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Information Effects in Uniform Price Multi-Unit Dutch Auctions

2016; Wiley; Volume: 83; Issue: 1 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1002/soej.12145

2325-8012

Joy Buchanan, Steven Gjerstad, David Porter,

Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies

Southern Economic JournalVolume 83, Issue 1 p. 126-145 Article Information Effects in Uniform Price Multi-Unit Dutch Auctions Joy Buchanan, Joy Buchanan George Mason University, Interdisciplinary Center for Economic Science, 4400 University Drive, Fairfax, VA 22030, USASearch for more papers by this authorSteven Gjerstad, Steven Gjerstad Chapman University, Economic Science Institute, One University Drive, Orange, CA 92866, USASearch for more papers by this authorDavid Porter, Corresponding Author David Porter Chapman University, Economic Science Institute, One University Drive, Orange, CA 92866, USAE-mail: dporter@chapman.edu; corresponding author.Search for more papers by this author Joy Buchanan, Joy Buchanan George Mason University, Interdisciplinary Center for Economic Science, 4400 University Drive, Fairfax, VA 22030, USASearch for more papers by this authorSteven Gjerstad, Steven Gjerstad Chapman University, Economic Science Institute, One University Drive, Orange, CA 92866, USASearch for more papers by this authorDavid Porter, Corresponding Author David Porter Chapman University, Economic Science Institute, One University Drive, Orange, CA 92866, USAE-mail: dporter@chapman.edu; corresponding author.Search for more papers by this author First published: 02 May 2016 https://doi.org/10.1002/soej.12145Citations: 6 Read the full textAboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditWechat Abstract We design a multi-unit descending-price (Dutch) auction mechanism that has applications for resource allocation and pricing problems. We address specific auction design choices by theoretically and experimentally determining optimal information disclosure along two dimensions. Bidders are either informed of the number of bidders in the auction, or know that it is one of two possible sizes; they also either know the number of units remaining for sale or are unaware of how many units have been taken by other bidders. We find that revealing group size decreases bids, and therefore revenue, if units remaining are not shown. When group size is unknown the price also falls if the number of units remaining is revealed. The most efficient and largest revenue outcome occurs when bidders are not provided information on either group size or units remaining. These laboratory results conform to some directional predictions from our theory, although overbidding is common. Citing Literature Volume83, Issue1July 2016Pages 126-145 RelatedInformation