Bounding equilibrium payoffs in repeated games with private monitoring
2017; Econometric Society; Volume: 12; Issue: 2 Linguagem: Inglês
10.3982/te2270
ISSN1933-6837
AutoresTakuo Sugaya, Alexander Wolitzky,
Tópico(s)Game Theory and Voting Systems
ResumoTheoretical EconomicsVolume 12, Issue 2 p. 691-729 Original ArticlesOpen Access Bounding equilibrium payoffs in repeated games with private monitoring Takuo Sugaya, Takuo Sugaya tsugaya@stanford.edu Graduate School of Business, Stanford UniversitySearch for more papers by this authorAlexander Wolitzky, Alexander Wolitzky wolitzky@mit.edu Department of Economics, MIT This replaces our earlier paper, "Perfect Versus Imperfect Monitoring in Repeated Games." For helpful comments, we thank Dilip Abreu, Gabriel Carroll, Henrique de Oliveira, Glenn Ellison, Drew Fudenberg, Michihiro Kandori, George Mailath, Hitoshi Matsushima, Stephen Morris, Ilya Segal, Tadashi Sekiguchi, Andrzej Skrzypacz, Satoru Takahashi, Juuso Toikka, Thomas Wiseman, the anonymous referees, and participants in several seminars. Search for more papers by this author Takuo Sugaya, Takuo Sugaya tsugaya@stanford.edu Graduate School of Business, Stanford UniversitySearch for more papers by this authorAlexander Wolitzky, Alexander Wolitzky wolitzky@mit.edu Department of Economics, MIT This replaces our earlier paper, "Perfect Versus Imperfect Monitoring in Repeated Games." For helpful comments, we thank Dilip Abreu, Gabriel Carroll, Henrique de Oliveira, Glenn Ellison, Drew Fudenberg, Michihiro Kandori, George Mailath, Hitoshi Matsushima, Stephen Morris, Ilya Segal, Tadashi Sekiguchi, Andrzej Skrzypacz, Satoru Takahashi, Juuso Toikka, Thomas Wiseman, the anonymous referees, and participants in several seminars. Search for more papers by this author First published: 26 May 2017 https://doi.org/10.3982/TE2270Citations: 10 AboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditWechat Abstract We provide a simple sufficient condition for the existence of a recursive upper bound on (the Pareto frontier of) the sequential equilibrium payoff set at a fixed discount factor in two-player repeated games with imperfect private monitoring. The bounding set is the sequential equilibrium payoff set with perfect monitoring and a mediator. 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