Portal de Periódicos da CAPES

POSTMORTEM POLITICS

2006; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 5; Issue: 2 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1080/14725880600741490

1472-5894

Udi Lebel,

French Historical and Cultural Studies

Abstract This article discusses the connection between the political behaviour model of bereavement in Israel and the ability of the military to preserve its hegemonic standing under a veil of secrecy unchallenged by civil criticism. After the War of Independence (1948), with its heavy military death toll, a model of hegemonic bereavement made its appearance. A nationalist/collectivist ideology geared to nation‐building fostered widespread support of government institutions and mobilized grief on its behalf. In this framework, the activities of bereaved parents were channelled by the state to public sites and commemoration practices, and bereavement was, in effect, nationalized. After the Yom Kippur War (1973), and following the Lebanese incursion of 1982, a political bereavement model became dominant. Parents assigned guilt for the death of their sons to the formulators of security policy – principally the Defense Minister and the Prime Minister – and engaged in media and political activities against the state. In the 1990s, following a revolution in the media and the law, the awareness of liberal values and the beginnings of a peace agreement with the Palestinians, bereaved parents whose sons had been killed in training accidents and military failures adopted a model of confrontation bereavement vis‐á‐vis the army. They engaged in public activity aimed at exposing the army to civilian criticism. The article looks at the three models and the responses of the military to each one. It appears that a close connection exists between the dominant bereavement model, the quality of army and societal relations in Israel, and the degree of transparency of the military. Notes 1. On “hegemonic status” of armies and security arenas, a concept employed by Antonio Gramsci, see U. Lebel, “Legal‐Media Complex”, 151–179. 2. Max Weber notes that “the concept of the ‘official secret’ is the specific invention of bureaucracy, and nothing is so fantastically defended by the bureaucracy as this attitude” (quoted in Nielsen 659). On the development of Weber’s notion of secrecy regarding the natural tendency of bureaucracies to deflect criticism and shun organizational learning, see A. Downs, Citation1967. 3. The expansion of military authority during wars and existential threats, along with the social legitimacy accorded it, is a known phenomenon. Among the diverse examples: the Roman senate during military operations (Yavetz); emergency regulations implemented by the British Empire (Hoffnung); American detention regulations for Japanese citizens during the Second World War (Reder).This phenomenon was also observed in Turkey (Liel), Algeria (Alexander et al.), Greece (Amitai) and in several Latin American states (Madin). 4. Abba Eban is quoted at length in connection with the sacrosanctity of secrecy in the pre‐State period (Ben‐Meir 117–118). 5. There was an historical/psychological background to this lack of publicity concerning military ineptness and carelessness. Official state bereavement during this period was understood as the complete opposite of that experienced during the Holocaust. 6. Some of these commemorations were of events that had occurred five decades earlier, e.g., the battle at Holikat (“Monument for the Remembrance of Holikat,” Sha‘ar Hanegev 227, 7 December 2005, p. 7) or the battle at Tel Mutila (see the film Tail of the Missile, producer: Hanoch Navon, script: Dubi Kroituro and Udi Lebel, November 2002). 7. Thus, for example, a bereaved father, one of many, whose two sons were killed in war wrote: “The deaths of my children did not come as a surprise. All my life I educated [them] for this, and now it is a very great moment for me to bless them both” (see “Lament for a Father” in Avinoam). 8. It became apparent that the general ideas about security embraced by the security establishment in the period preceding the war were flawed: the Bar Lev Line (like France’s Maginot Line before the Second World War, it was a static defense position along the length of the Suez Canal facing Egypt); that Egypt would not begin all‐out hostilities without first re‐arming; that Syria would not go to war without a lead from Egypt; a deep belief in the security afforded by the strategy achieved in the Six‐Day War of 1967; continuing disdain for the military capabilities of the Arab world (Carmel 677). 9. On 5 June 1982, the government launched a military campaign called “Peace in the Galilee.” Prime Minister Menahem Begin and Defence Minister Ariel Sharon ordered the IDF to cross the border into Lebanon and dismantle terrorist bases used as missile launching pads against Israel’s northern settlements. Despite the fact that the campaign was defined as a limited operation in terms of the amount of territory that the IDF would temporarily seize, forces in fact advanced to the outskirts of Beirut. While there was a general political consensus during the first week of military operations regarding the necessity for such action, increasing opposition was voiced in the ensuing weeks as the toll of casualties mounted (Carmel 682). 