Task Force Eagle and the Battle of the Buses
2000; The MIT Press; Volume: 80; Issue: 2 Linguagem: Inglês
ISSN
0026-4148
Autores Tópico(s)Military and Defense Studies
ResumoIn September 1997, Task Force (TF) Eagle's 1st Infantry Division was wrapping up eight months of peace-enforcement operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina when it received a delay order from Stabilization Force (SFOR) headquarters. This operation was to serve the same purpose as a delay during combat, but it had no established tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP) for peace support operations (PSO). Multi-National Division-North (MND-N--TF Eagle --received the delay mission to buy for MultiNational Division-Southwest (MNDSW), which was stabilizing a dangerous political/police conflict in Banja Luka, Republic of Srpska (VRS), the government seat of elected VRS President Biljana Plavsic. The Delay Begins The Pale, VRS, shadow government, headed by Serb leader Momcilo Krajisnik, planned an aggressive demonstration with a renta-mob to upstage a political rally sponsored by the legal government. Reliable intelligence, confirmed by eyes-on information sources, reported that from 500 to 1,000 Serbs armed with clubs, rocks and liquor were boarding buses near Pale. Krajisnik, already in Banja Luka with his henchmen and special police, orchestrated local belligerents' activities. Political leaders and SFOR commanders were concerned that the fragile Plavsic government could not withstand an onslaught of manipulative, drunken Pale Serbs. The MND-SW commander had the resources to control the situation if TF Eagle could delay the Serb masses until the rally ended. When the delay fragmentary order to MND-N arrived, the task force quickly refocused forces conducting other PSO. However, coalition forces required prompting to react with the necessary speed. Between 20 and 40 Serb buses were moving north out of the French sector (MND-SE) into the MND-N area of operations (AOR). Initial orders were to take some time with the inspection, checking all buses, searching and confiscating weapons, then allowing the buses to move on. Since Pale-controlled media had painted the Serb's actions as a peaceful political rally, the commander's intent was to maintain legitimacy and prevent being accused of supporting one political group over another. Almost every bus contained 20-- to 40-year-old men who were drunk, aggressive and determined to get to Banja Luka quickly. The buses, driven by drunken drivers, moved at excessive speeds, usually in loosely organized convoys of from 5 to 15 vehicles. This dangerous situation threatened the small-unit leaders and soldiers occupying hastily constructed roadblocks. Support Requirements Because the buses could not transit Bosnian-Croat Federation territory, the Serbs had to remain within Srpska, which forced them through checkpoints at Zvornik, Brcko and Modrica. Also, many roads were not conducive to bus traffic. These factors allowed for a quick intelligence assessment that helped US forces take advantage of the terrain and lines of communications and establish support requirements: Delay the Pale Serbs in the AOR until 1800. * Maintain continuous contact with the buses. * Wear down the buses' drivers and occupants. * Establish no-penetration lines for certain periods, then if necessary, stop all movement. * Avoid decisive engagement and adhere to rules of engagement except as a last resort. * Establish centralized control with decentralized operations. * Conduct positive handoff of buses between coalition sectors. * Maximize use of terrain and obstacles. * Set up hasty roadblocks and strengthen them as permitted. * Mask tactical intent to the Serb population throughout the AOR. * Plan for nonlethal means of crowd control. * Provide prompt, accurate reporting using control measures, phase line crossings, passing checkpoints, occupying battle positions and engagements. * Establish both a mechanized and an air-assault reserve. …
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