Johann Georg Hamann: Metacritic of Kant
1966; University of Pennsylvania Press; Volume: 27; Issue: 1 Linguagem: Inglês
10.2307/2708314
ISSN1086-3222
Autores Tópico(s)Classical Philosophy and Thought
ResumoHamann's criticisms of Immanuel Kant (as the critical philosopher after 1781) are contained in letters to Hamann's friends and in two short articles on the Critique of Pure Reason. The first article, a book review, was completed by the time of the appearance of the Critique of Pure Reason in July 1781. Hamann had received the first pages of Kant's book in proof from Hartknoch, both his publisher and Kant's, as early as April. The second article Hamann called the Metacritique of the Purism of the Reason (1784). Playing on the term metaphysics, which was the name given to the book in Aristotle which followed the Physics, Hamann intends to be the critic who follows the Critique. This criticism of Kant was born of the most serious respect on Hamann's part. At the time of the appearance of the Critique of Pure Reason Hamann was working on a translation of Hume's Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion to which he planned to append his own critique of Hume. When Kant's book appeared it was evident to Hamann that the opponent was no longer Hume, and the project was never resumed. Although the underground influence of Hamann's criticism may be considerable, an evaluation of Hamann's critique of Kant has not yet been satisfactorily carried through-largely because such an undertaking would depend upon a grasp of Hamann's thought as a whole which only recent Hamann-research promises to provide. Kant's problem was one of escaping certain conclusions of Hume, while observing the principle inaugurated by the empirical tradition, that genuine additions to human knowledge (i.e. those embodied in synthetic judgments) 1 depend upon intuitions (Anschauungen) of sensibility (Sinnlichkeit).2 Yet reason is not to be dissolved into momentary sense impressions (Empfindungen) and thus saved from complete fragmentation only by nature or habit. The ideal before Kant is the Cartesian ideal of certainty.3 The way to accomplish this ideal is to show how synthetic, but a priori (i.e. necessary and universal) knowledge is possible.4 Philosophical reason must show that it stands on a sure foundation. This can be done by restricting its claims. A body of synthetic a priori
Referência(s)