10. When the Israeli Government under Shimon Peres decided to bring an end to the war in Lebanon (1985), it was decided that the IDF would withdraw to a border security strip within Lebanon. The concentration of Hezbollah forces in the area resulted in many military casualties over the next few years. 11. If during the war in Lebanon the influence of activist bereaved parents was indirect; this time they gained attention because of widespread media activities, frequent meetings with the Defence Minister and his deputy, the President of Israel, eight additional government ministers and representatives of all the political parties in the Knesset. Through the use of widely distributed assistance from the European Union, they expanded the distribution of their information and became a body that contributed to the formulation of policy (information gained through personal interview; see also Ma‘ariv, 22 June 2001). 12. Platform of The Four Mothers (archives of Kibbutz Gadot: “Four Mothers” file). 13. Two areas in which relations in regard to the entire structure took place are communications and law. In the former, the government monopoly of communications policy came to an end; with the latter, liberal and individualistic values began to prevail in court decisions as well as a willingness to challenge the political arena over the allocation of social values. The sphere of the consumer was also undergoing radical change. The Israeli citizen was becoming a client and began to make growing claims on the state on all matters pertaining to the rights of the individual (Lebel, “Cracks in the Mirror”). 14. Undated letter given to the author by Mrs Lea Tsuriano. The letter was apparently sent to army newspapers in 1995 explaining the objectives behind the actions of the bereaved parents. 15. Lea Tsuriano, speaking before a gathering of bereaved parents at the grave of Shula Malt. Undated. The eulogy was given to the author by Mrs Tsuriano in March 1998. 16. See, for example, the Vinograd Committee Report headed by Judge Yaacov Vinograd, which was established in response to bereaved parent claims that their sons had been killed in a tragedy involving the snapping of a cable that tied them to the outside of a helicopter during an exercise. After innumerable petitions to the Supreme Court, the judges decided that an extra‐military investigative committee should examine the event. It was revealed to the public that there had been concerted efforts to cover it up and to ignore facts related to the instructions of the air force commander and those subordinate to him (Doron and Lebel). 17. Petition to the Supreme Court sitting as the High Court of Justice, no. 4537/96, Massoud and Aliza Sasson v. the Head of the General Staff and others. 18. An investigation of the event revealed that the explosion was the result of failure to follow safety instructions. Commanders of the company, regiment and brigade to which the soldiers belonged were not even aware of the existence of these safety measures. 19. A written indictment against Horev and other commanders was issued on 14 May 1996 for the crime of causing death by negligence (violation of clause 304 of the Criminal Law, 1977). 20. A remark attributed to David Ben‐Gurion, which has become a slogan found at almost all army bases in Israel. 21. For example, a report written by Reserve Colonel Moshe Givati, who investigated the incident of “friendly fire” in which two paratroopers were killed. The report was widely circulated in the press by bereaved parents (see Doron and Lebel). 22. In an exchange between Eli Ben Shem and Alon ben David on the nightly news programme “Mabat” on Israel Television’s First Channel, 5 February 1997. 23. Dudu Elharad, Yediot Aharanot, 31 January 1990, p. 3. 24. Said by Yael German, currently mayor of Herzliya in Sima Kadmon (“How Could I be Angry with Our Army, with the Commanders that Eyal Loved?”, Ma‘ariv, 27 November 1992). 25. Research on Israeli civil society shows that social movements and public campaigners employ two strategies to advance their interests: media and legal undertakings (see Lebel, “Legal‐Media Complex”). 26. According to Forum founders, all army representatives in the Israeli elite including members of the Chief of Staff’s office, members of the Knesset who were generals, the President of the State (Ezer Weizmann), previous Ministers of Defense supported the Forum and praised its establishment (interview by the author with Arye Nager, Tel Aviv, 10 February 1989). 27. Yoram Alper, father of Edan, killed in the helicopter tragedy, in an interview with Guy Benyovitz on Army Radio, 9 June 1997. 28. The parents operated in a “legally revolutionary” framework that had been initiated by the head of Israel’s Supreme Court, Aharon Barak. The ground of this innovative approach was the claim that “all matters can be judged” and the court began to intervene in matters it had not taken into its docket in the past, including straightforward security issues (see Segal). 29. Clause “b 5” in the revised amendment 33, compared to clause “b 2” in the original amendment 33.