 25. An actio in personam was the assertion of a right against an individual, and was always clearly distinguished in Roman law from an actio in rem, which was exclusively concerned with ownership of property without any personal claim against the actual possessor. All actiones iniuriarum were, of course, in personam. 26. For more detailed discussion of the formulary system, see, for example, Thomas, 83–110; W. W. Buckland, A Text-Book of Roman Law from Augustus to Justinian, 3rd edn (Cambridge: C.U.P., 1966), 625–62; R. W. Leage, Roman Private Law Founded on the ‘Institutes’ of Gaius and Justinian, 2nd edn (London: Macmillan, 1946), 397–414. 27. The procedure was called extraordinaria because originally it signified that the praetor was acting outside the normal rigidity of the formulary system (i.e. extra ordinem). From the establishment of the Empire, any case which was judged by the Emperor was conducted extra ordinem. Justinian still refers to cognitio as extraordinaria in recognition of its being outside the old ordo iudiciorum, although by his time it had been the only procedural system for two centuries. See Sandars, 496–97, and Thomas, 119. 28. See Vittorio Scialoja, Procedura civile romana (Rome: Anonima Romana Editorale, 1936), 274; Buckland, 666; Ursicino Álvarez Suárez, Curso de Derecho romano (Madrid: Instituto de Estudios Políticos’ 1948), 50. 29. For a fuller discussion of the system of extraordinaria cognitio, see Thomas, 119–22; Buckland 662–73-Leage, 415–18. 30. See Hinojosa, 209 and 214; Menéndez Pidal, Cantar de Mio Cid, II, 744–45. 31. Hispanic Law, 203. For Justinian's definition of the various types of iniuria, see Sandars, 418–23. 32. All quotations from PMC are from the edition of Colin Smith (Oxford: O.U.P., 1972). The numbers in parentheses refer to the lines. 33. The King's responsibility in marrying the Cid's daughters is explicitly stated in ll 2089. 2099, 2110, 2132–34, 2199–2204, 2231–32, 2908, 2939, 2956, 3150. 34. See Sandars, 149–151. 35. See García González, 558, n. 67. 36. For a more detailed study of the probable influence of Roman law on the institutions of the arras and axuvar in the poem, see our ‘Money, Marriage, and the Law in the Poema de Mio Cid’ Medium Aevum LI (1982), 197–212. 37. See José Orlandis, ‘Sobre el concepto del delito en el Derecho de la alta edad media,’ AHDE, XVI (1945), 112–192, at p. 115. 38. See Buckland, 594. Professor Thomas points out to us that Roman law recognized, broadly, three standards of liability: dolus (evil intent), culpa (negligence), casus (accident). To bring an action iniuria, proof of dolus was vital. 39. See Orlandis, 133, and Lacarra, 32 and 87. 40. See Lacarra, 91, especially n. 196. For a discussion of the importance of beards in the poem, see P. A. Bly, ‘Beards in the Poema de Mio Cid: Structural and Contextual Patterns’, FMLS, XIV (1978), 16–23 and John R. Burt, ‘Honor and the Cid's Beard’, La Coránica, IX (1980–81), 132–37. 41. See Menéndez Pidal, Cantar de Mio Cid, II, 884–85, and Zahareas, 168. 42. This argument is perhaps further supported by the fact that many of the legal terms in the cort scene, such as razón (3079, 3229, 3483) and recudir (3213, 3269), are simply old words of very general significance which have been given (by the poet?) a new and highly specialized meaning. 43. Especially 162–63. See also Lacarra, p. ix. 44. Lacarra appears to be of the same opinion: ‘Se propugna el concepto romano del derecho como vehículo de justicia’ (p. 101). Despite this, she devotes surprisingly little consideration to Roman law in her work, but argues in more general terms, like Zahareas, about a clash between old and new juridical systems in the poem. She does, however, make the important suggestion that the sabidores who are present in the cort are, in fact, experts in Roman law. Since the sabidores act as advisers only to the King (3005) and the Cid (3070) who, as we have shown, are following Roman-law procedures, her suggestion would seem to be well-founded. The case is further strengthened by the fact that the Infantes make no use ofsabidores but rely, in the old Germanic tradition, on a member of their bando for advice. 45. P. José López Ortiz, ‘El proceso en los reinos cristianos de nuestra reconquista antes de la recepción romano-canónica’, AHDE, XIV (1942–43), 184–226, at p. 209. 46. We should like to express our warmest thanks to Professor J. A. C. Thomas of University College, London, for a very helpful discussion on Roman law, and to Professors Colin Smith of the University of Cambridge and Derek W. Lomax of the University of Birmingham for reading an earlier version of this article and making several valuable suggestions for its improvement.