Portal de Periódicos da CAPES

Is Akratic Action Unfree?

1986; Wiley; Volume: 46; Issue: 4 Linguagem: Inglês

10.2307/2107677

1933-1592

Alfred R. Mele,

Philosophy and Theoretical Science

On New Year's Eve Fred resolved not to eat an after-dinner snack for the entire month of January. It is now January I5 and he still has not succumbed to temptation. Tonight, however, Fred finally gives in. While watching the NBC Sunday night movie, he experiences a desire to eat the piece of chocolate pie which he has set aside for tomorrow's dessert. He is not at all surprised by the desire's nagging presence, for he has had similar desires almost every night for the last two weeks. He has been able successfully to resist them by rehearsing the reasons for not acting on them and by making it evident to himself that these reasons far outweigh any competing reasons that he has. The reasons are now quite familiar to Fred, and the calculation is easy. Fred weighs his competing reasons on the basis of their respective merits, judges that it would be best, all things considered, not to eat the piece of pie, and decides to save the tempting tidbit for tomorrow's dessert. However, a short time later, during an advertisement for Michelob Light, Fred walks to his refrigerator for a beer, spies the pie on the middle shelf, and, still thinking that it would be best not to eat it, removes it and a container of Dream Whip from the refrigerator. Fred carefully spreads the whipped cream over the pie, carries the dessert to his seat in front of the television, and, admitting to himself that, all things considered, he ought not to do what he is about to do, proceeds to eat the pie. What we have here is ostensibly an example of incontinent action. In eating the pie, Fred seems to exhibit weakness of will or what Plato and Aristotle called akrasia. That incontinent action is possible, I have argued elsewhere.' The purpose of the present paper is to ascertain whether such action can ever be free. Akrasia is exhibited in a variety of ways. An agent may act akratically against an intention of his to do an A here and now, or fail, due to akrasia, to intend in accordance with his better judgment. A person may akrati-